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ESAAO  H, 


THERE  can  be  no 
Kope  of  progress  or 
freedom  for  the 
people  witKout  tne  un- 
restricted and  complete 
enjoyment  of  tne  right 
of  free  speech,  free  press 
and  peaceful  assembly. 


Gift  of 

IRA  B.  CROSS 


GIFT  OF 


7^ 


t  i 


THE  THEORY 


OF 


HUMAN  PROGRESSION 


BY 
PATRICK  EDWARD  DOVE 


A  bridged  hy 
JULIA  A.    KELLOGG 


NEW  YORK 

ISAAC   H.  BLANCHARD  COMPANY 

1910 


Copyright,  1910,  by 
ISAAC  H.  BLANCHARD  CO. 

New  York 


fl 


^^r^-" 


FOREWORD 

THE  purpose  of  this  abridgement  is  to  aid  the 
Propaganda  now  in  progress  for  a  reform  in 
our  land-tenure  in  line  with  the  ideas  of  Henry 
George:  as  promulgated  in  his  great  book,  '*  Progress  and 
Poverty/*  a  reform  generally  known  as  *'  The  Single 
Tax."  To  this  end  the  parts  of  the  work  upon  the  owner- 
ship of  natural  resources,  and  kindred  topics,  are  given 
nearly  in  full,  the  metaphysical  parts,  on  the  other  hand, 
being  given  only  with  sufficient  completeness  to  induce 
those  readers  who  are  interested  in  the  philosophy  of 
progress  to  have  recourse  to  the  original  for  themselves. 

Our  author  shows  clearly  that  land  is  naturally  com-\ 
mon  property  and  that  the  failure  to  see  this  and  to  ad- 1 
just  our  system  of  political  economy  to  its  truth  is  the/ 
supreme  cause  of  poverty  with  all  the  suffering  and  degraJ 
dation  that  poverty  entails. 

J.  A.  K. 

"  Slowly  comes  a  hungry  people;  as  a  lion  creeping  nigher 
Glares  at  one  that  nods  and  winks  behind  a  slowly-dying 
fire." 

Tennyson. 


447985 


THE  BOOK  AND  THE  AUTHOR 

Abridged  feom  Alexander  Harvey,  Editor. 

PATRICK  EDWARD  DOVE  was  a  Scotchman, 
born  at  Lasswade,  near  Edinburgh,  July  31, 
1815.  His  father  was  a  Lieutenant  Dove  of  the 
royal  navy.  The  families  of  both  parents  had  been  for 
generations  rich  and  prominent.  The  Doves  had  given 
many  officers  of  high  rank  to  the  navy  of  their  king,  and 
one  ancestor  had  been  bishop  of  Peterborough,  famous 
in  his  day.  Commander  Francis  Dove  settled  the  family 
in  Devonshire  in  1716. 

Patrick  Edward  received  a  good  education  in  his  own 
country  and  in  France.  From  the  French  Academy  he 
was  expelled  in  disgrace  for  leading  his  fellow-students 
in  an  open  insurrection  against  the  tutors.  On  leaving 
school  he  had  the  intention  of  goingj  into  the  navy,  but  he 
yielded  to  his  father's  wish  that  he  should  be  a  gentle- 
man farmer,  and  went  up  to  Scotland  to  learn  something 
of  husbandry.  He  led  practically,  however,  the  life  of  a 
gentleman  of  leisure,  reading  and  traveling,  making  sev- 
eral tours  on  the  continent  and  residing  for  some  years 
in  France. 

In  1840  he  came  into  his  property  and  the  next  year 
took  the  estate  called  **  The  Craig.** 

He  was  said  to  be  the  most  popular  landlord  in  Scot- 
land. But  this  landlord  did  not  believe  in  landlords.  Pie 
maintained  that  the  soil  of  a  nation  was  the  inheritance 
of  all  its  people.  He  was  never  weary  of  repeating  that 
rent    should    go    to    the    State    for    the    benefit    of  all. 


Also,  he  did  net  believe  in  the  game  laws.  He  had  no 
keeper  on  his  great  estate  and  no  poacher  was  ever  in- 
terfered with.  Anotlier  peculiarity  was  his  friendship  for 
Ireland.  He  stood  up  stoutly  for  the  Irish  peasantry 
and  denounced  Britain's  treatment  of  it. 

For  seven  years  he  lived  thus  happily  on  his  estate,  but 
in  1848  an  imprudent  investment  swept  away  his  fortune. 
Soon  after  that  he  married,  his  bride  being  penniless  like 
himself.  The  newly-wedded  couple  went  to  live  in  Darm- 
stadt, where  the  husband  studied  and  lectured  and  wrote. 
They  were  never  unprosperous. 

"  The  Theory  of  Human  Progression  **  was  the  first 
fruit  of  this  toil.  The  work  appeared  anonymously.  A 
limited  edition  was  published  in  1850,  both  in  London  and 
Edinburgh.  In  brief,  the  book  is  the  single-tax  theory 
elucidated  a  generation  in  advance  of  Henry  George. 
What  Dove  did  for  scholars,  George  achieved  for  the 
masses. 

Economic  works  were  not  widely  read  at  that  time. 
Nevertheless  Carlyle  read  and  praised  the  volume.  Sir 
William  Hamilton,  the  great  philosopher,  pronounced  it 
epoch-making,  and  our  own  Charles  Sumner  was  so  im- 
pressed by  it  that  he  circulated  many  copies  in  the  United 
States  and  persuaded  Dove  to  write  in  behalf  of  the 
emancipation  movement.  For  all  that  the  book  failed  to 
make  its  way  and  before  many  years  was  utterly  for- 
gotten. 

On  leaving  Germany  Dove  settled  in  Edinburgh  and 
soon  acquired  reputation  as  a  teacher  and  writer. 

The  latter  part  of  his  life  was  characterized  by  an  in- 
terest in  military  matters.  He  was  a  man  of  peace,  a  de- 
vout Christian  and  a  scholar,  yet  he  was  deeply  imbued 
with  the  idea  of  the  ultimate  necessity  of  social  revolu- 
tion. He  freely  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  masses  in 
their  own  interest  should  familiarize  themselves  with  the 


technicalities  of  warfare.  He  did  his  best  to  popularize 
this  sort  of  knowledge.  In  1848  he  produced  a  treatise 
on  the  Revolver  and  the  handling  of  firearms  generally. 
He  even  went  to  the  length  of  inventing  a  rifle  cannon 
which  was  commended  by  competent  authorities.  He  had 
command  also  of  a  rifle  corps  and  of  a  regiment  of  volun- 
teers which  he  drilled  and  equipped  himself.  He  became 
an  authority  on  the  militia. 

By  this  time  he  was  residing  in  Glasgow,  and  in  I860 
he  was  suddenly  stricken  with  paralysis.  Henceforth  he 
lived  mostly  a  retired  life  and  died  April  28,  1873. 

Note. — It  is  pleasant  to  know  that  he  lived  to  see  the  aboli- 
tion of  slavery  in  the  United  States,  which  he  had  foretold 
years  before  as  a  deduction  from  the  general  principles  of 
his  own  theory  of  the  progress  of  mankind. 


Dedication 

To 

MONSIEUR    VICTOR    COUSIN, 

Prof,  of  Philosophy  at  Paris. 

To  you  I  beg  leave  to  dedicate  the  following  Essay  on 
Human  Progression,  with  those  sentiments  of  esteem  and 
admiration  which  I  share  in  common  with  so  many  of  my 
countrymen.^ 

The  truth  I  endeavor  to  inculcate  is — That  credence  rules  the 
world — that  credence  determines  the  condition  and  fixes  the  des- 
tiny of  nations — that  true  credence  must  ever  entail  with  it  a 
correct  and  beneficial  system  of  society,  while  false  credence 
must  ever  be  accompanied  by  despotism,  anarchy,  and  wrong — 
that  before  a  nation  can  change  its  condition  it  must  change 
its  credence;  that  change  of  credence  will  of  necessity  be  ac^ 
companied  sooner  or  later  by  change  of  condition:  and  conse- 
quently, that  true  credence,  or  in  other  words  knowledge,  is  the 
only  means  by  which  man  can  work  out  his  wellbeing  and  ame- 
liorate his  condition  on  the  globe. 

The  question  is  often  asked.  What  is  the  use  of  philosophy? — 
nor  is  the  answer  difficult.  Next  to  religion,  philosophy  is,  of 
all  known  causes,  the  element  that  most  powerfully  tends  to  de- 
termine the  condition  of  a  country.  It  is  a  power — a  power  so 
vast  that  we  are  scarcely  likely  to  overestimate  its  effects;  and, 
though  it  must  ever  be  unable  to  solve  the  great  questions  in 
which  our  race  is  involved,  it  may,  by  uprooting  political  super- 
stitions and  false  religions,  exercise  an  influence  that  no  calcu- 
lation can  compute.  The  theories  of  one  generation  become  the 
habitual  credence  of  the  next;  and  that  habitual  credence,  trans- 
formed into  a  rule  of  action,  is  erelong  realized  as  a  palpable 
fact  in  the  outward  condition  of  society.  And  thus  it  may  be 
truly  said — As  the  philosophy  of  a  country  is,  so  its  condition 
will  be. 


To  no  one  could  I  dedicate  a  work  intended  to  elucidate  these 
principles,  so  appropriately  as  to  yourself — to  you,  Sir,  wha 
have  labored  so  earnestly  and  so  well  to  give  to  your  country- 
men a  correct  system  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  and,  through  them, 
to  communicate  to  Europe  a  scheme  of  natural  morals  which 
must  erelong  bear  a  rich  and  most  beneficial  harvest. 

Accept  Sir,  the  dedication  of  this  work  as  a  tribute  of  re- 
spect from  your  sincere  admirer. 

The  Authoe. 


CONTENTS 

chapter  'ag's 

Introduction  —  Preliminary    Explanation 

OF  THE  Nature  of  Political  Science       .  1 

I.  The   Elements  of   Human   Progression        .  7 

II.  The    Theory   of    Man's   Intellectual   Pro- 
gression       68 

III.  The   Theory   of   Men's   Practical   Progres- 
sion        95 

IV.  Sentiments  of  the  Human  Mind  which  Have 

Ruled  Society 133 


INTRODUCTION 

PRELIMINARY   EXPLANATION    OF    THE    NATURE    OP 
POLITICAL    SCIENCE 

BEFORE  attempting  to  exhibit  an  argument  to 
establish  the  possibility  of  a  science  of  politics 
it  is  necessary  to  define  exactly  what  we  mean 
by  such  a  science. 

Science  is  nature  seen  by  the  reason,  and  not  merely 
by  the  senses.  Science  exists  in  the  mind,  and  in  the 
mind  alone.  Wherever  the  substantives  of  a  science 
may  be  derived  from,  or  whatever  may  be  their  charac- 
ter, they  form  portions  of  a  science  only  as  they  are 
made  to  function  logically  in  the  human  reason.  Un- 
less they  are  connected  by  the  law  of  reason  and  con- 
sequent, so  that  one  proposition  is  capable  of  being 
correctly  evolved  from  two  or  more  other  propositions, 
called  the  premises,  the  science  as  yet  has  no  existence, 
and  has  still  to  be  discovered.  Logic,  therefore,  is  the 
universal  form  of  all  science.  It  is  science  with  blank 
categories,  and  when  these  blank  categories  are  filled 
up,  either  with  numbers,  quantities,  and  spaces,  as  in 
the  mathematical  sciences,  or  with  qualities  and  powers 
of  matter,  as  in  the  physical  sciences,  mathematics  and 
physics  take  their  scientific  origin,  and  assume  an  or- 
dination which  is  not  arbitrary.  Science,  then,  wher- 
ever it  is  developed,  is  the  same  for  the  human  intellect 
wherever  that  intellect  can  comprehend  it.  It  abolishes 
diversity  of  credence,  and  re-establishes  unity  of 
credence. 

1 


Politics  is  the  science  of  Equity,  and  treats  of  the 
relations  of  Men  in  equity. 

It  professes  to  develop  the  laws  by  which  human 
actions  ought  to  be  regulated,  in  so  far  as  men  inter- 
fere with  each  other. 

In  position  it  is  posterior  to  political  economy  and 
anterior  to  religion.  Its  principal  substances  are: 
Man,  Will,  Action,  Duty,  Crime,  Rights,  Wrongs  and 
Property;  and  the  general  problem  is  to  discover  the 
laws  which  should  regulate  the  voluntary  actions  of 
men  towards  each  other,  and  thereby  to  determine  what 
the  order  of  society  in  its  practical  construction  and 
arrangement  ought  to  be. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  the  earth  cannot  function  in 
political  economy  until  it  is  transformed  into  a  power 
of  production  having  a  value.  And,  to  carry  it  for- 
ward into  the  science  of  politics,  all  that  is  requisite 
is  to  apply  the  axiom,  "  an  object  is  the  property  of 
its  creator " ;  so  that  when  political  economy  has  de- 
termined, by  a  scientific  method  which  is  not  arbitrary, 
what  value  is  created  and  who  creates  this  value,  poli- 
tics takes  up  the  question  where  political  economy  had 
left  it,  and  determines,  according  to  a  method  which 
is  not  arbitrary,  to  whom  the  created  value  should  be 
allocated. 

In  man,  the  subject,  lies  the  whole  question  of  hu- 
man liberty;  in  the  earth,  the  object,  the  whole  ques- 
tion to  human  property:  and  political  science,  if  it  be 
really  and  truly  a  branch  of  knowledge  must  assume 
to  determine,  not  merely  the  laws  that  should  regulate 
an  individual  but  any  number  of  individuals  asso- 
ciated together.  Science  can  acknowledge  no  arbitrary 
distinctions.  If  there  be  a  rule  at  all,  it  must  be 
general,  and  therefore  political  science  must  assume 
to  determine  the  principles   upon   which  political  so- 

2 


cieties  ought  to  be  constructed,  and  also  to  determine 
the  principles  on  which  human  laws  ought  to  be  made. 

And  as  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  God 
has  made  truth  the  fountain  of  good,  it  may  perhaps 
be  fairly  expected,  that  if  ever  political  science  is 
fairly  evolved  and  really  reduced  to  practice,  it  will 
confer  a  greater  benefit  on  mankind  and  prevent  a 
greater  amount  of  evil,  than  all  the  other  sciences. 

Political  science  is  peculiarly  man-science;  and 
though,  as  yet,  the  subject  is  little  or  no  better  than 
a  practical  superstition,  we  propose,  in  the  present 
volume,  to  exhibit  an  argument,  affording,  we  think, 
sufficient  ground  for  believing  that  it  will,  at  no  dis- 
tant period,  be  reduced  to  the  same  form  and  ordina- 
tion as  the  other  sciences. 

Of  course,  anything  like  a  unity  of  credence  is  at 
present  altogether  out  of  the  question.  Such  a  unity 
is  neither  possible  nor  desirable.  It  could  only  be  a 
superstition — that  is,  a  credence  without  evidence.  To 
produce  conviction,  therefore,  is  not  so  much  our  hope, 
as  to  endeavor  to  open  up  the  questions  that  really  re- 
quire solution. 

The  first  question  in  every  branch  of  knowledge  is 
its  method.  Without  method  there  can  be  no  stand- 
ard of  appeal — no  means  of  determining  whether  a 
proposition  is  true  or  false.  Whatever  system  may 
be  practically  adopted,  that  syst;em  necessarily  in- 
volves a  theory ;  and  the  question  is,  "  Is  there  any 
possibility  of  discovering  or  evolving  a  natural  theory 
which  is  not  arbitrary.?"  Is  there  in  the  question  of 
man's  political  relation  to  man,  a  truth  and  a  falsity 
as  independent  of  man's  opinion  as  are  the  truths  of 
geometry  or  astronomy?  A  truth  there  must  be  some- 
where, and  in  the  present  volume  we  attempt  to  exhibit 
the  probability  of  its  evolution. 

8 


Our  argument  is  based  on  the  theory  of  progress, 
or  the  fact  of  progress;  for  it  is  a  fact  as  well  as  a 
theory.  And  the  theory  of  progress  is  based  on  the 
principle,  that  there  is  an  order  in  which  man  not  only 
does  evolve  the  various  branches  of  knowledge,  but  an 
order  in  which  man  must  necessarily  evolve  the  various 
branches  of  knowledge.  And  this  necessity  is  based 
on  the  principle,  that  every  science  when  undergoing 
its  process  of  discovery  is  objective,  that  is,  the  object 
of  contemplation;  but  when  discovered  and  reduced 
to  ordination  it  becomes  subjective,  that  is,  a  means 
of  operation  for  the  discovery  and  evolution  of  the 
science  that  lies  logically  beyond  it,  and  next  to  it  in 
logical  proximity. 

If  this  logical  dependence  of  one  science  on  another 
could  be  clearly  made  out  for  the  whole  realm  of  knowl- 
edge, it  would  give  the  outline,  not  only  of  the  classi- 
fication of  the  sciences,  but  of  man's  intellectual  his- 
tory— or  his  intellectual  development — where  the  word 
development  means,  not  the  alteration  of  man's  nature, 
but  the  extension  of  his  knowledge,  and  the  consequent 
improvement  of  his  mode  of  action,  entailing  with  it 
the  improvement  of  his  condition. 

And  if  the  law  of  this  intellectual  development  can 
be  made  out  for  the  branches  of  knowledge  which  have 
already  been  reduced  to  ordination,  it  may  be  carried 
into  the  future,  and  the  future  progress  of  mankind 
may  be  seen  to  evolve  logically  out  of  the  past  prog- 
ress. 

In  attempting  to  classify  the  sciences,  and  to  show 
that  they  evolve  logically  out  of  each  other,  we  do 
not  profess,  in  the  slightest  degree,  to  discourse  on 
the  matter  of  the  sciences  themselves,  further  than 
their  primary  propositions  are  concerned ;  but  on  their 
form,  their  position,  their  actual  development  (as  com- 

4 


monly  acknowledged),  and  on  the  lesson  which,  as  a 
whole,  they  must  ultimately  teach. 

Every  function,  of  whatever  character,  or  wherever 
found,  we  assume  to  present  itself  under  the  form  of 

An  Agent,         An  Object,         A  Product; 
and  this  division  belongs,  in  no  respect,  to  any  one 
particular  science,  but  to  all.     While  a  science  is  un- 
dergoing its  process  of  discovery,  this  logical  ordina- 
tion of  its  parts  cannot  be  made  on  sufficient  grounds. 

Under  these  circumstances,  we  have  given  only  a 
general  estimate,  sufficient  to  direct  the  line  of  argu- 
ment without  trespassing  on  special  departments,  or 
intruding  opinions  on  subjects  that  lie  beyond  our 
province.  To  construct  an  argument  that  should  be 
in  the  main  correct,  is  all  we  could  hope  to  achieve. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    ELEMENTS    OP    HUMAN    PROGRESSION 

A  DISTINCTION  must  necessarily  be  drawn  be- 
tween the  science  of  politics  itself,  and  its  ap- 
plication to  Man. 

The  science  is  purely  abstract  and  theoretic.  It 
professes  only  to  determine  the  trueness  or  falsity  of 
certain  propositions  which  are  apprehended  by  the 
reason. 

But  when  we  admit  the  fact  that  man  is  a  moral 
being,  the  theoretic  dogma  becomes  transformed  into 
a  practical  rule  of  action,  which  lays  an  imperative 
obligation  on  man  to  act  in  a  particular  manner,  and 
to  refrain  from  acting  in  another  manner.  The  theo- 
retic truth  determines  the  relations  of  moral  beings, 
and  consequently  determines  what  ought  to  be  their 
conditions  with  regard  to  each  other ;  the  practical  rule 
determines  what  man  may,  or  may  not,  do  justly,  and 
consequently  what  the  political  construction  of  civil 
society  ought  to  be. 

The  science  of  politics  then  treats  of  equity,  and  of 
the  relations  of  men  in  equity.  All  questions  of  politics 
may  be  discussed  under  the  heads  of  liberty  and  prop- 
erty, bearing  in  mind  always  that  political  science 
treats  exclusively  of  the  relations  of  men. 

An  exposition  of  the  laws  of  liberty  should  determine 
the  moral  rules  that  preside  over  the  actions  of  men  in 
the  matter  of  mutual  interference;  while  an  exposition 

7 


of  the  laws  of  property  should  determine  the  moral 
rules  that  preside  over  men  in  their  possession  of  the 
earth. 

But  politics,  taking  into  consideration  only  the  rela- 
tions of  men,  cannot  take  cognizance  of  any  duty  which 
would  still  be  a  duty  if  only  one  man  were  in  existence. 
The  duties  of  religion  that  relate  to  the  Creator  are  be- 
yond and  above  the  sphere  of  politics ;  and  so  also  are 
the  duties  of  benevolence,  which  belong  to  another  cate- 
gory than  equity. 

It  is  only  as  men  may  act  towards  each  other  equitably 
or  unequitably  that  we  consider  their  relations.  An  act 
of  benevolence  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  either  equitable 
or  unequitable.  The  recipient  has  no  equitable  claim 
to  the  bounty;  and  what  the  donor  gives,  he  gives  not 
to  satisfy  the  law  of  equity,  but  a  higher  law,  which 
appHes  to  him  as  an  individual,  but  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  apply  (by  law  and  force)  to  a  society.  The 
relations  of  men  in  society  must  first  be  constructed  on 
the  principle  of  equity,  and  then  each  individual  may 
exercise  his  benevolence  as  occasion  may  require. 
Were  there  no  equity  there  could  be  no  benevolence,  be- 
cause no  man  could  know  what  was  his  own,  or  what 
he  had  a  right  to  give.* 

Liberty  signifies  the  condition  in  which  a  man  uses 
his  powers  without  the  interference  of  another  man. 
It  differs  from  freedom  in  the  circumstance  of  amount. 
Freedom  appears  to  signify  the  absolute  condition  in 
which  interference  by  human  will  is  altogether  re- 
moved. Liberty  appears  capable  of  indefinite  varia- 
tion :  from  the  smallest  amount  that  the  most  oppressed 

*  For  instance,  the  kings  of  England  gave  lands  (which  be- 
longed to  the  crown,  that  is,  to  the  nation)  to  private  individuals. 
The  question  then  is,  had  the  incumbent  monarch  a  right  to 
alienate  those  lands  in  perpetuity  from  the  nation? 

8 


slave  has,  to  the  utmost  and  most  perfect  amount,  which 
then  becomes   freedom.* 

Liberty,  in  its  most  extensive  signification,  involves 
the  whole  powers  or  conditions  of  men  which  can  be 
affected  by  the  agency  of  other  men;  but  liberty  has 
also  a  more  restricted  signification,  which  confines  it  to 
liberty  of  thought,  speech,  publication,  and  action. 
In  the  former  sense,  life  is  involved  in  liberty;  in  the 
latter  sense,  life  assumes  a  separate  standing,  and  be- 
comes a  category  by  itself.  And  again,  the  moral 
feelings  may  be  interfered  with  by  slander  or  defama- 
tion; and  this  gives  rise  to  another  category  of  poli- 
tics, namely,  reputation. 

Life,  liberty,  property,  andi  reputation,  are  then 
viewed  as  the  possessions  of  men;  and  the  laws  which 
should  regulate  men  in  their  mutual  action  on  each 
other,  with  regard  to  life,  liberty,  property,  and  repu- 
tation, have  to  be  determined  by  political  science. 

The  genuine  essence  of  all  liberty  is  non-interfer- 
ence, and  to  secure  universal  non-interference  is  the 
first  and  most  essential  end  of  all  political  associa^ 
tion. 

But  interference  may  be  from  the  government  and 
law,  quite  as  much  as  from  the  individual,  and  inter- 
ference by  law  is  incomparably  more  prejudicial  to  a 
community  than  any  amount  of  casual  interference 
that  would  be  likely  to  take  place  in  a  civilized  coun- 

Liberty  presents  itself  under  the  form  of  liberty  of 
thought,  liberty  of  speech,  liberty  of  publication  and 
liberty  of  action,  and  political  liberty  evolves  chrono- 

*  Such  at  all  events  would  seem  to  be  the  sense  usually 
affixed  to  the  two  terms.  But,  in  that  case,  the  word  freedom 
would  advantageously  supplant  liberty  in  several  passages  of 
the  New  Testament. 

9 


logically  In  the  order  of  thought,  speech,  publication 
and  action.  To  secure  this  liberty  by  law  and  to  make 
it  exactly  equal  for  all  individuals  in  the  eye  of  the 
law  is  the  great  end  of  political  civilization. 

Time  was  in  Briton  when  men  attempted  to  con- 
trol each  other  in  their  thoughts,  and  unless  a  man 
renounced  his  creed  he  was  tortured  by  the  ruthless 
arm  of  power  and  carried  to  the  stake.  Feeling  is  not 
under  man's  control,  and  therefore  they  have  allowed 
each  other  to  escape  from  profession  upon  that  sub- 
ject, at  the  same  time  taking  advantage  of  the  nerves 
for  the  infliction  of  as  much  pain  as  man  could  reason- 
ably  devise. 

Speech  is  still,  and  properly  enough,  made  a  matter 
of  superintendence.  A  man  may  injure  another  by  his 
speech,  and  consequently  speech  does  come  within  the 
limits  of  politics.  Immense  changes,  however,  have 
taken  place  in  the  laws  that  relate  to  the  expression 
of  thought,  more  especially  on  political  subjects. 
Freedom  of  speech,  and  of  public  speech,  and  in  any 
number  of  speakers  or  auditors,  is  one  of  the  first  es- 
sentials of  true  liberty. 

Freedom  of  discussion  is  the  great  turning-point  of 
liberty,  the  first  great  field  of  battle  between  the  na- 
tion and  the  rulers.  If  the  nation  gain  the  day,  its 
progress  is  onward  towards  freedom ;  but  if  the  rulers 
gain  the  day,  the  nation  must  submit  to  tyranny,  and 
must  groan  under  the  licentious  hand  of  a  self-con- 
stituted government.  So  soon  as  freedom  of  speech 
is  prevented,  no  other  resource  than  revolution  can 
possibly  remain,  and  the  men  who  might  not  speak 
with  tongues  must  have  recourse  to  weapons  of  more 
powerful  argument.  Where  there  is  freedom  of  dis- 
cussion, there  is  always  hope  for  the  nation.  The  gov- 
ernment may  enforce  its  privileges  for  a  time;  but  so 

10 


certainly  as  freedom  of  discussion  is  preserved,  so  cer- 
tainly must  those  privileges  be  curtailed,  one  after 
another,  and  freedom  of  action  must  eventually  com- 
plete the  evolution. 

Writing  and  publication  are  as  essential  as  speech. 
The  censorship  is  an  abomination  altogether  incom- 
patible with  freedom. 

England  has  almost  achieved  her  emancipation  in 
the  matter  of  thought,  speech,  and  writing;  but  very 
considerable  changes  still  remain  to  be  effected  before 
liberty  of  action  can  be  said  to  be  achieved.  There 
are  actions  which  are  naturally  crimes,  and  which 
never  can  be  anything  else  than  crimes — robbery  and 
murder,  for  instance.  Such  actions  are  criminal  an- 
terior to  all  legislation,  and  independently  of  any 
human  enactment  whatever.  They  are  unjust  from 
their  nature,  and  we  can  predicate,  a  priori,  that  they 
are  unjust,  as  well  as  prove,  a  posteriori,  by  their  ef- 
fects that  they  are  eminently  prejudicial. 

Such  actions,  and  such  actions  alone,  is  the  govern- 
ment of  a  country  competent  to  prohibit,  and  to  class 
as  crimes.  But  let  us  observe  what  takes  place  in 
actual  legislation.  No  action  can  be  less  criminal 
than  the  purchase  of  the  productions  of  one  country, 
and  the  transport  of  those  productions  to  another 
country,  for  the  legitimate  profit  of  the  trader  and  the 
convenience  of  the  inhabitants.  The  government,  how- 
ever, passes  a  law  that  such  transport  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed, and  that  the  man  who  still  persists  in  it  shall  be 
called  a  criminal,  and  treated  as  such.  The  govern- 
ment thus  creates  a  new  crime,  and  establishes  an  ar- 
tificial standard  of  miorality,  one  of  the  most  pernicious 
things  for  a  community  than  can  possibly  exist,  as  it 
leads  men  to  conclude  that  acts  are  wrong  only  be- 
cause they  are  forbidden,  and  also  enlists  in  favor  of 

11 


the  offender  those  feelings  which  ought  ever  to  be  re- 
tained in  favor  of  the  law. 

The  restriction  would  be  a  crime  if  it  were  only  a 
restriction,  and  prevented  the  international  exchange 
of  produce.  But  what  are  its  effects?  It  calls  into 
existence  a  set  of  men  who  devote  themselves  by  pro- 
fession to  infringe  the  law.  The  act  of  transport  is 
perfectly  innocent  and  highly  beneficial ;  but  so  soon 
as  it  is  prohibited  by  law,  the  man  who  engages  in  it 
is  obliged  to  use  the  arts  of  deception  and  concealment, 
and  from  one  step  of  small  depravity  to  another,  sinks 
lower  and  lower,  until  at  lasts  he  employs  violence, 
and  does  not  hesitate  to  murder.  The  act  of  transport 
in  which  the  smuggler  is  engaged  is  one  of  the  most 
legitimate  modes  of  exercising  the  human  powers. 
Every  kind  of  advantage  attends  it.  First,  it  is  profit- 
able to  the  foreign  seller.  Second,  it  is  profitable  to 
the  merchant.  Third,  it  is  profitable  to  the  carrier. 
Fourth,  it  is  profitable  to  the  home  consumer;  for  if 
the  goods  were  not  more  highly  esteemed  by  him  than 
the  money,  he  w^ould  not  purchase  them  at  the  price. 
And  fifth,  it  is  injurious  to  no  one.  The  first  three 
profits  are  money  profits ;  the  fourth,  a  profit  of  con- 
venience and  gratification.  But  the  moral  effects  are 
no  less  beneficial.  First,  the  man  who  is  engaged  in 
lawful  trading  is  well  employed,  and  likely  to  be  a 
peaceful  and  good  citizen.  Second,  the  fact  of  pur- 
chasing from  a  foreigner  gives  the  trader  an  Interest 
in  that  foreigner,  and  eminently  tends  to  break  down 
those  national  antipathies  which  have  descended  from 
the  darker  ages.  The  buyer  and  the  seller  are  a  step 
further  from  war  every  bargain  they  conclude  in  hon- 
est dealing;  and  the  iniquitous  doctrine,  that  a 
"  Frenchman  Is  the  natural  enemy  of  an  Englishman," 
must  every  day  find  its  practical  refutation  in  the  sub- 

12 


stantial  benefite  of  track.  First,  then,  the  prohibitory 
law  sacrifices  all  those  benefits,  and  the  law  of  restric- 
tion diminishes  them  to  the  full  extent  of  its  restriction. 
But  what  takes  place?  The  contraband  trader  is 
created  by  the  prospect  of  gain  arising  from  the  in- 
crease of  price.  The  increase  of  price,  instead  of  be- 
ing a  benefit  to  the  legal  trader,  is  his  curse.  It  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  a  premium  held  out  to  the 
smuggler  to  evade  the  custom  and  to  undersell  the  legal 
trader,  thereby  tending  constantly  to  reduce  his  profit, 
as  well  as  to  diminish  his  sale.  But  this  is  not  all.  It 
is  a  premium  to  the  reckless  to  break  the  law ;  and  the 
man  who  lives  in  the  habitual  breach  of  the  law  soon 
becomes  a  ruined  character  and  a  ruined  man. 

There  are,  perhaps,  few  courses  of  life  that  end  so 
certainly  in  ruin  as  the  smuggler's  and  the  poacher's; 
and  yet,  barring  the  law,  the  acts  in  which  they  are  en- 
gaged are  perfectly  innocent  and  perfectly  legitimate. 
The  man  who  takes  to  smuggling  or  to  poaching  as 
the  means  of  gaining  his  bread,  is  almost  as  certainly 
beyond  recovery  as  the  drunkard  or  the  thief.  It  has 
been  our  lot  to  see  some  of  these  characters,  and  to  ob- 
serve the  influence  of  their  pursuits,  and  we  can  say 
no  otherwise  than  that  we  have  been  shocked  to  see 
men  of  energy  and  great  natural  endowment  destroyed 
by  the  temptations  which  the  law  had  so  superfluously 
placed  in  their  way.  When  once  the  habit  of  breaking 
the  law  is  established,  the  distinction  is  overlooked  that 
would  not  otherwise  have  been  forgotten,  namely,  that 
there  is  a  right  and  a  wrong  independently  of  the  law ; 
and  the  man  who  commenced  by  shooting  a  hare  in  his 
cabbage-plot  finishes  by  shooting  a  keeper,  and  expiat- 
ing the  off^ence  on  the  gallows. 

We  do  not  mean  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  shoot 
everywhere  and  anywhere,  but  we  mean  that  the  act  of 

13 


shooting  the  game,  the  legal  crime,  is  not  a  crime,  and 
never  can  be  such;  and  that  the  consequences  are  in  a 
great  measure  the  fruits  of  the  law,  and  must  be 
charged  against  it. 

Let  us  take  another  case.  The  Creator,  in  his 
bounty,  has  distributed  rivers  over  our  country;  and 
the  rivers  of  Scotland,  at  a  certain  season,  teem  (or 
did  teem  till  the  sea  nets  were  established)  with  abun- 
dance of  food  in  the  shape  of  salmon,  which  are  thus 
brought,  as  it  were,  to  the  very  door  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  uncultivated  moors  of  the  same  district  abound 
with  wild  birds,  to  an  extent  perhaps  unequalled  in  the 
world.  It  might  be  supposed  reasonable  that  these 
gifts  of  Providence  should  be  of  some  service  to  the 
stated  inhabitants  who  labor;  and  as  corn  land  is  not 
so  plentiful  in  the  north  as  in  the  south.  Providence  ap- 
pears to  have  thrown  the  salmon  and  the  grouse  into 
the  scale  to  furnish  the  necessary  food  for  man.  But 
what  has  the  law  done?  To  shoot  a  grouse  is  not 
merely  a  trespass  on  the  occupier  of  the  land,  but  a 
crime,  a  criminal  act,  a  thing  that  must  be  punished, 
a  deed  for  which  the  half-starved  Highlander  can  be 
haled  to  prison,  and  shut  up  as  an  offender  against 
the  laws  of  his  country,  when  that  country  had  reduced 
him  to  the  verge  of  starvation.  And  to  spear  a  sal- 
mon, a  fish  from  the  sea  that  no  man  may  ever  have 
seen,  and  cannot  possibly  recognize,  is  also  attended 
with  pains  and  penalties  for  killing  the  fish  that 
Heaven  had  sent  for  food. 

Let  us  consider  that  Providence  has  made  some  ani- 
mals susceptible  of  domestication.  A  man  takes  the 
trouble  of  rearing  a  lamb  or  a  bullock;  and  by  every 
principle  of  equity  they  are  his — at  least  he  has  the 
claim  of  preference,  which  no  other  man  has  a  right 
to  invade.     Were  any  man  to  take  this  sheep  or  ox 

U 


for  his  own  use,  we  see  at  once  the  impropriety  of  the 
action.  First,  it  is  an  interference  with  another  man 
without  a  justifying  reason ;  and  second,  were  such  in- 
terference allowed  generally,  the  domestication  of  ani- 
mals would  cease,  and  food  would  become  so  much  the 
less  abundant. 

In  this  case  there  Is  a  breach  of  equity  involved, 
and  the  taking  is  a  crime.  But,  on  the  other  hand. 
Providence  has  made  other  animals  incapable  of  domes- 
tication, and  distributed  them  over  the  country,  ap- 
parently for  the  very  purpose  of  affording  food,  and 
this  is  in  the  very  districts  that  are  not  so  highly  fav- 
ored with  the  cereal  productions  of  the  soil.  Such, 
in  Scotland,  are  the  salmon  and  the  grouse;  and  these, 
at  one  period,  were  so  abundant  as  to  afford  a  staple 
article  of  food,  and  even  now  are  sufficiently  numerous 
to  feed  a  large  portion  of  the  population  from  August 
to  December.  And  what  has  the  law  done  with  regard 
to  these  bountiful  gifts  of  Providence?  The  law  has 
made  it  a  crime  for  the  poor  man  to  touch  them.  The 
poor  man  now  can  never  legally  have  either  a  salmon 
or  a  grouse ;  and  in  the  very  parishes  where  those  ani- 
mals are  suffi^ciently  numerous  to  feed  the  whole  resi- 
dent pauper  population,  the  poor  may  take  their 
choice  between  starvation  and  expatriation. 

Now,  in  the  case  of  the  animals  that  are  not  capa- 
ble of  domestication,  there  is  an  important  distinction 
to  be  observed.  To  shoot  one  of  these  animals  is  not 
a  breach  of  equity — that  is,  the  wild  one  is  no  man's 
property,  while  the  domesticated  one  must  practically 
be  regarded  as  such ;  and  therefore,  as  the  wild  ani- 
mals could  not  be  regarded  as  property — for  property 
must  be  recognizable — the  law  has  made  it  a  crime  for 
the  poor  man  to  take  them  for  his  use.  And  the  privi- 
leged classes,  not  content  with  all  the  land,  and  nearly 

15 


all  the  offices  of  the  state,  have  usurped  the  fowls  of 
the  air,  and  the  fish  of  the  sea,  that  never  owned  a 
master  save  the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth. 

It  may  be  considered  that  the  question  is  of  no 
great  importance;  neither  perhaps  is  it,  'compared 
with  the  weightier  question  of  the  land;  but  we  have 
taken  it  as  an  illustration  of  the  principle  of  legisla- 
tion as  regards  action.  As  regards  action  England 
is  not  a  free  country,  and  the  sooner  the  nation  is  con- 
vinced of  the  fact,  the  better  for  the  community.  And 
by  free  country,  we  mean  a  country  in  which  every 
man  has  a  legal  right  to  do  everything  that  is  not 
naturally  a  crime.  Where  a  man  can  do  what  is  a 
crime,  freedom  is  no  more.  But  the  law  may  be  the 
criminal  as  well  as  the  nation;  and  injustice  from  the 
law  is  quite  as  unjust,  and  ten  times  more  detrimental, 
than  injustice  from  the  individual. 

With  regard  to  the  crime,  the  real  criminality  of 
the  action,  measured  either  by  reason  or  by  Scripture, 
and  with  regard  to  the  detriment,  measured  by  the 
consequences,  let  us  ask  the  following  question,  and  let 
any  man  answer  it  on  his  conscience: — Here  are  ani- 
mals provided  by  nature  in  abundance — they  cannot 
follow  even  the  laws  of  property  established  in  all 
analogous  cases,  inasmuch  as  they  are  not  recogniza- 
ble, and  cannot  be  claimed  as  ever  having  been  in  pos- 
session. These  animals  are  distributed  widely,  and 
spread  throughout  the  country  in  a  manner  to  afford 
a  convenient  supply  to  the  various  districts.  The  fish 
arrive  from  the  sea  in  their  highest  condition,  and  af- 
ford good  and  wholesome  food.  The  birds  are  of  the 
poultry  kind,  distinguished  for  the  quality  and  quan- 
tity of  their  flesh,  and  for  their  powers  of  reproduc- 
tion,— characters  that  have  always  drawn  a  line  of 
demarcation  between  them  and  the  birds  of  prey,  and 

16 


pointed  them  out  for  food.  These  animals  are  dis- 
tributed by  nature  throughout  the  habitable  districts 
where  cultivation  must  be  limited,  and  where  animal 
food  must  be  required,  both  from  the  scarcity  of  corn 
and  from  the  nature  of  the  climate.  Such,  at  least,  is 
the  judgment  of  Providence,  as  manifested  in  the  works 
of  creation,  and  in  the  harmony  which  is  everywhere 
perceptible  between  the  productions  of  a  region  and 
their  suitability  to  man.  These  districts  (from  the 
monopoly  of  the  land)  are  now  inhabited  by  a  race 
reduced  to  the  lowest  state  of  poverty,  and  in  many 
cases  to  a  degradation  that  would  class  them  with  the 
savages.  Let  us  ask,  which  is  the  crime.?  That  these 
people  should  take  the  animals  which  nature  has  pro- 
vided, or  that  the  privileged  classes  of  the  country 
should  pass  a  law  to  prevent  their  touching  a  single 
one  of  them,  under  the  pain  of  fine  and  imprisonment.? 
And  be  it  remarked,  these  animals  are  not  property, 
even  by  the  wording  of  the  enactment,  which  does  not 
punish  for  interference  with  property,  but  for  inter- 
ference with  animals,  which  the  privileged  classes  wish 
to  monopolize  for  other  purposes.  Hundreds  of  tons 
of  fish,  and  thousands  of  boxes  of  birds,  are  annually 
taken  away  for  sale  from  these  districts,  and  yet  not 
one  of  the  poor  of  the  inhabitants  may  touch  a  feather, 
nor  finger  a  scale,  without  being  guilty  of  a  crime; 
and  from  one  year's  end  to  the  other,  the  mass  of  the 
population  have  not  the  legal  right  to  take  one  single 
meal  from  a  bird  without  danger  of  imprisonment,  nor 
from  a  fish  without  danger  of  a  fine.  Is  it  a  crime, 
or  is  it  not,  that  the  privileged  classes  should  pass 
such  a  law?  And  is  it  a  crime,  or  is  it  not,  that  the 
nation  should  allow  such  laws,  and  such  privileged 
classes,  to  continue? 

Again,  the  manufacturers   of   certain   articles,   who 

17 


are  certainly  not  guilty  of  crime,  or  even  of  the  shadow 
of  offence,  are  not  allowed  to  carry  on  the  neces- 
sary operations  except  under  the  lock  and  key  of  the 
state  officials ;  and  the  regulations  are  of  so  stringent 
a  character,  that  if  they  were  not  partially  relaxed  by 
the  excisemen,  the  business  could  scarcely  be  carried 
on  without  incurring  penalties  from  the  law. 

The  soap  manufacturer  is  certainly  engaged  in  the 
production  of  an  article  that  benefits  the  community; 
and  even  the  distiller  (for  whom  as  much  cannot  be 
said)  is  entitled  to  carry  on  his  business  on  the  same 
footing  as  every  other  man.  The  legislators  make  a 
pretext  of  revenue ;  and  revenue  of  course  is  necessary, 
although  not  to  the  extent  to  which  revenue  is  raised 
in  Britain.  But  when  the  necessity  of  revenue  is 
granted,  is  it  at  all  necessary  that  the  man  who  is  en- 
gaged in  the  lawful  manufacture  of  an  article  required 
by  the  community,  should  be  obliged  to  give  notice  to 
a  state  official  that  he  is  about  to  perform  this,  that, 
and  the  other  process  of  his  manufacture,  and  be  es- 
teemed a  criminal  worthy  of  punishment  if  that  notice 
is  forgotten  or  neglected? 

All  these  restrictions  are  the  remnants  of  the  more 
exclusive  privileges  claimed  and  enforced  by  the  privi- 
leged classes  of  other  times,  and  the  remnants  of  that 
political  superstition  which,  next  to  religious  super- 
stition, every  man  ought  to  lend  his  aid  to  destroy. 

The  pretext  that  revenue  is  necessary,  is  one  that 
would  scarcely  be  entitled  to  attention,  were  it  not  ac- 
companied by  the  injustice  and  detriment  that  follow 
in  its  train.  Revenue,  so  far  as  necessary  for  the  ac- 
tual requirements  of  a  state,  need  form  a  very  trifling 
portion  of  a  nation's  expenditure.  The  whole  cost  of 
the  administration  of  justice,  and  of  every  other  valu- 
able service  that  the  state  really  requires,  is  a  mere 

18 


trifle  in  comparison  to  the  actual  revenue,  and  to  the 
still  greater  cost  occasioned  by  the  enactments  of  the 
legislature.  But  as  revenue  may  be  derived  from  two 
sources,  the  privileged  classes  have  taken  care  that  it 
shall  be  derived  from  that  source  In  which  they  are 
not  so  immediately  interested. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  liberty  of  human  actions; 
and  one  of  the  forms  of  that  action  is  labor.  The  ma- 
terial objects  of  the  creation  possess  a  value  of  ex- 
change; that  is,  people  are  willing  to  pay  for  them. 
But  labor  also  possesses  a  value  of  exchange,  and 
people  are  willing  to  pay  for  it  as  well  as  for  the 
material  objects  that  constitute  the  globe  and  its  In- 
habitants. Let  It  be  observed  that  labor  Is  essentially 
private  property.  It  has  a  value,  and  the  land  has 
no  more  than  a  value. 

Let  it  also  be  observed  that  the  land  Is  not  essentially 
private  property,  and  that  naturally  one  man  has  as 
much  right  to  the  land  as  another. 

Labor  on  the  one  hand,  and  land  on  the  other,  are 
susceptible  of  taxation. 

The  privileged  classes,  In  the  earlier  stages  of  so- 
ciety, had  all  the  land  and  all  the  labor.  The  lord 
was  the  lord  not  only  of  the  land,  but  of  the  labor  of 
those  who  were  engaged  in  the  useful  arts  of  Industry. 
In  the  course  of  time  the  serfs  obtained  a  small  por- 
tion of  their  rights,  and  towns  were  formed  where  the 
citizens  could  carry  on  their  labor  with  a  certain  de- 
gree of  advantage  to  themselves,  and  with  a  certain 
degree  of  emancipation  from  the  licentious  will  of  the 
lord.  Taxation  could  consequently  be  on  the  land  of 
the  lord,  or  on  the  labor  of  the  townsman,  for  all  the 
townsman's  capital  was  originally  the  produce  of  his 
labor. 

Let  it  be  observed,  that  when  the  land  Is  taxed,  no 

19 


man  is  taxed;  for  the  land  produces,  according  to  the 
law  of  the  Creator,  more  than  the  value  of  the  labor 
expended  on  it,  and  on  this  account  men  are  willing 
to  pay  a  rent  for  land.  But  when  the  privileged 
classes  had  monopolized  the  land,  they  called  it  theirs 
in  the  same  seiise  in  which  labor  is  supposed  to  belong 
to  the  laborer;  and,  although  the  absurdity  of  the 
proposition  is  sufficiently  apparent,  the  laborer  was 
glad  enough  to  escape  with  even  a  small  portion  of  his 
liberty,  and  to  rejoice  that  he  could  call  his  life  and 
his  family  his  own. 

But  then  the  lords  of  the  land  were  the  rulers  and 
the  makers  of  the  laws,  and  the  imposers  of  taxation, 
and  it  was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  should 
tax  the  land.  The  king  required  money,  and  various 
persons  about  kings  in  all  ages  require  money,  and  of 
course  the  only  choice  in  the  matter  of  taxation  is  be- 
tween labor  and  the  land. 

To  tax  labor,  then,  becomes  a  matter  of  the  most 
palpable  necessity,  and  those  who  have  been  divested 
of  almost  every  single  particle  of  earth  or  sea  that 
could  be  of  any  benefit  to  them,  must  also  be  made  to 
bear  the  burdens  of  the  state,  and  to  pay  for  the  sup- 
port of  a  government  that  was  of  little  use  to  the  com- 
munity, and  that  only  existed  by  the  right  of  the 
strongest,  or  the  consent  of  superstition.* 

The  principle  of  taxing  labor  is  only  a  remnant  of 
the  serfdom  of  the  darker  ages,  and  it  has  been  con- 
tinued in  this  country  by  the  ingenious  device  of  what 

*  A  bad  government  is  of  no  use  to  the  community  immedi- 
ately, but  mediately  and  prospectively  the  most  stringent  des- 
potism in  the  world  is  of  the  highest  importance  and  of  the 
greatest  value.  Man  must  apparently  progress  through  cen- 
tralization; and  a  bad  government,  provided  it  centralizes,  is  the 
foundation  of  after  changes  most  beneficial  to  mankind.     The 

20 


are  termed  indirect  taxes,  by  which  labor  is  taxed,  al- 
though the  laborer  is  only  made  acquainted  with  the 
fact  by  the  distress  that  periodically  oppresses  him. 

The  man  who  is  poisoned  without  his  knowledge 
does  not  die  the  less  certainly  for  his  ignorance,  and 
the  people  who  are  taxed  do  not  suffer  the  less  because 
the  taxes  happen  to  be  imposed  in  such  a  manner  that 
the  unthinking  and  the  ignorant  do  not  perceive  those 
taxes  in  the  price  they  pay  for  almost  every  article  of 
consumption.  All  the  real  harm  is  done  to  a  country 
as  effectually  by  indirect  taxation,  as  if  every  penny 
were  paid  out  of  the  day's  wages  to  the  tax-gatherer 
of  the  state.  But  the  rulers  know  full  well  that  if  the 
tax-gatherer  were  to  present  himself  at  the  pay-table 
of  the  laborer,  at  the  counter  of  the  shopman,  at  the 
office  of  the  merchant,  and  at  the  ship  of  the  seafaring 
carrier,  the  doom  of  labor  taxation  would  be  sealed, 
and  the  country  would  not  tolerate  so  glaring  an  in- 
justice. And  the  indirect  system  of  taxation  is  em- 
ployed, not  that  it  prevents  the  conimunity  from  suf- 
fering, but  that  it  prevents  the  community  from  dwell- 
ing on  the  cause  of  their  suffering,  and  thereby  retards 
a  revolution  against  the  privileged  classes. 

Such  are  the  circumstances  that  have  led  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  customs  and  excise;  and  the  total  and 
complete  abolition  of  those  two  branches  of  interfer- 
ence is  one  of  the  necessary  changes  that  must  take 
place  before  this  country  can  be  free  and  before  this 

good  part  of  the  Russian  government  is  its  centralization.  In 
the  general  history  of  man,  it  seems  requisite  that  central  mon- 
archy should  destroy  the  privileges  of  multiple  aristocracy;  and 
Russia  is  gradually  effecting  this  great  change.  The  sympathy 
manifested  towards  the  Poles  is  questionable,  inasmuch  as  the 
great  majority  of  Poles  were  ruled  by  individual  aristocrats 
instead  of  by  laws. 

21 


country  can  enjoy  that  commercial  liberty,  without 
which  a  periodical  crisis  must  necessarily  be  the  lot  of 
the  laborer,  the  merchants  and  the  manufacturer.  It 
is  true  that  the  total  abolition  of  the  customs  appears 
chimerical  at  present;  yet,  if  we  consider  the  history 
of  the  changes  that  have  already  taken  place,  and  seize 
their  abstract  form  (the  only  form  that  contains  real 
instruction),  we  have  sufficient  ground  to  hope,  not 
only  for  the  abolition  of  every  species  of  tax  upon 
labor,  but  for  the  recovery  of  each  man's  natural 
property.  So  certainly  as  this  country  continues  to 
progress,  so  certainly  must  every  restraint  be  removed 
from  every  action  that  is  not  a  crime;  and  the  cus- 
toms' laws  can  no  more  be  perpetuated,  if  the  present 
liberty  of  discussion  continues,  than  restraints  upon 
discussion  could  be  perpetuated  after  men  had  learnt 
to  think  for  themselves,  and  to  form  their  convictions 
according  to  the  evidence  before  them. 

The  Protestant  creed  introduced  a  very  important 
change  in  the  credence  of  the  country  in  the  matter 
of  religion. 

The  Romanists  always  professed  to  slaughter  men 
to  the  glory  of  God.  The  Protestants,  on  the  con- 
trary, abandoned  the  high  ground  of  sacrifice  to  the 
Deity,  and  substituted  the  more  rational  idea  of  sac- 
rifice to  the  King.  The  unfortunate  Covenanter,  who 
was  shot  or  decapitated,  was  not  an  offering  to  the 
Deity,  but  an  offering  to  the  King;  and  the  difference 
was  of  immense  importance  to  the  country,  although 
of  no  particular  consequence  to  the  Covenanter.  So 
soon  as  legislation  for  men's  thoughts  was  conceived 
to  be  for  man,  and  not  for  God,  men  began  to  inquire 
whether,  after  all,  the  King  had  really  the  right  to 
legislate  to  such  an  extent.  And  as  knowledge  in- 
creased, they  began  to  relax  their  principles  a  little, 

22 


and  to  think  that  the  deprivation  of  civil  privileges, 
would  be  punishment  sufficient  for  the  offence  of  think- 
ing differently  from  the  sect  in  power. 

The  modification  still  goes  on,  and  measure  after 
measure  is  abolished,  until  at  last  the  professors  of  dif- 
ferent creeds  almost  begin  to  think  that  they  can  in- 
habit the  same  country  without  persecuting  each  other 
on  account  of  their  religion. 

The  last  remnant  of  this  religious  superstition  that 
once  played  so  prominent  a  part  in  Britain,  Is  now  to 
be  found  in  the  taxation  of  nonconformists ;  and  the 
church-rates  and  the  official  distinction  between  the 
various  sects  are  the  last  representatives  of  that  sys- 
tem of  legislation  that  lit  the  fires  of  Smithfield,  and 
sent  Claverhouse  and  his  dragoons  to  murder  the  hill- 
side peasant  and  to  torture  the  differently  thinking 
Presbyterian. 

But  what  is  the  principle  that  has  so  modified  the 
laws  of  Britain?  Whence  comes  it  that  men  should 
have  so  singularly  changed  their  opinions  in  the  course 
of  a  century  or  two? 

It  is  perfectly  evident  that  justice  does  not  vary 
from  age  to  age.  Justice  is  the  same  from  the  be- 
ginning of  world  to  the  time  that  man  shall  change 
his  constitution. 

An  act  of  justice  can  no  more  alter  its  character 
than  the  diameter  of  the  circle  can  alter  its  relation 
to  the  circumference.  What  was  just  yesterday  is 
just  to-day,  was  just  a  thousand  years  ago,  and  will 
be  just  a  thousand  years  to  come. 

How  then  does  it  happen  that  so  strange  a  modi- 
fication should  have  come  over  the  credence  of  our  race, 
and  how  does  it  happen  that  men  should  legislate  so 
differently. 

The  credence  has  changed  with  the  acquisition  of 


knowledge,  and  the  legislation  has  changed  with  the 
credence. 

Men  have  discovered  that  legislators  have  no  right 
to  legislate  for  credences,  and  thus  the  last  remnants 
of  such  legislation  are  obliged  to  appear  under  an- 
other name,  and  to  assume  a  false  guise  that  they 
may  be  allowed  to  continue  a  few  years  longer. 

For  the  man  animal,  food  is  the  first  necessity;  but 
for  the  man  mental,  credence  according  to  evidence  is 
the  first  correct  law  of  his  intellectual  nature.  Food 
is  one  of  the  conditions  of  existence;  and,  until  it  can 
be  procured  in  tolerable  quantity,  and  with  some  de- 
gree of  certainty,  a  community  cares  little  about  the 
mind,  and  allows  the  question  of  free  thought  to  re- 
main in  abeyance. 

When  a  community  begins  to  emerge  from  barbar- 
ism, and  legislation  assumes  a  definite  form,  everything 
is  legislated  for.  Food,  thought,  speech,  action,  prop- 
erty, in  all  their  various  forms,  are  all  made  sub- 
ject of  enactment;  and  men  thus  endeavor  to  improve 
the  world  that  God  made,  by  passing  laws  to  amend 
the  order  of  nature.  The  first  necessity  for  the  com- 
munity is  to  have  some  small  opportunity  of  procuring 
food,  and  when  the  necessary  conditions  are  obtained 
(which  involve  some  degree  of  liberty),  men  turn 
their  attention  to  other  subjects,  according  to  the 
character  of  their  theological  belief.  The  religious  im- 
pulses of  our  nature  require  satisfaction,  perhaps,  be- 
fore any  other  portion  of  the  mental  constitution ;  and 
as  men  must  have  some  kind  of  theological  credence, 
right  or  wrong,  they  believe  anything  rather  than  re- 
main in  doubt.  And  as,  where  there  is  no  evidence, 
there  can  be  no  truth  and  no  error,  but  mere  arbitrary 
superstition,  the  state  has  generally  established  some 
form  of  credence  by  law,  and  committed  the  care  of 

24 


the  superstition  to  the  priests.  But  there  does  happen 
to  be  a  true  religion  as  well  as  an  indefinite  number  of 
superstitions;  and,  after  the  revival  of  learning,  when 
the  truth  began  to  break  on  men's  minds,  that  religion 
was  not  a  matter  of  mere  arbitrary  church  authority, 
but  a  real  matter  of  truth  and  falsehood,  in  which  life 
and  death  were  involved,  the  Christianity  of  the  Bible 
came  into  collision  with  the  established  superstitions 
of  the  Papal  priesthood,  and  a  struggle  was  commenced 
which  began  by  the  maximum  of  persecution,  and 
ended,  in  this  country  at  least,  in  the  maximum  of 
liberty  of  thought. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  a  country 
is  in  the  same  circumstances  before  a  law  has  been 
called  into  existance,  and  after  its  abolition.  Before 
the  law  is  enacted  men  are  naturally  free,  but  when  the 
law  has  been  abolished  men  are  legally  free.  A  country, 
arrived  at  complete  freedom  after  the  various  trans- 
formations of  superstition  and  injustice,  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  a  country  where  legislation  has 
only  commenced.  The  actual  laws  that  exist  in  both 
cases  might  perhaps  be  the  same;  but  in  the  one  case 
they  are  the  stepping-stones  to  an  indefinite  series  of 
legislative  acts,  and  in  the  other  case  they  are  the  per- 
manent records  of  a  nation's  final  judgment.  England, 
before  men  legislated  for  thoughts,  and  England  after 
men  have  legislated  for  thoughts,  and  abolished  such 
legislation,  is  in  very  different  circumstances;  inas- 
much as  it  may  now  be  reckoned  a  matter  of  ascer- 
tained truth,  that  legislation  for  matters  of  belief  is 
pre-eminently  prejudicial,  as  well  as  unjust.  And  the 
probability  of  new  legislation  on  the  subject  can 
scarcely  be  contemplated. 

Where  rulers  govern  by  power,  and  not  by  the  en- 
lightened choice  of  the  nation,  they  are  a  party  op- 

25 


posed  to  the  nation.  On  the  one  hand  is  the  nation 
and  the  national  interest;  on  the  other  hand  is  the 
government  and  the  interest  of  the  individuals  con- 
nected with  it.  The  more  powers  the  rulers  have,  the 
less  liberty  the  people  have;  and  the  more  land  and 
privilege  the  rulers  have,  the  less  wealth  have  the  popu- 
lation. Now  wealth  and  power  are  exactly  what  men 
are  desirous  of  possessing;  and  as  rulers  are  men,  it 
is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  they  dip  their  fingers 
into  every  man's  dish,  equitably  or  unequitably,  and 
monopolize  the  best  things  that  happen  to  be  going. 
The  land,  of  course,  either  in  kind  or  in  some  other 
form,  falls  to  the  lot  of  the  rulers  and  their  coadjutors 
— the  nobles  and  the  priests.  The  cultivation  of  the 
land  (the  labor),  instead  of  also  falling  to  the  lot  of 
the  privileged  classes,  becomes  the  portion  of  the 
people. 

But  excessive  privileges  are  much  easier  maintained 
against  a  weak  people  than  against  a  strong  one ;  and 
as  the  people  can  only  be  strong  by  knowledge,  virtue, 
and  combination — knowledge,  virtue,  and  combination 
are  in  little  favor  with  despotic  governments. 

Political  knowledge  (that  is,  a  knowledge  of  their 
rights  and  interests)  is  carefully  excluded  from  the 
mass  of  the  population ;  and  as  political  knowledge 
grows  out  of  discussion  about  social  welfare,  as  well  as 
out  of  the  thoughtful  toil  of  the  author,  both  discus- 
sion and  authorship  are  subjected  to  partial  or  total 
prohibiten.  The  most  frantic  blasphemies  will  find  a 
readier  license  for  publication  than  a  sober  treatise 
on  the  public  welfare;  and  a  philosophical  denial  of 
all  right  and  wrong  whatever,  will  be  more  tolerable 
than  an  inquiry  into  the  foundations  of  the  rulers' 
privileges.  The  most  infamously  immoral  production 
is  less  likely  to  be  scrutinized  than  a  dissertation  on 

26 


political  economy;  and  an  association  for  murdering, 
torturing,  and  expatriating  the  population,  would  be 
more  readily  authorized  than  an  association  for  for- 
warding the  rights  of  the  people. 

Anything  in  the  shape  of  superstition  (that  is,  unin- 
qulrlng  credence)  Is  esteemed  proper  enough;  but  the 
moment  men  begin  to  Inquire  and  to  seek  reasons,  that 
moment  the  government  Is  alarmed,  and  that  moment 
must  means  be  put  In  operation  to  stop  the  course  of 
knowledge. 

The  government  must  either  give  up  its  privileges, 
or  keep  the  people  in  slavery  with  regard  to  expression 
of  opinion ;  and  the  stringent  laws  of  the  continental 
powers,  relative  to  every  kind  of  political  meeting,  are 
no  more  than  measures  of  precaution,  analogous  to 
those  practised  by  the  pirate  who  scuttles  his  prize 
(with  Its  crew)  as  a  measure  conducing  to  his  safety.* 

The  objects  of  a  despotic  government  must  neces- 
sarily be  distinguished  from  Its  means.  The  objects 
are  wealth  and  power;  the  means,  tyranny  and  super- 
stition. Tyranny  Is  power  without  right,  and  super- 
stition Is  credence  without  evidence.  The  governor 
of  a  country.  In  the  earlier  stage  of  legislation. 
Is  the  strongest  man  In  the  country;  and,  by  conver- 
sion, the  strongest  man  in  the  country  Is  the  governor. 
Now,  one  strongest  man,  who  has  the  opportunity  of 
taking  a  thousand  weaker  men  In  detail.  Is  stronger 

*  The  pirate  is  rationally  correct ;  that  is,  his  act  does  conduce 
to  his  immediate  safety,  for  dead  men  tell  no  tales,  and  sunk 
ships  cannot  appear  in  evidence.  And  despotic  governors  are 
also  rationally  correct;  that  is,  an  ignorant  and  superstitious 
population  has  less  power  and  less  desire  for  liberty  than  a 
population  that  thinks  for  itself,  and  has  free  opportunity  of 
expression.  The  remote  consequences,  however,  are  sometimes 
overlooked.  When  the  truth  is  discovered,  the  pirate  is  hanged, 
and  the  ruler  guillotined. 

27 


than  the  whole  thousand  if  he  can  prevent  them  from 
combining.  This  is  the  concise  explanation  of  the 
theory  of  a  despotic  government.  A  noble,  a  chief, 
even  a  bishop,  may  become  a  sovereign,  and  remain  so 
as  long  as  he  has  power  or  dexterity  to  prevent  the 
people  from  combining.  As  soon  as  they  combine  he 
is  no  longer  the  strongest,  and  his  wealth  as  well  as 
his  power  is  in  a  fair  way  to  depart.  It  therefore 
becomes  a  matter  of  serious  consideration  for  him  to 
discover  and  put  in  practice  those  means  that  tend  to 
secure  his  power,  and  prevent  his  enemies  (his  sub- 
jects)  from  combining. 

In  the  first  place,  he  must  have  more  wealth;  and, 
as  he  cannot  have  it  by  his  own  honest  industry  he 
must  have  it  by  the  industry  of  others,  or  by  the  mo- 
nopoly of  those  natural  objects  which  other  men  must 
possess  as  the  conditions  of  their  existence. 

Land  is  the  great  source  of  wealth;  forests  and 
fisheries  are  also  tolerable;  mines  and  minerals  are 
capable  of  yielding  a  revenue;  and,  in  addition  to 
these,  comes  the  taxation  of  labor. 

These  sources  of  wealth,  therefore,  must  be  turned 
to  account,  and  the  governor  of  course  does  not  neglect 
them.  Wealth  is  power  for  the  ruler,  as  knowledge  is 
power  for  the  people;  and  the  more  wealth  the  ruler 
has,  the  more  power  has  he  for  taking  advantage  of 
his  subjects.  Wealth,  therefore,  is  both  a  means  and 
an  end, — a  means  of  getting  more  wealth  and  of  get- 
ting more  power.  Wealth  gives  birth  to  a  standing 
army,  and  a  standing  army  gives  birth  to  more 
power,  as  it  enables  the  ruler  to  apply  his  principles 
more  extensively  and  with  greater  security. 

But  if  a  people  were  to  combine  against  any  stand- 
ing army  that  is  likely  to  exist,  the  ruler  would  no 
longer  be  a  ruler,  and  the  army  would  no  longer  be  an 

28 


army.  It  therefore  becomes  a  matter  of  serious 
thought  for  the  ruler  to  obviate  the  tendencies  towards 
combination. 

There  are  two  or  three  kinds  of  combination. 

The  combination  of  national  antipathy,  which  may 
exist  where  there  is  abundance  of  ignorance.  Also 
religious  combination,  which  by  no  means  advances 
freedom  as  a  matter  of  necessity.  The  Crusades*  ex- 
hibited this  kind  of  combination ;  also  the  union  of  the 
Presbyterians  of  Scotland,  and  the  puritans  of  Eng- 
land. They  had  hold  of  the  truth,  and,  though  they 
had  scarcely  yet  learnt  to  view  it  in  its  true  light,  they 
progressed  immensely  towards  freedom.  They  did 
confound  civil  and  religious  liberty ;  but  notwithstand- 
ing, it  is  to  them,  under  God,  that  we  owe  the  preser- 
vation of  the  cause  of  liberty  in  this  country. 

A  third  kind  of  combination  is  for  the  purpose  of 
overthrowing  an  evil  that  presses  on  the  feelings, 
thoughts  and  interests  of  men.  This  combination  is 
a  mere  reaction  against  pressure. 

But  there  is  another  kind  of  combination,  and  a 
far  more  important  one  for  the  welfare  of  the  world: 
the  combination  of  knowledge  and  reason.     Knowledge 

*  Absurd  as  the  Crusades  were  in  themselves,  they  were  of 
the  highest  value  to  Europe;  in  fact  it  seems  that  whatever  the 
temporary  evils  attendant  on  any  human  condition,  that  condi- 
tion was  a  phase  of  progress,  calculated  to  leave  society  in  a 
better  state  than  it  found  it.  This  principle  is  applicable  also 
to  the  first  French  Revolution.  It  was  a  fearful  scene  when 
viewed  individually  But  if  we  look  to  the  condition  of  France 
before  the  revolution,  and  again  after  the  revolution,  we  cannot 
deny  that  its  effects  were  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  country. 
Those  who  attend  merely  to  the  revolution  and  its  horrors,  are 
like  those  who  go  to  see  a  criminal  executed  without  asking  the 
reason  of  his  execution,  or  inquiring  into  the  reasonableness  of 
the  laws  which  demand  his  execution.  The  French  Revolution 
was  produced  by  the  laws  of  nature.     Who  made  those  laws? 

29 


IS  credence  based  on  sufficient  evidence;  and  reason  is 
the  power  of  perceiving  consequences,  and  inferring 
antecedents.  Without  reason  man  would  only  be  a 
higher  kind  of  ape;  as  it  is,  he  is  a  spirit  and  an 
immortal. 

Man  has  an  intellect  as  well  as  a  bodily  frafne,  and 
this  intellect  has  its  laws  and  its  requirements.  Ob- 
servation is  its  food,  reason  is  its  process  of  digestion, 
and  truth  is  its  circulating  fluid,  without  which  it 
degenerates  and  dies.  Truth  makes  the  mind  strong, 
ignorance  makes  It  weak,  and  error  infects  it  with 
disease.  Knowledge  is  not  only  power,  it  is  strength 
— strength  of  the  mind,  health,  and  life.  To  obliterate 
this  strength,  therefore,  is  the  object  of  the  despotic 
ruler.  If  the  people  are  strong,  the  despot  must  be 
weak;  but  the  legitimate  ruler  Is  so  much  the  stronger 
as  the  people  are  stronger.  When  the  rulers  and  the 
nation  are  In  opposite  scales,  the  less  weight  the  people 
have,  the  more  easily  are  they  outweighed;  but  when 
both  are  in  the  same  scales,  the  heavier  they  both  are 
the  better  for  both,  and  the  worse  for  those  who  are 
opposed  to  them.  In  a  free  country,  where  law  was 
absolutely  supreme  and  really  equitable,  every  man 
would  feel  the  ruler  to  be  a  portion  of  himself,  and 
would  lend  his  arm  or  his  aid  to  further  the  ends  of 
justice. 

In  a  despotism,  superstition  takes  the  place  of 
knowledge,  and  the  fear  of  suffering  helps  to  procure 
an  unwilling  obedience. 

The  ruler  Is  the  wolf,  the  people  are  the  flock,  and 
the  lawyers  and  priests  are  the  foxes  who  prepare  the 
flock  for  slaughter. 

When  the  priesthood  lose  their  influence,  an  army 
must  be  resorted  to,  and  physical  tyranny  and  central- 
ization must  do  the   work    of    superstition.       At    all 

30 


hazards,  the  people  must  be  kept  down,  or  the  game  of 
despotism  is  lost. 

Mere  superstition,  however,  is  insufficient  to  enslave 
a  people  that  has  commercial  intercourse  with  other 
nations.  So  long  as  the  country  can  be  surrounded 
with  a  barrier,  and  free  communication  prevented, 
superstition  may  do  its  work  tolerably  well,  and  a 
nation  may  remain  in  much  the  same  state  for  an 
indefinite  period.*  When,  for  a  thousand  years,  the 
sun  rises  every  day  upon  similar  conditions,  it  is  by 
no  means  wonderful  that  change  should  not  take  place. 
In  the  political  as  well  as  the  physical  world,  the  con- 
ditions must  be  changed  before  we  can  look  for  a 
change  in  the  phenomena.  Change  the  conditions, 
and  some  change  or  other  will  be  exhibited  in  the  con- 
sequent results.  For  those  who  have  the  land  and  the 
privilege,  every  change  is  dangerous ;  and  the  invari- 
able tendency  of  the  privileged  classes  to  oppose 
change  is  only  a  prudent  exercise  of  foresight. 

One  of  the  most  important  changes  in  the  condition 
of  a  people  is  free  intercourse  with  strangers.  Inter- 
change of  thought  and  opinion  takes  place,  informa- 
tion is  given  and  received,  new  arts  are  learnt  and 
communicated,  and  something  analogous  to  a  chem- 
ical effervescence  takes  place  between  the  two  people, 

*  We  have  only  to  look  at  Spain  to  see  how  effectually  super- 
stition eradicates  even  an  aspiration  after  freedom.  Let  it  be 
remembered  that  a  few  centuries  since  Spain  was  second  to  no 
country  in  Europe  in  the  extent  of  her  political  power.  What 
is  she  now,  and  what  has  superstition  made  her?  "The  masses 
care  no  more  for  a  constitution  than  the  Berber  or  Oriental; 
with  them  this  thing  of  parchment  is  no  reality,  but  a  mere 
abstraction,  which  they  neither  understand  nor  estimate.  The 
people  do  not  want  their  laws  to  be  changed,  but  to  have  them 
fairly  administered.  Their  only  idea  of  government  is  despot- 
ism."— Ford's  Spain,  p.  862. 

SI 


who  are  thus  mutually  excited  to  a  state  of  social 
ferment.  But  not  only  are  nations  stimulated  by 
intercourse  with  others ;  it  appears  to  be  a  law  of  ani- 
mal development,  that  the  mixture  of  races  produces 
a  higher  and  a  better  type  than  either  of  the  originals, 
and  the  finest  races  are  those  in  whose  elements  the 
original  types  have  almost  disappeared.  Races  of 
men  may,  at  the  same  time,  be  so  mingled  as  to  pro- 
duce a  lower  type,  and  this  law  also  extends  to  the 
lower  animals ;  but  while  two  races,  already  low,  may 
be  injudiciously  crossed,  to  the  detriment  of  the  pro- 
geny, there  seems  little  reason  for  doubt  that  the 
intermixture  of  national  blood,  where  the  races  are  of 
a  higher  character,  is  conducive  to  the  physical  per- 
fection of  mankind.  The  races  of  western  Europe^ 
that  now  take  the  pre-eminence  in  the  world,  are  com- 
plex, and  the  result  of  many  amalgamations,  The 
south  of  Britain,  especially,  which  produces  men  prob- 
ably inferior  to  none  on  the  whole  surface  of  the  globe, 
is  peopled  by  a  race  resulting  from  many  tribes  who 
successively  invaded  the  shores,  and  left  a  greater  or 
less  impress  on  the  character  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
Spaniard  and  the  Frenchman  are  also  the  results  of 
mixed  blood ;  and,  though  the  kingdom  of  Spain  has 
sunk  into  insignificance  from  the  effects  of  supersti- 
tion and  tyranny,  the  Spaniard  is  a  high  type  of  the 
human  species,  and  only  wants  truth  and  freedom  to 
enable  him  to  play  a  distinguished  part  in  the  desti- 
nies of  the  world.  When  England  and  France  were 
as  superstitious  and  as  enslaved  as  Spain,  Spain 
was  perhaps  the  most  powerful  kingdom  in  Europe: 
but  since  Spain  did  not  progress  in  freedom,  she  has 
naturally  sunk  into  every  kind  of  licentiousness;  and 
the  Spanish  race,  with  all  its  immorality  and  reckless- 
ness of  bloodshed,  is  a  living  evidence  of  what  kings 

S2 


and  priests  can  do  with  a  nation,  when  the  nation  does 
not  destroy  their  influence  in  time.  Had  Spain  estab- 
lished freedom  of  thought,  instead  of  torturing  and 
expatriating  her  industrious  inhabitants,  she  might 
now  have  been  a  second  England,  with  wealth  and 
power  beyond  any  other  continental  country.  Free- 
dom of  thought  is  now  evolving  in  Spain ;  and  if  a 
moderate  tyranny  could  be  established,  to  consolidate 
the  disjointed  elements  of  the  country,  Spain  might 
still  progress.  But  freedom  of  thought  is  now  neces- 
sary; and  if  any  attempt  be  made  to  curtail  it,  the 
progress  of  revolution  may  go  on  for  years  and  years, 
until  worn  out  by  anarchy,  and  the  credences  of  the 
rising  generation  running  counter  to  the  old  supersti- 
tions, some  old  adventurer  may  seize  the  reins  of  gov- 
ernment, and  exhibit  Spain  under  an  entirely  new 
aspect.  That  the  present  rulers  will  continue  is  almost 
an  impossibility. 

Knowledge  is  credence  based  on  sufficient  evidence, 
and  reason  is  the  power  of  perceiving  consequences, 
and  of  inferring  antecedents.  The  combination  of 
knowledge  and  reason  is  the  great  moving  power 
destined  to  emancipate  the  world.  It  is  the  only 
ground  of  hope  for  the  unprivileged  classes,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  it  Is  a  sure  ground  of  hope;  and  the 
more  rapidly  knowledge  Increases,  the  more  rapidly 
will  its  all-powerful  influence  be  made  apparent  to  the 
world.  Correct  credence  is  absolutely  essential  to  the 
human  race,  before  that  race  can  know  and  work  out 
its  own  wellbeing. 

The  elements  of  this  correct  credence  are,  1st,  The 
Bible.  Sd,  A  correct  view  of  the  phenomena  of  mate- 
rial nature.  3d,  A  correct  philosophy  of  the  mental 
operations. 

1st,  The  Bible.       So  far  from   the  Bible  being  in 

38 


opposition  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  it  is  the  great 
emancipator  of  the  reason. 

Independently  of  all  considerations  of  a  hereafter, 
the  Bible  has  an  eminent  effect  in  regulating  the  con- 
ditions of  men  of  this  world. 

The  Bible  strikes  at  the  root  of  persecution,  by  re- 
moving the  false  credence  on  which  it  is  based ;  it 
sanctions  no  persecution,  but  teaches  men  that  they 
are  made  of  -one  flesh,  and  that  they  are  personally 
responsible  to  their  Creator. 

2d,  A  correct  view  of  natural  phenomena.  In  this 
two  things  are  implied:  1st,  A  knowledge  of  natural 
phenomena  (science)  ;  and,  2d,  The  attribution  of 
those  phenomena  to  their  true  cause.  If  God  be  the 
creator  of  the  universe,  God  is  also  the  physical  gov- 
ernor of  the  universe;  and  as  such  we  must  regard  the 
occuiTences  of  nature  as  the  results  of  the  laws  estab- 
lished by  Him.  And  when  once  men  shall  really  awake 
to  the  conviction,  that  the  social  evils  of  the  community 
(poverty  and  want,  with  the  accompaniments  of  crime, 
ignorance  and  disease)  arise  from  an  infringement  of 
certain  invariable  laws,  no  more  uncertain  in  their 
nature  than  those  which  regulate  the  fall  of  a  stone 
or  the  motion  of  a  planet,  we  may  reasonably  expect 
that  men  will  bend  their  eye  on  the  phenomenon,  en- 
deavor to  ascertain  the  conditions  and  forces  that 
result  in  good  or  evil,  and  thus  to  discover  a  natural 
science  of  society  that  may  open  a  new  era  in  the  his- 
tory of  civilization.  Induction  is  no  less  applicable 
to  the  phenomena  of  men  than  it  is  to  the  phenomena 
of  matter. 

So  long  as  man  takes  the  fact  in  nature,  and  seeks 
to  assign  a  cause,  he  follows  the  true  path;  and  that 
path  is  abstractly  correct,  however  absurd  may  be  the 
fancied  explanation. 

84 


An  endless  variety  of  phenomena  are  constantly 
occurring  around  us,  and  these,  by  a  law  of  our  mental 
constitution,  are  referred  to  causes.  These  causes 
have  ever  played  a  most  prominent  part  in  the  history 
of  mankind,  and  the  fancy  has  ever  thrown  around 
them  that  mysterious  mantle  of  the  imagination  by 
which  they  were  clothed  with  personality.  From 
necessary  forms  of  rational  thought,  they  become 
transfigured  into  conscious  existences,  that  willed  and 
acted  for  themselves  and  produced  the  multifarious 
phenomena  of  nature.  The  world  was  filled  with  half 
material  spirits,  demons  and  demigods,  fates,  furies, 
destinies,  and  all  vague  mythologies  of  mysterious 
influences. 

But  it  was  reserved  for  the  corruption  of  Chris- 
tianity to  throw  the  darkest  shade.  It  is  said  that  "  the 
shadow  is  nowhere  so  dark  as  immediately  under  the 
lamp."  Piety  died  away  and  theology  took  her  place. 
The  wisdom  that  is  from  above  Is  not  a  creed, 
but  a  principle  of  life  imbued  with  truth;  and  when 
the  Church  forgot  the  life,  the  truth  vanished  from 
the  symbol  and  left  the  dead  remains  of  unspiritual 
knowledge.  The  shadows  were  dark  before,  but  now 
was  the  night  of  degradation.  Demons  and  devils 
stared  from  out  the  ordinary  phenomena  of  nature; 
and  the  multitude  of  sorcerers  who  were  immolated  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  were  as  much  the  victims  of  nature 
misinterpreted,  as  the  martyr  Christians  were  the 
victims  of  a  false  theology.* 

*  Then,  too,  men  fought  because  it  was  their  trade.  Patriot- 
ism, that  most  pure  and  most  holy  of  all  man's  natural  senti- 
ments, was  disbanded  save  with  the  peasant  cultivators  of  the 
soil,  who  still  could  fight  for  their  homes  like  the  tiger  for  his 
lair.  A  country  where  there  is  no  patriotism  is  not  safe  for  a 
day.  Patriotism  is  a  country's  true  strength;  for  where  there 
is  no  patriotism  there  is  no  bond  of  union. 

35 


But  day  broke  at  last,  and  nature  was  emancipated 
from  the  mystic  folds  of  superstition.  The  great 
turning-point  of  modern  times  was,  when  the  doctrine 
of  constant  repetition  of  similar  phenomena  in  similar 
conditions  was  substituted  for  the  dread  of  unseen,  and 
too  often  malevolent,  agency. 

Man  learned  at  last  to  bend  his  eye  on  the  phenom- 
enon, accurately  to  observe  the  conditions,  and  ac- 
curately to  measure  the  change.  Physical  truth  was 
the  result  of  this  operation,  so  simple,  now  we  knoT^  it, 
yet  of  such  vast  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the  world. 
Superstition  here  received  its  blow  of  death;  and,  just 
in  proportion  as  the  inductive  philosophy  (in  physical 
science)  was  received  and  cultivated,  so  was  man  eman- 
cipated from  the  terrors  of  unseen  agency,  and  the 
phenomena  of  nature  were  fixed  on  a  stable  basis  that 
invited  man  constantly  to  further  inquiry. 

But  what  has  become  of  the  causes? 

The  causes  were  now  no  longer  beings,  but  the  laws 
by  which  the  one  God  carries  on  the  government  of 
the  material  world.  But  has  this  view  of  nature  a 
direct  bearing  on  the  political  condition  of  mankind? 
No  doubt  of  it  whatever.  Those  who  have  advocated 
the  utilitarian  theory  are  true  benefactors  to  their 
country;  and,  though  we  may  take  occasion  to  advert 
to  the  cases  in  which  that  theory  has  been  carried 
altogether  out  of  its  legitimate  province,  we  of  course 
accept  it  to  its  utmost  extent  in  those  matters  that 
come  within  its  range.  But  what  is  the  utilitarian 
theory,  and  what  is  its  connection  with  inductive 
philosophy  ? 

Let  us  suppose  men  legislating  on  a  theological  prin- 
ciple (no  matter  what),  and  carrying  out  their  laws 
by  force.  Let  us  suppose  an  inductive  philosopher 
beginning  at  the  effects  of  these  laws,  carefully  col- 

36 


lecting  the  statistics  of  the  things  he  can  observe,  and 
arranging  them  into  an  exhibition  of  facts.  Let  us 
suppose  that  these  facts  show  the  results  of  the  legis- 
lation to  have  been  eminently  detrimental  to  the  great 
body  of  the  population.  Suppose  he  publishes  these 
details.  Of  course  those  who  legislate  on  a  theological 
principle  care  nothing  about  consequences ;  for  if  the 
principle  be  correct,  the  legislation  is  a  duty  at  all 
hazards.  Now,  what  is  to  be  done?  Of  course,  if  the 
populace  are  not  quite  so  certain  about  the  principle 
as  the  legislators  are,  they  might  begin  to  suspect  a 
mistake  in  the  rulers'  method  of  proceeding,  and  per- 
haps they  might  weigh  the  statistics  against  the  theol- 
ogy, and  give  the  preference  to  the  former.  This 
is  very  likely.  Now,  what  course  have  the  rulers? 
Either  to  abandon  their  legislation,  or  to  expel  the 
philosopher,  and  prevent  all  further  inquiries  of  the 
kind.  But  suppose  the  inductive  mode  'of  judging  of 
legislative  acts  should  happen  to  procure  free  course, 
it  is  quite  impossible  that  facts,  mere  facts,  should  not 
tell  on  the  country  in  the  long  run,  and  that  reasonings 
upon  those  facts  should  not  spring  up  in  every  man's 
mind,  and  cause  him  to  throw  all  his  weight  into  every 
change  in  which  he  could  see  his  own,  and  the  interest 
of  his  fellows  involved. 

But  suppose  a  new  light  were  to  break  upon  the 
nation.  Suppose  men  should  happen  to  reflect  that 
facts  come  from  the  operations  of  the  laws  of  God, 
and  suppose  the  thought  should  strike  them  that  God 
is  a  benevolent  and  a  just  God — ^that  he  made  a  good 
world,  gave  it  good  laws,  and  that  social  evils  sprang 
from  man's  injustice  to  his  fellow,  and  from  the  wrong 
way  in  which  things  have  been  divided.  Suppose  the 
idea  should  go  abroad  that  God  is  no  respecter  of  per- 
sons, but  that  perhaps  the  welfare  of  a  peasant  is  of 

37 


as  much  value  in  the  eyes  of  Him  who  doeth  all  things 
well,  as  the  welfare  of  a  king.  Now,  suppose  to  these 
reflections  were  joined  another  or  two,  that  God  made 
man's  reason,  and  made  man  to  hate  pain  and  flee 
from  it;  and  also  that  man's  nature  obliges  him  to 
live  in  society,  and  that  societies  may  make  mistakes, 
as  the  child  does  who  puts  his  finger  into  the  flame, 
and  that  the  pain  is  to  teach  him  to  beware  in  future. 
Were  such  notions  to  go  abroad,  it  is  perfectly  evident 
that  the  inductive  philosophy,  when  it  found  out  evils 
and  suff*ering  attending  legislative  acts,  would  come 
backed  with  the  authority  of  Him  who  made  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  it  would  lead  to  the  belief  that  the  wel- 
fare of  the  great  masses  of  the  population  was  never 
sacrificed  to  procure  the  wealth  of  the  few,  without 
God's  displeasure  being  always  made  manifest  in  the 
suff'ering  that  ensued.  Not  that  this  suff*ering  was  a 
miraculous  interference,  but  the  result  of  the  ordinary 
laws  which  God  has  made  for  the  government  of  the 
world. 

Suppose,  however,  one  more  principle  should  be 
admitted,  namely,  that  "  that  which  is  just  is  benefi- 
cial, and  for  the  good  of  the  greatest  number."  Sup- 
pose men  should  reflect  that  induction  requires  time 
and  knowledge  before  it  can  be  brought  to  perfection, 
and  that  God  endowed  man  with  an  a  priori  principle 
of  justice,  to  enable  him  to  steer  clear  of  injuring  his 
fellow,  even  where  the  inductive  evidence  should  not  be 
at  hand.  Suppose  the  results  of  this  justice  and  of 
this  induction  should  happen  to  turn  out  always  and 
invariably  coincident,  and  although  pursuing  diff^erent 
paths  to  reach  the  same  end,  yet  the  end  arrived  at 
never  was  diff^erent. 

Were  all  this  admitted,  it  is  plain  that  the  inductive 
method   of  examining  the   condition    of    the    country 

38 


would  have  a  most  direct  and  most  powerful  influence 
on  the  legislation  of  the  country.  Where  suffering 
was  considered  not  the  mere  accident  of  chance,  nor 
the  work  of  a  malevolent  spirit,  but  the  voice  of  a  just 
and  benevolent  God  telling  men  to  amend  the  order  of 
society,  and  to  return  to  those  elementary  principles 
of  justice  that  He  had  implanted  in  their  mind — 
surely  we  can  see  that  the  progress  of  this  nation  must 
be  very  different  from  the  progress  of  that  nation 
from  which  inductive  philosophy  was  banished,  and 
where  men  legislated  for  themselves  and  pretended 
to  be  legislating  for  God. 

3d,  A  correct  philosophy  of  the  mental  operations. 

Whenever  we  approach  what  is  termed  metaphysical 
philosophy,  we  feel  that  we  approach  a  quagmire,  over 
which  a  dense  mist  seems  to  hold  its  perpetual  habita- 
tion. If  we  attempt  to  advance,  two  ultimate  and 
hitherto  impassable  objects  present  themselves  to  view. 
On  the  one  hand  is  the  bottomless  pit  of  scepticism, 
and  on  the  other  is  the  commanding  but  inaccessible 
height  of  absolute  truth. 

Between  scepticism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  dog- 
matism of  unsupported  faith  on  the  other,  philosophy 
has  slowly  swayed  backwards  and  forwards,  leaving 
man  as  little  farther  advanced  in  ontology  as  he  was 
five  hundred,  or  a  thousand,  or  two  thousand  years 
since. 

To  suppose,  however,  that  philosophy  is  the  useless 
jargon  that  some  writers  appear  desirous  of  repre- 
senting, because  it  has  failed  to  solve  the  great  prob- 
lem, namely,  "  How  can  objective  existence  be  ration- 
ally substantiated?"  is  surely  to  look  at  history  with 
only  one  eye. 

Grant  that  scepticism  in  philosophy  is  the  ultimate 
result  of  all  investigation;  let  us  only  be  consistent, 

39 


and  make  that  scepticism  universal,  and  the  bugbear 
of  scepticism  disappears  forever.  Let  us  write  a  plus 
or  a  minus,  a  sign  positive  or  a  sign  negative,  before 
all  our  knowledge,  and  what  difference  can  it  possibly 
make? — knowledge  remains  the  same  in  all  its  relative 
proportions ;  and  all  that  man  has  really  ascertained 
to  be  true,  remains  as  permanently  stable,  and  as 
really  capable  of  application,  as  if  ten  thousand  syllo- 
gisms had  proven  that  knowledge  was  truth,  and  that 
the  axiomatic  credence  of  mankind  was  really  vera- 
cious. Scepticism,  whatever  be  its  danger,  is  only 
dangerous  when  partially  applied.  When  one  man 
shall  have  demonstrated  to  another  man  his  own  exist- 
ence (and  the  most  sceptical  of  sceptics  admits  the 
existence  of  the  me) ,  it  will  then  be  time  to  substantiate 
objective  existence,  by  a  process  of  proof  that  can 
have  no  difficulties,  when  once  the  proof  of  the  one  me 
is  furnished  to  the  other.  If  we  will  be  sceptics,  let 
us  be  consistent;  and  let  us  write  our  sign  negative, 
not  merely  before  objective  knowledge,  but  before  the 
existence  of  that  mey  whose  existence  is  absolutely  as 
incapable  of  every  approach  to  rational  proof  as  is 
the  existence  of  an  external  world. 

When,  however,  we  take  the  existence  of  the  m^  for 
granted,  and  then  insist  that  other  objective  existence 
should  produce  a  proof  of  which  it  is  incapable,  our 
scepticism  is  not  only  dangerous  but  fatal.  Rational 
proof  there  is  none,  either  in  the  one  case  or  the  other ; 
for  the  Tne  is  as  really  objective  to  all  our  conscious- 
ness, as  is  matter  or  universal  mind.  We  are  conscious 
of  mental  phenomena  alone;  and  the  me  is  as  far  re- 
moved from  immediate  appreciation,  as  is  any  other 
substantive  existence  that  our  race  admits  with  perse- 
vering universality.  Let  us  only  make  scepticism 
(philosophic  scepticism),  absolutely  universal,  and  the 

40 


foundations   of  real  knowledge  are  laid  anew,  scepti- 
cism being  buried  in  a  grave  of  its  own  digging. 

For  ourselves,  we  believe  that  scepticism  may  be 
fairly  met,  and  fairly  vanquished  by  the  most  strict 
rules  of  logic.  Its  stronghold  is  in  the  ambiguity  of 
terms,  and  in  the  use  of  terms  which  it  has  no  logical 
right  to  use.  Scepticism  says,  "  You  have  no  proof 
for  the  objective  truth  of  your  subjective  convictions." 
We  deny  the  fact,  and  allege  that  an  argument  based 
on  the  calculation  of  probabilities  would  establish, 
beyond  the  smallest  possibility  of  doubt,  the  objective 
veracity  of  the  subjective  laws  of  reason.  The  mathe- 
matical sciences  are,  every  one  of  them, — ^namely, 
arithmetic,  algebra,  geometry,  and  statics,  purely 
subjective;  every  one  of  their  primary  propositions 
is  an  axiomatic  truth  taken  for  granted,  self-evident, 
incapable  of  question,  purely  abstract,  and  that  does 
not  pronounce  on  the  real  existence  of  any  concrete 
reality  whatever.  Now  how  comes  it,  that  when  these 
subjective  sciences  are  applied  to  matter,  an  entity 
with  which  they  have  nothing  to  do,  they  are  invari- 
ably as  correct  as  when  merely  contemplated  by  the 
reason.?  How,  if  the  subjective  convictions  and  sub- 
jective processes  of  the  reason  are  not  correct,  can  an 
astronomer  predict  the  return  of  a  comet.? — and  the 
comet  does  return,  to  other  men's  perceptions,  years 
after  he  is  dead.  Scepticism  is  the  greatest  imposition 
that  ever  fooled  a  man's  reason,  yet  it  must  be  fairly 
met. 

Never,  perhaps,  was  the  absence  of  a  definition  pro- 
ductive of  so  much  fruitless  toil,  as  when  men  set  to 
work  on  philosophy.  What  does  a  man  propose  to 
expound  when  he  teaches  philosophy?  For  a  long- 
period  philosophy  was  ontology ;  that  is,  the  knowledge 
of  being,  entirely  and  exclusively  objective  in  its  char- 

41 


acter,  entirely  and  exclusively  subjective  in  its  means 
of  operation.  That  is,  men  endeavored  to  substan- 
tiate both  the  reality  and  the  form  of  the  universe  in 
their  own  minds,  without  the  connecting  link,  evidence, 
that  renders  one  form  of  thought  knowledge.  There 
was  no  evidence,  therefore  there  was  no  knowledge. 
With  such  a  system  the  abstract  sciences  alone  are 
possible,  as  in  them  the  evidence  is  subjective,  and 
supplied  by  the  rational  constitution  of  the  mind. 

The  Baconian  philosophy  broke  up  ontology  by 
supplying  the  connecting  link  that  must  unite  the 
object  and  the  subject.  That  link  was  evidence,  and 
that  evidence  was  only  possible  by  means  of  observa- 
tion. Philosophy  now  separated  into  two  parts — 
metaphysics  and  science,  which  latter  was  the  new 
philosophy  that  arose  from  the  new  method  of  found- 
ing knowledge  on  evidence. 

The  new  philosophy  has  advanced  with  wonderful 
strides,  enlightening  man's  intellect,  and  dispersing 
innumerable  benefits,  which  reproduce  themselves  in  an 
infinity  of  forms,  and  hold  out  hopes  of  great  and 
permanent  advantage  to  our  race.  The  old  philoso- 
phy remains  much  where  it  was  as  regards  its  nature, 
but  in  a  very  different  position  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
ground  it  occupies. 

At  one  period  the  method  of  making  science  without 
evidence  was  universal.  It  was  applied  to  physics  as 
well  as  to  metaphysics,  and  its  domain  was  supposed 
to  extend  over  everything  that  could  become  the  sub- 
ject of  human  knowledge.  It  has  now  been  driven 
from  every  part  of  that  region  that  has  been  occupied 
by  positive  science. 

Can  nothing  be  learned  from  this  fact?  We  think 
that  something  can,  and  it  is  tliis — That  philosophy, 
after  retrograding  from  every  region  of  thought  to 

42 


wlilch  man  may  apply  his  attention,  shall  at  last  re- 
solve Itself  into  the  science  of  human  thought,  and 
pronounce  nothing  whatever  on  any  subject  that  is 
not  merely  and  exclusively  human  thought.  If  we 
consider  knowledge,  we  shall  find  that  it  Implies  three 
things,  the  object  (that  is,  the  universe)  ;  the  subject 
(that  is,  the  human  mind)  ;  and  the  connecting  link 
between  them,  that  is,  evidence.  Now,  if  we  consider 
that  philosophy  has  abandoned  one  portion  after 
another  of  the  object,  just  in  proportion  as  positive 
science  has  occupied  that  portion,  we  can  see  that,  if 
the  process  continues,  the  whole  of  the  object  must 
ultimately  be  abandoned,  and  the  subject  alone  become 
the  object  of  contemplation.  And  If  so,  then  will  phi- 
losophy teach  only  psychology,  taking  that  term  ex- 
tensively to  signify  mental  science. 

The  multitude,  in  all  ages,  and  in  all  places,  have 
admitted  the  existence  of  the  mind,  the  existence  of 
the  external  world,  and  the  existence  of  Deity.  These 
appear  to  be  the  common  and  general  groundwork  of 
human  credence  and  human  action.  The  multitude 
believed,  and  acted  on  their  belief,  taking  the  three 
great  facts  we  have  mentioned  as  the  most  common 
and  ordinary  truths,  without  which  the  whole  economy 
of  thought  must  be  overturned,  and  laid  in  inextri- 
cable confusion. 

The  philosophers,  however,  endeavored  to  give  a  ra- 
tional explanation  of  the  theory  of  human  credence 
Their  object  was  not  to  accept  these  great  facts,  and 
thence  to  proceed  to  specific  knowledge,  but  to  lay 
anew  the  rational  evidence  on  which  these  facts  them- 
selves were  to  be  admitted. 

But  before  man  can  reason,  three  substantives  must 
be  taken  for  granted,  and  two  propositions  must  also 
be    given,  involving  those  three  substantives  as  the  terms 

43 


or  he  cannot  by  any  possibility  arrive  at  a  proposi- 
tion established  by  rational,  that  is,  by  logical  proof. 
Let  men  therefore  pursue  their  inquiry  as  far  back  as 
the  most  subtle  intellect  can  possibly  reach,  there  must 
necessarily  be  found  at  the  bottom  of  all  real  or  of  all 
hypothetical  reasoning,  lihree  substantives  atid  two 
propositions,  which,  if  accepted,  may  lead  to  real 
knowledge,  and,  if  rejected,  must  land  us  without  fur- 
ther difficulty  in  scepticism,  absolutely  universal. 

Such  being  the  case,  we  may  unhesitatingly  assert, 
that  at  the  bottom  of  all  knowledece  whatever  there 
must  be  found  some  substantive  existences  absolutely 
incapable  of  rational  substantiation,  and  some  prop- 
ositions absolutely  incapable  of  rational  demonstra- 
tion.   Without  these  it  is  impossible  for  man  to  reason. 

The  specific  difference,  then,  between  real  knowledge 
and  philosophy  appears  to  be  this: — ^Real  knowledge, 
or  positive  science,  accepts  the  ordinary  belief  of  the 
multitude;  and,  pursuing  it  forwards,  endeavors  to 
determine  its  limitations,  becoming  at  every  step  less 
and  less  general.  Philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  com- 
mencing at  the  ordinary  belief  of  the  multitude,  pur- 
sues its  course  backwards,  endeavoring  at  every  step 
to  become  more  and  more  general.  The  ultimate  ter- 
mination of  this  course  must  ever  necessarily  be,  either 
to  accept  some  propositions  as  primary  and  unproven, 
or  to  maintain  a  consistent  scepticism,  which  abso- 
lutely obliterates  the  possibility  of  rational  knowledge. 

The  geometrician,  for  instance,  accepts  space,  with- 
out the  smallest  inquiry  into  its  nature.  His  object 
is  to  limit,  define,  and  exhibit  the  relations  of  spaces. 
The  sister  substantive  of  space,  namely  time,  is  also 
accepted  by  the  man  of  science,  whose  only  object  is 
to  measure  it  accurately — that  is,  definitely  to  deter- 
mine the  limitations   of  its   portions.       The   physical 

44 


sciences,  again,  accept  matter;  and  without  the  small- 
est speculation  as  to  what  matter  really  is,  they 
each,  in  their  several  branches,  endeavor  to  determine 
definitely  its  various  forms,  and  accurately  to  specify 
its  manifestations.  Philosophy,  on  the  contrary, 
endeavors  to  go  backwards  from  the  ordinary  cre- 
dence, and  to  furnish  some  explanation  as  to  what 
matter  is  or  is  not,  for  some  have  attempted  to  oblite- 
rate it  altogether. 

The  two  substantives,  space  and  matter,  are  suffi- 
cient for  our  purpose.  Positive  science  accepting  space, 
and  pursuing  the  inquiry  forwards — investigating  first 
the  forms  of  spaces,  and  then  the  necessary  relations 
that  exist  between  those  forms — furnishes  us  with 
geometry.  While  by  accepting  matter,  and  inquiring 
only  into  the  forms  of  its  manifestation,  and  the  rela- 
tions that  are  observed  to  exist  between  those  forms, 
we  are,  by  the  exercise  of  the  human  reason,  at  last 
presented  with  the  sciences  of  astronomy,  mechanics, 
chemistry,  physiology,   etc. 

What  has  philosophy  to  place  in  the  opposite  scale? 
After  a  thousand  years  of  speculation  as  to  whether 
matter  be  a  substance  or  a  shadow,  an  existence  real 
or  ideal,  not  one  single  hair's  breadth  of  progress 
towards  its  determination  has  ever  been  made.  Every 
discussion  as  to  the  nature  of  matter  or  of  space  may 
be  raised  to-day  as  well  as  two  thousand  years  ago. 

We  conceive,  then,  that  the  moment  at  which  phi- 
losophy wandered  and  went  astray  was,  when  it  at- 
tempted to  discuss  the  objective  truth  or  falsehood  of 
the  primary  credences  or  convictions  of  mankind. 
These  primary  convictions,  in  their  general  form,  are 
at  the  bottom  of  all  human  knowledge;  but  whether 
human  knowledge  have  or  have  not  an  external,  real, 
and  objective  counterpart,  which  would  remain  if  man 

45 


and  man's  intellect  were  annihilated,  neither  philosophy 
nor  any  other  natural  method  can  possibly  determine. 
Whether  the  mental  propositions  which  constitute 
knowledge  coincide  with  actual  and  external  realities 
is  a  matter,  not  of  knowledge,  which  can  be  rationally 
substantiated,  but  of  primary,  unproven,  and  unprov- 
able credence. 

Philosophy  can  no  longer  attempt  to  pronounce  h 
priori  upon  what  is  or  what  is  not,  but  must  confine  it- 
self exclusively  to  thought  and  to  that  alone.  The 
true  province  of  philosophy  is  not  to  inquire  into  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  the  primary  convictions  of  the 
intellect,  but  to  observe  and  record  what  those  primary 
convictions  are,  to  enumerate  them,  to  determine  the 
forms  of  their  manifestations,  and  to  pursue  with  re- 
gard to  human  thought  the  same  kind  of  inquiry  that 
the  mathematical  sciences  pursue  with  regard  to  num- 
bers, quantities,  and  spaces,  and  more  nearly  still,  the 
same  kind  of  inquiry  that  the  physical  sciences  pursue 
with  regard  to  matter  and  its  manifestations. 

Be  the  mind  as  complex  as  it  may,  it  could  of  itself 
originate  not  one  single  iota  of  knowledge,  unless  the 
substantive  groundwork  of  that  knowledge  were  fur- 
nished to  it  from  without.  Observation,  psychological 
or  sensational,  can  alone  furnish  us  with  a  fact,  and  a 
fact  in  one  form  or  other  must  lie  at  the  bottom  of 
every  chain  of  reasoning,  not  purely  hypothetical.  The 
primary  matter  of  knowledge,  whether  relating  to  the 
me  or  the  not  me,  must  be  derived  exclusively  from  ob- 
servation and  never  can  by  any  possibility  be  more 
than  guessed  at  by  the  mere  metaphysician.  The  form 
of  knowledge  and  not  the  matter  is  the  true  object 
of  philosophy. 

We  conclude,  then,  our  argument  with  regard  to  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason.     We  mean  not 

46  ^ 


that  men  must  combine  knowledge  and  reason,  but  that 
the  great  masses  of  the  unprivileged  classes  must  com- 
bine together  on  the  same  knowledge  and  on  the  same 
principles,  that  they  have  rationally  deduced  from  that 
knowledge.  It  has  been  said,  that  "  for  men  to  be 
free,  it  is  sufficient  that  they  will  it ; "  never  was  there 
a  greater  mistake,  or  one  so  utterly  at  variance  with 
the  great  facts  of  history.  Perhaps  no  sentiment  is 
stronger  in  the  human  breast  than  the  love  of  liberty. 
For  this  men  have  panted,  prayed,  fought,  struggled, 
rebelled,  and  endured  every  kind  of  hardship,  and  ev- 
ery kind  of  cruelty.  And  yet  they  are  not  free.  To 
be  free,  it  is  first  necessary  that  men  should  know 
wherein  true  freedom  consists ;  namely,  in  the  absolute 
supremacy  of  equal  and  impartial  law,  made  without 
respect  of  persons  or  classes,  and  administered  with 
uprightness  and  regularity.  Nor  is  this  all.  True 
freedom  is  the  very  highest  point  of  political  civiliza- 
tion ;  and  to  suppose  that  mere  will  can  ever  lead  to 
that  point,  is  to  suppose  that  men  may  overleap  the 
conditions  of  their  nature,  and  reach  the  goal  without 
the  struggles  of  the  race.  True  freedom,  however  sim- 
ple In  its  theory,  is  the  highest,  and  probably  the 
most  complex,  form  of  combined  society.  It  is  the 
whole  body  of  society  acting  on  the  principles  of  knowl- 
edge, and  carrying  truth  into  practical  operation. 
Will  can  never  achieve  this.  It  is  the  result  and  ulti- 
mate end  of  a  great  progress,  which  makes  its  way  with 
knowledge,  sometimes  advancing  with  peaceful  steps, 
sometimes  overturning  the  barriers  that  stand  in  the 
way  amid  the  din  of  revolution.  It  is  the  condition  of 
society  where  will  is  excluded,  and  law  Is  made  on  an 
objective  reason,  which  convinces  man's  judgment  that 
it  is  equitable.  It  is  the  condition  first  to  be  defined 
in  its  abstract  form  by  the  man  of  thought,  and  then 

47 


to  be  striven  for  by  the  mass  of  the  population.  A 
condition  that  supposes  great  advancement  and  in- 
finite benefit  to  mankind,  but  a  condition  that  must  be 
purchased,  and  purchased  only  on  those  terms  which 
are  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  man's  constitution. 

There  are  three  conditions  of  society  involving  a 
cause  on  the  one  hand,  and  an  eff'ect  on  the  other. 

The  causes  are  Knowledge,  Superstition,  Infidelity. 
The  eff^ects  Freedom,  Despotism,  Anarchy. 

Such  are  the  conditions  of  our  nature.  Man  may 
make  his  election  of  the  cause,  but  God  has  determined 
the  character  of  the  consequent. 

No  fact  stands  out  more  prominently  from  the  con- 
dition of  the  various  nations,  or  from  their  history, 
than  that  those  conditions,  and  the  great  actions  of 
men  in  the  figure  of  society,  depend  upon  their  cre- 
dences ;  that  is,  on  the  convictions  of  their  intellect ;  that 
is,  on  the  propositions  they  hold  to  be  true.  What 
makes  one  nation  press  ardently  forward  in  the  pur- 
suit of  liberty,  while  another  sits  dead  and  stupid  un- 
der the  iron  rule  of  the  despot?  Thought,  mere 
thought,  impalpable  and  invisible  thought,  a  something 
which  can  neither  be  seen,  felt,  nor  handled ;  but  which 
fixes  man's  destiny,  raising  him  if  correct  to  the  dig- 
nity and  energy  of  freeman,  dooming  him  if  erroneous 
to  vice,  degradation,  and  slavery.  The  history  of  the 
world  has  to  be  re-written  on  a  new  principle,  and  this 
unseen  element  has  to  be  exhibited  as  the  cause  of  the 
condition  of  the  nations.  Climate,  circumstance,  and 
race,  may  all  go  for  something  or  for  much;  but,  far 
more  influential  than  either,  is  credence.  Sooner  or 
later  men  must  learn  the  great  fact,  that  the  social 
and  political  condition  of  a  nation  is  absolutely  de- 
pendent on  that  nation's  credence.  Correct  credence 
is  knowledge,  and  knowledge  alone  is  capable  of  re- 

48 


generating  the  political  condition  of  mankind.  Change 
the  credence  of  a  nation,  and  you  change  the  whole 
current  of  its  future  progress. 

We  now  turn  to  the  use  of  combination.  There  are 
certain  evils  which  belong  to  the  race  of  mankind,  and 
which  afflict  humanity  more  or  less  in  every  quarter  of 
the  globe.  In  the  existence  of  these  evils  is  to  be 
found  the  reason  of  combination;  and  the  object  of 
combination  is  to  remove  as  much  as  possible,  such  of 
them  as  affect  the  political  condition  of  men,  or  the 
condition  of  men  in  society. 

The  first  great  master  evil  is  that  which  causes  man 
to  prefer  the  gratification  of  passion  to  the  enlight- 
ened and  rational  exercise  of  his  natural  faculties. 
Whatever  view  may  be  taken  of  the  theological  ques- 
tion of  natural  depravity,  we  hold  it  a  historical  fact 
of  the  very  first  magnitude,  and  of  the  most  indubitable 
veracity,  that  the  human  race,  as  such,  has  always,  and 
in  every  known  region  of  the  earth,  "  done  the  things 
which  it  ought  not  to  have  done,  and  left  undone  the 
things  which  it  ought  to  have  done."  With  regard  to 
man's  nature,  we  shall  enter  into  no  disputation ;  but, 
with  regard  to  men's  actions,  we  view  them  through 
the  common  medium  of  history,  and  we  hesitate  not  to 
see  the  practice  of  injustice  more  or  less  prevalent  in 
every  country  of  the  earth,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
accept  that  explanation  of  the  fact  which  is  furnished 
in  such  plain  terms  by  the  words  of  divine  revelation. 
History  informs  us  that  the  actions  of  men  are  wicked ; 
and  surely  there  can  be  no  absurdity  in  giving  cre- 
dence to  Scripture,  when  it  informs  us  that  their  hearts 
are  so  likewise.  With  the  depravity  of  the  heart,  poli- 
tics has  no  concern;  but,  so  soon  as  that  depravity 
comes  to  manifest  itself  in  action,  and  to  appear  in 
the  form  of  fraud  or  violence,  the  necessity  of  a  sys- 

49 


tern  of  politics  is  immediately  substantiated.  Men  are 
wicked,  and  therefore  inclined  to  do  wrong;  but  they 
are  also  rational,  and  may  combine  systematically  to 
prevent  the  wrong  from  being  done. 

1st,  The  progress  of  mankind  is  a  progress  from 
ignorance,  error,  and  superstition,  toward  knowledge. 

2d,  Governments  being  established  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  society — that  is,  during  the  reign  of  igno- 
rance, error,  and  superstition — have  always,  and  in  ev- 
ery known  case,  been  more  or  less  despotic;  that  is, 
have  aystematically  assumed  powers  to  whiich  they 
were  not  justly  entitled. 

3d,  The  progress  of  political  society  is  a  progress  in 
which  these  unjust  powers  have  been  gradually  cur- 
tailed and  abolished,  in  proportion  as  the  nation  has 
progressed  from  ignorance  and  superstition,  and  ad- 
vanced towards  knowledge. 

The  use,  then,  of  the  combination  of  knowledge  and 
reason,  is  (not  to  combine  against  individual  injustice, 
this  being  the  province  of  the  government,  but)  to  re- 
duce the  powers  of  the  government  and  the  laws  of 
the  country  within  those  bounds  of  justice  beyond 
which  they  cannot  be  other  than  despotic. 

It  is  the  combination  of  the  nation,  or  of  the  en- 
lightened portion  of  the  nation,  against  the  laws  of 
the  nation,  and  against  the  unjust  powers  of  the  rulers. 

Liberty  is  advanced  not  by  the  warfare  of  one  nation 
against  another  nation,  but  by  the  warfare  (physical 
or  moral)  of  the  unprivileged  classes  against  the  un- 
just laws,  and  against  the  unjust  privileges  that  pre- 
vail within  the  nation  Itself;  and  this  warfare  can  only 
be  carried  on  efficiently  by  the  mass  of  the  population 
combining  to  extort  those  measures  that  have  been 
theoretically  shown  to  be  right,  or  those  measures  that 
on  good  grounds  are  presumed  to  be  beneficial. 

50 


When  we  look  back  on  the  history  of  England  or  of 
any  other  country  that  has  made  considerable  progress, 
we  see  that  all  the  great  changes  that  have  taken  place 
in  the  political  condition  of  the  population  have  been 
preceded  by  changes  in  the  theoretic  credence  of  the 
population,  and  that  the  amended  order  of  society  has 
resulted  directly  from  a  new  and  more  correct  order 
of  thought.  And  we  may  also  see  that  these  beneficial 
changes  have  seldom,  if  ever,  originated  with  the 
rulers  themselves,  but  have  been  extorted  from  them 
sometimes  by  force,  and  sometimes  by  the  moral  in- 
fluence that  the  man  in  the  right  has  over  the  man 
in  the  wrong. 

Without  alluding  to  the  explosion  of  the  "  divine 
right  of  kings,"  etc.  (which  enabled  rulers  to  practice 
flagrant  iniquities  without  being  brought  to  judicial 
trial),  we  may  refer  to  two  modem  instances  of  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason,  by  which  the 
people  of  Britain  obtained  changes  of  vast  extent,  by 
a  moral  power  which  overcame  the  will  of  the  rulers 
and  of  the  privileged  orders,  who  were  linked  to  sup- 
port the  abuses.  We  refer  to  the  emancipation  of  the 
negroes,  and  to  the  repeal  of  the  corn-laws. 

The  laws  of  Great  Britain  declared  that  it  was  law- 
ful for  one  man  to  possess  another  man  as  his  property ; 
and  this  principle  was  carried  into  practical  operation 
by  the  seizure  and  reduction  to  slavery  of  vast  num- 
bers of  Africans. 

In  this  negro  slavery  we  have  a  vast  system  of  fraud 
and  violence,  established  and  continued  by  authority 
of  the  British  government;  that  is,  we  have  the  power 
which  has  been  conferred  on  the  government  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  violence  and  fraud,  turned  al- 
together away  from  its  legitimate  exercise,  and  made 
the  instrument  of  supporting  a  system  of  glaring  in- 

51 


justice  and  flagrant  iniquity.  We  have  that  greatest 
of  all  political  evils,  injustice,  established  and  main- 
tained by  law.  And  what  was  it  that  abolished  negro 
slavery.?  It  was  the  moral  influence  of  knowledge,  rea- 
son, and  religion.  The  trade  had  been  sanctioned  by 
long  use;  the  interests  of  the  wealthy  and  powerful 
were  linked  to  maintain  it;  the  laws  of  the  empire  had 
declared  it  legitimate,  and  the  government  was  opposed 
to  its  abolition.  More  than  this,  not  one  single  man 
who  had  the  means  and  the  opportunity  to  make  him- 
self heard  on  behalf  of  the  negro,  had  one  farthing  of 
pecuniary  interest  in  procuring  the  negro's  emancipa- 
tion. 

What,  then,  were  the  motives  and  the  means  that 
led  to  so  great  a  political  change  as  the  emancipation 
of  a  race  from  slavery? 

First,  Certain  individuals  learnt  to  think  aright 
on  the  subject,  and  to  give  utterance  to  their  thoughts. 
The  battle  was  then  commenced.  On  the  one  hand  was 
reason,  involving  the  principles  of  natural  equity,  and 
on  the  other  was  the  despotism  of  the  law,  the  power 
of  the  government,  and  the  pecuniary  interests  of  the 
wealthy  and  influential. 

Sooner  or  later  correct  thought  makes  its  way,  and 
the  more  rapidly  and  surely,  the  more  a  nation  has 
abandoned  superstition. 

The  theoretic  argument  or  credence  adopted  by  the 
advocates  of  liberty  was,  "  That  man  is  made  free  by 
God,  and  can  never  be  made  rightfully  a  slave  by 
man."  The  argument  in  its  most  essential  character 
was  one  of  mere  justice,  not  of  economical  benefit  or 
prejudice,  profit  or  loss.  A  moral  agitation  was  com- 
menced, the  few  were  transformed  into  the  many,  and 
the  progress  of  opinion  (of  credence)  was  such,  that 
every  possible  argument  that  could  be  adduced  on  the 

52 


opposite  side  was  brought  forth  from  the  lying  cham- 
bers of  selfishness.  Everything  in  the  shape  of  an  ar- 
gument, everything  that  could  be  made  to  pass  for 
one,  though  halt,  lame,  or  blind,  was  pressed  into  the 
service  of  casuistry,  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating 
injustice. 

The  theoretic  credence,  however,  gained  ground,  and 
was  powerfully  aided  by  a  more  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  enormities  that  Britons  practised  on  Africans 
under  shelter  of  British  law.  Authentic  information 
was  obtained  and  disseminated,  and  at  last  a  great 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  was  brought  to 
bear  against  the  iniquity.  PoHtical  justice,  however, 
is  a  plant  of  slow  growth ;  and  years  of  debate,  of 
contest  between  truth  and  falsehood,  were  necessary, 
before  even  the  trading  in  human  blood,  the  buying 
and  selling  of  man,  who  was  made  in  the  image  of  the 
Creator,  ceased  to  receive  the  sanction  of  the  most  en- 
lightened and  freest  state  in  the  world.  And  here  we 
cannot  fail  to  remark  one  circumstance  that  has  almost 
invariably  accompatiied  eVery  political  change  which 
had  for  its  object  the  destruction  of  an  injustice.  We 
mean  the  outcry  about  the  evils  that  would  follow.  No 
sooner  has  any  one,  more  enlightened  or  more  impartial 
than  his  neighbors,  insisted  on  an  act  of  justice  (which, 
after  all,  let  it  never  be  forgotten,  is  only  the  refrain- 
ing from  injustice),  than  all  the  evils  in  the  category 
are  immediately  prognosticated,  as  if  the  doing  of 
God's  will  were  to  let  loose  hell  to  ravage  the  earth. 

When  the  emancipation  of  the  African  was  spoken 
of,  and  when  the  nation  of  Britain  appeared  to  be 
taking  into  serious  consideration  the  rightfulness  of 
abolishing  slavery,  what  tremendous  evils  were  to  fol- 
low !  Trade  was  to  be  ruined,  commerce  was  almost  to 
cease,  and  manufacturers  were  to  be  bankrupts.   Worse 

53 


than  all,  private  property  was  to  be  invaded  (property 
in  human  flesh),  the  rights  of  planters  sacrificed  to  the 
speculative  notions  of  fanatics,  and  the  British  govern- 
ment was  to  commit  an  act  that  would  forever  deprive 
it  of  the  confidence  of  British  subjects.  These  evils  at 
home  were,  of  course,  to  be  accompanied  by  others 
abroad  much  more  tremendous.  The  West  India 
islands  were,  of  course,  to  be  ruined  past  all  possible 
hope  of  recovery;  the  blacks  were  to  insurge  and  to 
destroy  the  white  population;  a  moral  hurricane,  ten 
times  more  dreadful  than  the  winds  of  heaven,  was  to 
sweep  across  the  Caribbean  Sea ;  blood  was  to  flow  like 
water;  the  emancipated  slave  was  to  celebrate  the  first 
moment  of  his  liberty  with  rape,  rapine,  and  murder; 
evils  unheard  of  and  inconceivable  were  to  astonish  the 
earth;  the  very  heavens  were  to  fall.  And  why?  Be- 
cause British  subjects  were  no  longer  to  be  permitted 
by  British  law  to  hold  their  fellow  men  in  slavery  on 
British  ground. 

The  law  was  a  positive  enactment  armed  with  power, 
and  the  moment  the  law  ceased  to  exist  the  negro  was 
emancipated,  not  by  the  law,  but  by  nature.  The  law 
may  make  a  slave,  but  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the 
law  to  make  a  freeman.  The  only  question  that  can 
ever  be  legitimately  taken  into  consideration,  with  re- 
gard to  slavery,  is  immediate  and  total  abolition,  and 
so  of  all  similar  cases  where  injustice  is  established  or 
systematically   perpetuated  by   law. 

The  people  of  Great  Britain  were  taxed  by  force  for 
the  purpose  of  paying  the  planters  for  their  slaves. 
Theoretically,  the  Commons  imposed  the  taxation  on 
themselves;  but  nine-tenths  of  the  population  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  election  of  members  of  parlia- 
nicnt,  and  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the  taxation 
was  ah  extra — forced  on  them  by  a  government  which 

54 


they  had  no  voice  in  electing.  We  maintain  that  this 
act  was  one  of  downright  injustice  and  oppression, 
whatever  may  be  said  of  its  magnanimity. 

The  planters  knew  perfectly  well  that  they  never 
had  a  moral  right  to  the  slaves,  and  consequently  they 
could  have  no  mon  1  claim  to  compensation.  Now,  the 
slave-laws  were  not  enacted  by  this  generation,  and  it 
is  admitted  that  those  who  enacted  them  had  no  pos- 
sible right  to  do  so.  The  payment  of  the  twenty  mil- 
lions, therefore,  resolved  itself  into  this,  "  The  law  of 
Britain  will  not  cease  to  lend  its  aid  and  its  arm  to 
perpetuate  slavery,  unless  the  people  of  Britain  pay 
an  immense  sum  to  the  planters."  The  only  course 
that  was  really  legitimate  was  for  the  government  of 
Britain  to  declare  that  it  had  no  possible  right  to  make 
or  keep  men  slaves,  and  at  once  to  expunge  the  stat- 
utes, letting  the  planters  take  their  chance,  at  the 
same  time  protecting  the  negroes,  as  British  subjects, 
born  on  British  ground.  It  was  a  just,  and  as  the 
world  goes,  a  glorious  thing  for  Britain  to  abolish 
slavery  as  it  did;  but  most  certainly  the  laboring  man 
of  England,  who  pays  five  per  cent,  on  his  tea,  sugar, 
and  tobacco,  to  pay  the  planters,  is  as  surely  oppressed 
and  defrauded  as  was  the  negro,  although  not  to  the 
same  extent.  No  man  in  the  world,  and  no  association 
in  the  world,  could  ever  have  an  equitable  right  to  tax  a 
laborer  for  the  purpose  of  remunerating  a  man-robber; 
and  although  the  measure  is  now  passed  and  done  with, 
we  very  much  question  whether  some  analogous  cases 
will  not  be  cleared  up  by  the  mass  of  the  nation  ere 
many  years  pass  over  the  heads  of  Englishmen.  When 
the  question  of  landed  property  comes  to  a  definite 
discussion,  there  may  be  little  thought  of  compensa- 
tion. 

The  other  instance  of  a  great  and  successful  com- 

55 


bmation,  in  which  knowledge  and  reason  triumphed 
over  the  law,  the  government,  and  the  privileged  classes 
of  the  country,  was  recently  exhibited  in  the  repeal  of 
the  corn-laws. 

The  case  of  the  corn-laws  appears  to  have  been  this. 

The  farmer,  in  taking  a  farm,  has  three  great  sub- 
jects to  consider,  1st,  The  quantity  of  produce.  2d, 
The  probable  price  of  produce,     3d,  Amount  of  rent. 

The  first  question  which  the  would-be  farmer  has  to 
answer,  is,  "  Can  he  make  a  profit  by  taking  land  from 
the  landowner,  and  selling  corn  to  the  consumer?"  A 
given  farm  is  estimated  to  produce  a  certain  average 
quantity  of  grain.  This  quantity  is  the  first  item  to 
be  considered,  as  it  is  the  basis  of  all  future  calcula- 
tion. A  certain  portion  of  this  quantity  is  requisite 
for  consumption,  and  the  remainder  is  marketable. 
The  marketable  portion,  being  the  real  merchandise 
which  the  farmer  buys  and  retails  again,  must  always 
be  assumed  at  a  certain  value  in  the  terms  of  the  price 
paid  for  it.  Whatever  price  the  farmer  pays  for  his 
marketable  com,  he  must  expect,  on  the  first  principle 
of  commerce,  to  receive  a  larger  price  (in  the  same 
terms)  from  the  consumer.  This  larger  price  is  the 
whole  ultimate  object  of  the  farmer;  and  provided  it 
is  sufficient  he  is  satisfied. 

This  then  appears  to  have  been  the  essence  of  the 
corn-laws.  At  the  price  at  which  com  would  be  sold 
in  the  English  market,  provided  that  market  were  open 
to  all  the  world,  the  farmer  could  only  pay  a  certain 
rent  for  land;  but,  provided  all  foreign  competition 
was  excluded  up  to  a  given  point,  the  farmer  could 
aflTord  to  pay  a  much  higher  rent  for  land,  and  yet 
derive  the  same  real  profit.  The  farmer  was  deluded 
into  the  idea  of  obtaining  a  high  price  for  com,  and 
naturally  gave,  or  stipulated  to  give,  a  high  price  for 

56 


land.  The  evil  was  unseen  in  Its  real  malignity,  until 
the  abundant  harvests  of  1835  and  1836.  The  farmers 
were  then  reduced  to  sell  at  a  natural  price,  while  they 
had  to  pay  a  taxation  rent,  and  of  course  they  felt  the 
weight  of  that  system  of  legislation  which  attempted 
to  amend  the  order  of  Providence,  and  on  which,  with 
all  its  nice  adjustments,  the  landed  legislators  had  des- 
canted so  wisely. 

The  low  price  of  com  at  that  period  let  the  manu- 
facturers into  a  secret;  they  obtained  great  sums  of 
money,  and  with  the  money  obtained  what  was  of  more 
value  to  the  country — they  obtained  knowledge.  They 
were  taught  that  their  commercial  prosperity  de- 
pended, in  a  great  measure,  on  the  low  price  of  corn 
in  Britain ;  and  a  very  cursory  consideration  may  ex- 
plain how  this  happens.  Let  us  suppose  that  there 
are  five  millions  of  the  laboring  population  who  have  a 
gross  income  of  from  10s.  or  12s.  to  30s.  or  40s.  per 
week.  The  laborer,  out  of  his  income,  has  to  provide 
the  three  great  requisites — food,  shelter,  and  raiment; 
and,  even  at  the  best  and  most  prosperous  of  times,  his 
earnings  are  not  much  more  than  sufficient  to  procure 
these  in  decent  abundance.  Let  us  suppose  that  wheat 
is  at  40s.  per  quarter,  and  that  a  laborer's  family  con- 
sumes 4s.  worth  of  bread  per  week.  He  then  has  the 
remainder  of  his  week's  income  to  dispose  of  in  the 
purchase  of  his  other  requisites.  But  let  wheat  rise  to 
80s.  per  quarter,  and  he  must  then  expend  8s.  per  week 
for  the  same  quantity  of  bread  that  he  previously  pur- 
chased for  4s.  We  have  here  a  difference  of  4s.  per 
week;  and  the  question  is.  What  does  the  laborer  do 
with  those  4s.  when  bread  is  cheap?  The  answer  is 
very  simple — he  spends  it  with  the  manufacturer.  The 
laborer  is  at  ease  in  his  circumstances  because  he  has 
this  little  revenue  of  4s.  a  week  to  come  and  go  on.     It 

57 


is  true,  he  must  lay  it  out  carefully ;  but  then  how  dif- 
ferent to  have  it  to  think  about,  instead  of  having  it 
screwed  out  of  him  by  a  crying  pressure  for  food! 
When  he  has  it,  he  feels  himself  a  free  man,  he  has  a 
new  social  and  domestic  existence,  he  is  a  buyer  from 
choice,  not  from  necessity;  and  the  family  deliberations 
as  to  how  it  shall  be  spent,  give  a  new  interest  to  the 
hours  he  spends  at  home.  All  goes  on  merrily,  and  old 
England  is  worth  all  the  countries  under  the  sun. 

Let  us  take  even  a  moderate  estimate  of  this  4s.  a 
week,  and  we  shall  see  how  vast  a  sum  it  amounts  to 
in  the  course  of  a  year.  Suppose  that  five  millions  have 
it  to  spend,  and  that  those  five  millions  spend  £10  with 
the  manufacturers.  Fifty  millions  sterling  arises  from 
the  difference  in  the  price  of  com !  Had  the  corn- 
laws  operated  according  to  the  intentions  of  land-pro- 
prietors, and  kept  wheat  at  80s.  in  the  year  1836, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  they  would  have 
deprived  the  laboring  population  of  fifty  millions  worth 
of  goods,  and  the  manufacturers  of  fifty  millions  worth 
of  sales,  as  directly  as  if  those  fifty  millions  had  been 
wrested  by  violence  from  the  laborer;  but  this  is  one 
of  the  facts  which  the  indirect  system  of  taxation  is 
employed  to  conceal. 

The  repeal  of  the  corn-laws  was  effected  by  a  great 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason.  Certain  in- 
dividuals found  that  their  lawful  interests  were  seriously 
injured  by  the  interference  of  the  enacbnents,  and  they 
resolved  to  make  an  effort  for  the  abolition  of  those 
enactments.  Of  themselves  they  were  utterly  powerless, 
and  all  their  individual  exertions  would  have  been  inef- 
fectual to  achieve  their  end.  They  had,  however,  knowl- 
edge and  reason  on  their  side ;  that  is,  they  v/ere  in  pos- 
session of  certain  facts,  which  led  by  necessary  infer- 
ence to  the  conclusion,  that  the  corn-laws  were  eminently 

58 


prejudicial  in  their  operation,  and  that  therefore  the 
corn-laws  should  no  longer  be  allowed  to  exist.  Con- 
scious that  they  had  truth  on  their  side,  they  came 
fearlessly  before  the  nation,  and  staked  their  cause 
on  the  power  of  truth  to  convince  the  mass  of  the  popu- 
lation. They  lectured,  and  published,  and  spoke,  and 
argued,  all  for  one  specific  end;  namely,  to  communi- 
cate knowledge  to  the  nation,  and  thereby  to  make  the 
nation  change  its  credence  on  the  subject  of  the  corn- 
laws.  The  truth  gradually  prevailed;  that  is,  was 
generally  disseminated;  that  is,  the  same  knowledge 
was  received  by  a  larger  number  of  individuals,  who 
naturally  drew  the  same  necessary  inference.  A  great 
combination  was  formed,  such  as  must  ever  remain  one 
of  the  historic  glories  of  Britain  and  of  Britons.  It 
was  essentially  a  combination  of  knowledge  and  rea- 
son ;  and  well-grounded  argument  was  the  only  weapon 
v/ith  which  it  maintained  the  contest.  Far  more  was 
involved  than  a  mere  change  in  the  economical  laws  of 
the  kingdom ;  it  was  a  contest  between  the  two  great 
classes  of  British  society — the  unprivileged  laborers 
and  the  privileged  landowners.  The  privileged  classes, 
almost  to  a  man,  were  against  the  change;  and  they 
also,  on  their  side,  endeavored  to  establish  a  combina- 
tion— a  combination  of  class  interest,  in  which  the  only 
available  argument  was  the  pecuniary  interest  of  the 
order.  The  exertions  made  by  the  anti-com-law  party 
to  convince  the  judgment  of  the  nation  were  prodigious 
and  never  had  any  political  agitation  so  much  the  ap- 
pearance of  instructing,  and  so  little  the  appearance  of 
exciting  the  passions.  Instead  of  the  vague  harangues 
of  noisy  and  designing  demagogues,  there  was  the  so- 
ber communication  of  information  which  would  have 
been  interesting  and  instructive,  even  had  it  been  alto- 
gether  unoonnected   with   the   great   practical   conse- 

59 


quence.  The  nation  was  convinced  at  last;  and  not- 
withstanding all  the  influence  of  the  aristocracy,  and 
all  the  unwillingness  of  the  Government,  the  laws  were 
repealed,  and,  as  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose, 
abolished  forever. 

Both  the  slave-laws  and  the  corn-laws  were  positive 
enactments  to  restrain  and  diminish  the  natural  liberty 
of  men  who  had  infringed  no  law  of  equity,  and  who 
had  in  no  respect  injured  their  fellow-men  by  force, 
fraud,  or  licentiousness.  The  abolition  of  those  laws, 
therefore,  was  only  to  allow  things  to  remain  as  they 
were  established  by  nature;  and  when  the  world  dis- 
covers that  God  has  constituted  nature  aright,  men 
will  have  arrived  at  the  first  and  greatest  principle  of 
social  science. 

The  legislators  of  the  country  were,  in  their  private 
capacity,  extensively  interested  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  unjust  laws;  and  thus,  in  opposing  their  repeal, 
were  using  their  official  influence  for  their  own  per- 
sonal advantage  to  the  eminent  detriment  of  their  fel- 
low-subjects. 

The  abolition  of  the  slave-  and  corn-laws  was  only 
attained  after  a  long  and  arduous  struggle;  the  legis- 
lature of  Great  Britain,  so  far  from  taking  the  initia- 
tive in  their  repeal,  offered  every  possible  opposition 
to  the  wishes  of  the  nation ;  and  it  was  only  when  the 
pressure  from  without  became  so  imperative  that  fur- 
ther resistance  might  have  been  dangerous,  that  the 
deliberative  assembly  of  the  freest  state  in  the  world, 
declared  that  it  was  not  a  crime  for  a  man  with  a  dark 
skin  to  enjoy  natural  freedom,  or  for  a  trader  to  im- 
port corn  without  being  subject  to  a  tax  so  enormous, 
that  it  usually  operated  as  a  prohibition. 

The  slave-  and  corn-laws  were  at  last  repealed,  by  a 
process  which  we  doubt  not  will  ultimately  achieve  the 

60 


repeal  of  every  law  which  restricts  or  prohibits  actions 
not  naturally  criminal — the  wiser  and  better  part  of 
the  nation  combined  against  the  legislature.  On  the 
one  hand  were  knowledge,  reason,  and  religion;  on  the 
other,  prescriptive  privilege,  and  the  will  of  the  legis- 
lator. The  abolition  of  slavery  was  a  question  of  jus- 
tice ;  the  abolition  of  the  corn-laws,  a  question  of  bene- 
fit. The  main  argument  advanced  against  slavery  was 
that  it  was  unjust;  the  main  argument  advanced 
against  the  corn-laws  was  that  they  were  prejudicial 
to  the  country. 

The  argument  of  justice  proceeds  upon  the  principle 
that  certain  actions  may  not  be  done,  whatever  be 
their  consequences.  The  argument  of  benefit  assumes 
that  the  action  itself  is  indifferent ;  that  is,  that  It 
has  not  In  itself  any  such  moral  character  as  will  en- 
able us  to  pronounce  at  once,  whether  it  ought  or 
ought  not  to  be  done. 

History  teaches  us,  that  It  is  not  sufficient  for  men 
to  know  that  an  action  or  an  enactment  is  unjust  to 
induce  them  to  abandon  the  action,  or  to  abolish  the 
enactment ;  for  this  they  seldom  do  until  the  evidence 
of  the  evil  fruits  of  the  Injustice  are  so  superabundant, 
that  no  mere  sophism  can  be  longer  held  as  an  excuse. 
The  argument  of  justice,  instead  of  being  the  most 
practically  influential,  as  it  is  the  most  morally  valid, 
is  seldom  of  avail  until  backed  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
economical  evils  that  never  in  any  one  case  fail  to  ac- 
company Injustice;  and  though  the  voice  of  God,  and 
the  voice  of  universal  reason  may  ever  be  heard  pro- 
claiming, "  Do  not  unto  others  as  ye  would  not  that 
others  should  do  unto  you,"  it  is  not  until  some  sum- 
mation of  evil  consequences  has  convinced  men  of  their 
error,  that  they  abandon  their  course  of  lawless  self- 
ishness, and  allow  the  constitution  of  society  to  remain 

61 


on  the  natural  footing  established  by  the  Creator. 
And  in  this  we  may  see  the  reason  why  the  political 
progress  of  mankind  has  been  so  slow,  and  why  an 
extensive  knowledge  of  facts  must  accompany  an  ad- 
mission of  principles,  before  societies  awake  to  the 
necessity  of  remodelling  their  constitution,  and  re- 
turning from  the  systems  established  in  barbarous 
ages,  to  the  more  simple  and  equitable  system  which 
the  eye  of  reason  may  read  in  the  constitution  of  har- 
monious nature.  It  is  ever  immutably  and  irrevocably 
wrong,  that  any  man,  or  any  body  of  men  whatever, 
should  constrain  another  man,  not  a  criminal,  to  labor 
for  the  advantage  of  any  save  himself  and  his  kindred ; 
yet  half  a  century  of  agitation  was  necessary  before 
England  withdrew  her  oppressing  arm  from  the  negro ; 
and  then  the  negro  was  only  emancipated  by  wresting 
his  price  from  the  population  of  Britain. 

Such  were  two  modern  instances  of  the  combination 
of  knowledge  and  reason, — spirit-stirring  exhibitions 
of  the  energies  of  a  noble  people  warring  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  injustice,  and  for  the  emancipation  of  legiti- 
mate industry. 

Notwithstanding  the  length  of  our  argument  con- 
cerning the  combination  of  knowledge  and  reason,  we 
shall  not  consider  it  too  lengthened,  if  it  in  anywise 
contributes  to  elucidate  those  means  that  must  be  put 
in  operation  for  advancing  the  political  progress  of 
mankind.  It  is  the  greatest  possible  absurdity  to  sup- 
pose that  all  the  changes  that  take  place  in  the  polit- 
ical condition  of  societies  are  only  portions  of  a  rou- 
tine which,  when  fulfilled,  is  to  commence  again,  and 
again  to  present  the  same  phases,  and  the  same  or 
analogous  phenomena.  No ;  the  political  progress  of 
mankind  is  a  passage  to  one  definite  end,  to  an  ultima- 
tum, to  a  condition  that  requires  no  further  change,  to 

62 


a  stable  s^^stem  of  law  that  does  not  demand  perpetual 
deliberation,  but  only  perpetual  administration ;  and 
the  great  question  for  the  political  world  is,  "  What 
is  that  end?  What  is  that  system?  What  is  that 
ultimatum  ? "  What,  in  fact,  is  the  political  con- 
dition of  society  that  controverts  no  principle  of 
reason,  and  sins  against  no  precept  of  religion?  for 
this,  we  may  rest  assured,  is  the  ultimate  end  towards 
which  all  civilized  societies  must  progress ;  no  man  for 
a  moment  can  hesitate  to  pronounce,  or  to  prophesy 
with  unlimited  assurance,  that  the  negroes  in  the  slave 
states  of  America  will  ultimately  obtain  their  freedom, 
and  that  the  serfs  of  Russia  will  ultimately  be  eman- 
cipated. 

The  real  history  of  political  progress  commences 
only  at  that  period  where  the  maximum  of  disparity 
between  the  various  orders  or  classes  begins  to  be  sys- 
tematically diminished.  From  this  point  (which  is 
chronologically  different  in  the  various  countries) 
there  is  a  natural  course  of  progress,  different  in  the 
outward  circumstances  of  its  manifestation,  but  essen- 
tially the  same  in  its  abstract  characters,  in  every 
country  that  achieves  civilization.  The  essence  of  this 
progress  is  the  gradual  emancipation  of  the  rights  of 
the  serf  or  unprivileged  laborer,  and  the  corresponding 
diminution  of  the  privileges  of  the  lord.  Now  it  may 
be  observed,  that  the  great  revolutions  which  take  place 
in  the  earlier  portions  of  this  progress  are  physical 
force  revolutions,  changes  brought  about  by  the  sword, 
because  there  are  no  other  means  sufficiently  powerful 
to  effect  them.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  see  v/hy.  Were  the 
privileged  classes  to  admit  reason  as  the  umpire,  there 
would  be  no  necessity  for  force  revolutions ;  but  as  the 
changes  come  to  be  necessary,  they  must  be  achieved 
by  such  means  as  will  effect  them,  however  undesirable 

63 


it  may  be  that  such  means  should  be  necessary.  Where, 
however,  liberty  has  made  a  real  progress,  knowledge 
must  have  made  a  real  progress ;  and  where  knowledge 
has  progressed,  reason  becomes  as  powerful  an  agent 
as  force  and  one  which  ought  ever  to  be  chosen  if  the 
alternative  be  in  our  choice. 

The  history  of  civilized  communities  shows  us,  that 
the  progression  of  mankind  in  a  political  aspect  is, 
from  a  diversity  of  privileges  towards  an  equality  of 
rights. 

That  one  man  can  have  a  privilege  only  by  depriv- 
ing another  man,  or  many  other  men,  of  a  portion  of 
their  rights,  consequently,  a  reign  of  justice  will  con- 
sist in  the  destruction  of  every  privilege,  and  in  the 
restitution  of  every  right. 

That  under  the  supreme  direction  of  divine  provi- 
dence, man  is  the  agent  employed  in  working  out  his 
own  political  wellbeing. 

That  man  cannot  work  out  his  political  wellbeing 
unless  he  knows  wherein  that  wellbeing  consists.  Knowl- 
edge, therefore,  is  necessary  to  enable  man  to  work  out 
his  political  wellbeing. 

That  men  must  know  correctly  before  they  can  act 
correctly. 

That  the  political  wellbeing  of  mankind  involves  two 
things — correct  knowledge  and  correct  action.  Cor- 
rect action  is  knowledge  carried  into  practical  opera- 
tion. 

That  the  political  regeneration  of  mankind  is  de- 
pending on  the  acquisition  and  promulgation  of  po- 
litical knowledge. 

That  in  the  laws  which  should  regulate  man's  politi- 
cal action,  there  is  a  truth  and  a  falsehood,  as  much  as 
there  is  a  truth  and  a  falsehood  in  matters  of  geomet- 
ric or  astronomic  science. 

64t 


That  the  political  condition  of  men  can  never  be 
what  it  ought  to  be,  until  men  have  acquired  the  req- 
uisite knowledge;  that  is,  until  they  have  perfected 
political  science,  and  reduced  it  to  the  same  form  and 
ordination  as  any  of  the  other  sciences. 

That,  with  the  perfection  of  political  science,  there 
will  necessarily  follow  an  amended  order  of  political 
action,  and  consequently  an  amended  condition  of 
society. 

That  political  knowledge  is  divided  into  two  dis- 
tinct branches ;  First,  a  sensational  branch,  which  fur- 
nishes us  with  the  facts  of  man's  condition,  and  the 
actual  results  of  human  action ;  Second,  a  rational 
branch  which  furnishes  us  with  the  principles  that 
ought  to  regulate  human  action. 

The  first  is  political  economy ;  the  second  is  politics, 
or  the  science  of  equity. 

That  improvements  in  the  political  conditions  of  a 
country  are  made  exactly  in  proportion  as  the  truths 
of  political  economy  and  political  science  are  reduced 
to  practice. 

That  in  every  country  there  are  privileged  classes 
who  have  more  power  or  more  property  than  they  are 
justly  entitled  to,  and  unprivileged  classes  who  have 
less  power  or  less  property  than  they  are  justly  en- 
titled to.  That  the  difference  between  these  two 
classes  has  been  undergoing  a  gradual  but  sure  proc- 
ess of  diminution.     This  fact  we  learn  from  history. 

That  the  further  progress  of  the  diminution  in  the 
difference  between  the  privileged  and  unprivileged 
classes,  may  be  surely  anticipated  as  the  continuation 
of  a  process  that  has  already  been  going  on  for  cen- 
turies. 

That  the  absolute  equality  of  men  in  all  political 
rights   is  the  ultimate  end    of    political    progression. 

65 


That  so  long  as  there  Is  not  absolute  equality  of  polit- 
ical rights,  there  is  the  constant  element  of  further 
change  and  consequently  good  reason  for  anticipating 
further  change. 

That  while  a  single  individual  may  or  may  not  de- 
termine his  actions  according  to  his  knowledge,  the 
constitution  of  humanity  in  the  mass  necessarily  de- 
termines, that  wherever  knowledge  is  obtained,  system- 
atically ordinated,  and  generally  diffused,  an  amended 
order  of  action  will  invariably  result. 

But  as  the  old  condition  necessarily  involves  the 
interests  of  some  parties  (placemen,  slave-ov/ners, 
land-owners,  for  instance),  the  transition  from  the  old 
condition,  which  was  erroneous,  to  the  new  and 
amended  condition,  is  always  the  cause  of  a  social 
struggle  between  the  partisans  of  the  old  condition 
and  the  partisans  of  the  new. 

If  the  change  be  sought  in  a  country  that  has  at- 
tained to  liberty  of  discussion,  a  free  press,  a  tolerably 
extensive  representation,  etc.  (that  is,  where  delibera- 
tive judgment  and  not  mere  will  rules),  the  sword 
(always  an  evil,  though  sometimes  necessary)  may  be 
superseded  by  the  moral  force  of  truth.  Knowledge 
disseminated  will  convince  the  masses,  and  when  the 
masses  are  convinced  they  will  combine,  and  when  they 
combine,  the  change,  sooner  or  later,  will  follow  as 
a  necessary  consequence.  But  wherever  the  unjust 
interests  of  the  ruling  classes  are  required  to  give  way 
before  the  progress  of  knowledge,  and  those  ruling 
classes  peremptorily  refuse  to  allow  the  condition  of 
society  to  be  amended,  the  sword  is  the  instrument 
which  knowledge  and  reason  may  be  compelled  to  use; 
for  it  is  not  possible,  It  is  not  within  the  limits  of  man's 
choice,  that  the  progress  of  society  can  be  permanently 
arrested  when  the  intellect  of  the  masses  has  advanced 

66 


In  knowledge  beyond  those  propositions,  of  which  the 
present  condition  is  only  the  realization. 

We  posit,  finally,  that  the  acquisition,  scientific 
ordination,  and  general  diffusion  of  knowledge,  will 
necessaril}^  obliterate  error  and  superstition,  and  con- 
tinually amend  the  condition  of  man  upon  the  globe, 
until  his  ultimate  condition  shall  be  the  best  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  earth  permit  of.  When  the  rule  of 
reason  and  equal  justice  to  all  has  superseded  the  rule 
of  superstition  and  prescription,  and  when  the  doc- 
trine of  equality  has  been  applied  to  society  and 
we  have  no  privileges,  no  hereditary  distinctions, 
and  no  diversity  of  conditions,  except  those  lof  office 
or  those  produced  by  the  more  or  less  successful  result 
of  industry,  skill  or  enterprise,  v/e  shall  have  a  system 
that  contains  within  Itself  the  construction  of  a  jural 
society,  and  also  the  obliteration  of  all  just  cause  of 
war.  On  this  ground  we  take  up  the  natural  probabil- 
ity of  a  millennium  whose  natural  probability  we  main- 
tain to  be  within  the  calculation  of  the  human  reason. 


67 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    THEORY    OF    MAn's   INTELLECTUAL    PROGRESSION 

THERE  are  only  so  many  possible  sciences,  al- 
though each  science,  in  its  own  department, 
may  be  pursued  indefinitely. 

The  sciences  are  capable  of  being  classed  on  a  sys- 
tem which  is  not  arbitrary. 

Classification  is  a  mere  process  of  the  intellect 
whereby  the  sciences  are  arranged  in  a  certain  order, 
according  to  a  principle.  The  discovery  of  the  sci- 
ences is  a  historical  fact  extending  over  many  cen- 
turies. We  assert  that  the  order  of  discovery  has 
been  correlative  with  the  order  of  classification.  There 
is,  therefore,  the  strongest  ground  for  believing  that 
the  future  sciences  will  be  discovered  and  reduced  to 
ordination  in  the  same  order  that  they  stand  in  the 
scheme  of  classification. 

Correlative  with  the  sciences  are  the  arts. 

The  sciences  are  knowledge,  the  arts  are  action. 

With  the  discovery  of  the  sciences,  there  follows  in- 
variably a  new  and  amended  order  of  action.  The 
word  art  we  use  as  signifying  the  systematic  products 
of  human  activity.  The  fine  arts  are,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, the  gift  of  the  individual,  and  consequently  arc 
so  far  independent  of  science. 

The  sciences  are  classed  on  their  complexity. 

Let  it  be  remembered  that  science  is  not  a  reality, 
but  only  a  form  of  thought.  Science  exists  in  the 
mind,  and  in  the  mind  alone;  it  is  the  mind's  mode  of 
viewing  reality. 

68 


The  realities  are  matter  and  mind. 

Reasoning  is  subsequent  to  a  propositional  knowl- 
edge, and  is  the  process  whereby  a  new  proposition 
is  made  to  evolve  from  two  anterior  propositions. 

The  syllogism  is  the  complete  expression,  in  lan- 
guage, for  reasoning ;  and  both  are  correlative  with  all 
the  active  functions  of  real  nature. 

Were  man  incapable  of  reasoning,  he  might  appre- 
hend all  the  realities  of  nature,  and  classify  all  on 
the  most  perfect  system  of  ordination ;  but  never,  by 
any  possibility,  could  he  explain  and  calculate  the 
functions  of  realities.  Every  function  is  active,  and 
every  action  involves  an  agent  (or  cause)  ;  and  were 
man  not  endowed  with  the  intuitive  principle  of  causa- 
tion, all  motions,  combinations,  functions,  in  a  word, 
all  changes,  would  immediately  become  inexplicable, 
and  the  universe  would  forever  remain  a  vast  enigma. 

The  actual  constitution  of  the  human  intellect  is  as 
absolutely  necessary  to  all  science,  as  is  the  existence 
of  the  realities  of  which  the  sciences  respectively  treat. 

This  is  the  necessary  order  of  the  mathematical 
sciences. 

Logic;  which  really  includes  two  sciences. 

Arithmetic ;  algebra  ;  geometry ;  statics. 

In  this  order,  the  mathematical  sciences  must  neces- 
sarily be  classed,  and  in  this  order  the  mathematical 
sciences  must  necessarily  be  discovered.  Ten  thousand 
men  originating  the  mathematical  sciences  by  a  proc- 
ess of  independent  investigation,  would  necessarily 
discover  them  in  this  order;  and  were  ten  thousand 
worlds  peopled  with  human  beings  to  go  through  the 
process  of  making  anew  the  mathematical  sciences, 
every  one  of  those  human  races  would  pass  through 
the  same  intellectual  course,  and  evolve  the  abstract 
sciences  exactly  in  the  same  necessary  lorder.       The 

69 


constitution  of  human  reason  forbids  that  it  should  be 
otherwise;  one  science  being  impossible  until  its  ante- 
cedent is  so  well  known  as  to  be  capable  of  subjective 
operation.  Thus,  unless  the  laws  -of  identity  are 
known,  there  can  be  no  investigation  of  the  laws  of 
equality;  and  until  the  laws  of  equality  are  known, 
there  can  be  no  investigation  of  the  laws  of  numbers ; 
and  until  arithmetic  is  known,  there  can  be  no  investi- 
gation of  the  laws  of  quantity;  and  until  the  laws  of 
quantity  are  known,  there  can  be  no  investigation  into 
the  relations  of  spaces ;  and  until  geometry  is  known, 
there  can  be  no  statics. 

Without  the  mathematical  sciences  there  can  be  no 
physical  science — there  may  be  classifications,  facts, 
propositions  innumerable;  but  science,  which  involves 
the  syllogism,  there  never  can  be  till  the  abstract 
sciences  are  so  far  advanced  as  to  be  capable  of  sub- 
jective application  to  the  real  facts  of  nature. 

Logic  is  the  universal  form  of  all  science.  The 
mathematical  sciences  are  only  logic,  with  numbers, 
quantities,  spaces,  or  forces  for  the  terms ;  and  the 
physical  sciences  are  only  logic,  with  physical  reali- 
ties for  the  terms.  The  form  remains  universally  the 
same. 

It  is  evident  that  all  the  physical  sciences  must  be 
based  on  the  observation  of  the  existence,  condition, 
and  function  of  the  real  matter  with  which  man  is 
acquainted. 

The  physical  sciences  may  be  termed,  nature  seen 
by  the  reason,  and  not  merely  by  the  senses. 

Between  the  syllogism,  the  intellectual  reason  of 
mankind,  and  the  operations  of  external  nature,  there 
is  the  most  perfect  parallelism;  and  this  parallelism 
affords  a  most  undoubted  proof  of  the  objective  vera- 
city of  the  subjective  convictions  of  the  human  mind. 

70 


Were  the  general  convictions  of  the  human  reason  (its 
axioms)  not  true  objectively,  as  well  as  necessarily 
true  subjectively,  the  prediction  of  physical  phenom- 
ena would  be  absolutely  impossible.  And  although 
the  philosophic  sceptic  may  by  ingenious  ambiguities 
involve  that  question  in  doubts  and  sophisms,  surely 
we  may  rest  satisfied  that  the  same  hand  that  made 
the  heavens  and  the  earth  in  so  wonderful  a  harmony 
of  order,  has  not  made  the  human  reason  only  a  mock- 
ery and  a  delusion. 

All  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  operations — things 
done.  Now,  science  consists  of  knowledge,  and  knowl- 
edge exists  in  the  mind.  How,  then,  are  we  to  view 
the  real  operations  of  nature,  considered  as  external 
to  the  mind? 

The  real  operations  of  nature  are  to  be  viewed  as 
arts — as  divine  arts — and  their  comprehension  alone 
can  be  called  science.  The  universe  is  God's  great 
workshop,  and  man  is  the  rational  spectator  whose  office 
it  is  to  comprehend  the  processes  that  are  there  car- 
ried on.  The  motions  of  the  planets  do  not  constitute 
science;  it  is  the  rational  apprehension  of  those  mo- 
tions in  the  human  mind  that  constitutes  science.  But 
the  principles  of  mechanics  are  far  more  general  tlian 
all  the  facts  of  astronomy;  they  apply  not  only  to 
the  real  sun  and  the  real  planets,  but  to  all  possible 
suns,  and  to  all  possible  matter  constituted  in  a  manner 
similar  to  the  matter  with  which  we  are  acquainted. 

Consequently  astronomy,  vast  as  it  is,  must  be 
viewed  only  as  a  real  illustration  of  the  principles  of 
mechanics,  as   an  exemplification  of  dynamics. 

We  have  said  that  the  classification  of  the  sciences, 
and  their  chronological  discovery,  must  follow  the 
order  of  their  complexity.  After  the  inorganic  sci- 
ences, therefore,  come  the  sciences  of  organization,  of 

71 


vegetable  and  animal  physiology,  showing  a  continual 
increase  of  complexity  until  we  arrive  at  man,  the  most 
complex  and  most  highly  organized  of  all  the  earth's 
inhabitants. 

But  still,  though  physiology  be  the  highest  and 
most  complex  of  all  the  physical  sciences,  there  Is 
something  beyond  it,  something  that  comes  after  it  in 
the  logical  order  of  classification.  Man  himself  has 
his  functions ;  and  when  we  have  considered  what  man 
is,  we  may  turn  to  what  man  does. 

Man  Is  by  nature  a  social  being,  made  to  live  in 
society,  and  his  social  acts  have  their  laws,  which 
when  understood  give  us  a  new  order  of  knowledge 
altogether  distinct  from  the  knowledge  contained  In 
the  previous  sciences.  And  again,  men  may  trespass 
on  each  other — may  inflict  pain  on  each  other — may 
do  evil  to  each  other.     Men  therefore  must  legislate. 

And  here  an  evident  distinction  presents  itself,  which 
enables  us  to  classify  human  action.  We  may  ask, 
"What  means  will  lead  to  a  certain  end?"  and 
"  What  Is  the  end  that  ought  to  be  produced  ?  " 

We  have  here  two  social  sciences,  in  each  of  which 
there  Is  the  same  stable  truth  that  prevails  In  all  the 
other  sciences,  if  man  can  only  discover  it  and  reduce 
it  to  scientific  ordination.  It  must  be  within  the  reach 
of  man,  or  else  we  must  admit  that  all  rules  of  social 
action  are  purely  arbitrary ;  that  Is,  In  fact,  that  there 
are  no  rules.  Such  a  supposition,  however,  is  per- 
fectly absurd,  and  can  never  be  consistently  main- 
tained. 

On  the  above  distinction  Is  grounded  the  division  of 
social  science  into  non-moral  and  moral;  the  one  treat- 
ing exclusively  on  the  relation  of  means  to  an  end, 
and  the  other  exclusively  on  the  end  that  ought  to  be 
the  object  of  pursuit. 

72 


In  these  new  sciences  human  action  is  the  element 
with  which  we  have  to  reason;  and  the  conditions  of 
men  are  the  phenomena  that  result  directly  from  that 
action. 

The  first  of  these  sciences  is  political  economy, 
which  is  purely  inductive,  and  treats  of  the  physical 
effects  of  human  action  so  far  as  those  effects  are  to 
be  discovered  in  the  condition  of  societies.  The  second 
is  politics,  the  science  of  equity  which  is  purely  ab- 
stract, and  treats  of  the  universal  principles  that 
ought  to  regulate  human  action,  so  far  as  men  can 
affect  each  other  by  their  actions. 

The  fundamental  noun-substantive  of  poltical  econ- 
omy is  utility,  of  which  value  is  the  measure.  The 
fundamental  noun-substantive  of  politics  is  equity, 
which,  having  its  abstract  laws  in  the  very  constitution 
of  the  human  mind,  gives  us  the  moral  measure  of 
human  action. 

The  principles  of  this  equity  are  abstract  and  uni- 
versal convictions  of  the  reason. 

We  maintain,  then. 

First,  That  the  sciences,  classed  on  their  com- 
plexity, must  be  classed  in  the  following  order: 

1st,  The  mathematical  and  force  sciences. 

2d,  The  inorganic  physical  sciences,  beginning  with 
the  most  general,  and  terminating  with  the  most 
specific. 

Sd,  The  organic  physical  sciences,  composed  of 
vegetable  and  animal  physiology. 

4th,  The  sciences  that  relate  exclusively  to  man, 
and  that  treat  of  human  action.  These  are  (1)  non- 
moral,  political  economy,  which  treats  of  the  bene- 
ficial or  prejudicial  effects  of  human  action;  (2) 
moral,  politics,  which  treats  of  the  moral  character  of 
human  action,  whether  that  action  be  the  action  of  a 

73 


single  individual  towards  another  individual,  or 
whether  it  be  the  action  of  a  whole  society,  or  portion 
of  a  society.  Politics  is,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than 
the  moral  law  which  ought  to  regulate  the  actions  of 
the  individual,  extended  to  the  actions  of  men  when 
associated  as  a  political  society,  the  same  moral  law 
being  obligatory  on  multitudes  that  is  obligatory  on 
the  individual. 

This  is  the  essence  of  human  welfare, — truth  dis- 
covered and  carried  into  practical  operation. 

Let  it  be  remembered  that  the  progress  of  mankind 
in  the  evolution  of  civilization,  is  a  progress  from 
superstition  and  error  towards  knowledge.  Super- 
stition and  error  present  themselves  under  the  form  of 
diversity  of  credence;  knowledge  presents  itself  under 
the  form  of  unity  of  credence.  Wherever  there  is 
knowledge,  that  knowledge  is  the  same  in  all  pai-ts  of 
the  earth,  and  the  same  in  substance  whatever  lan- 
guage it  may  use  as  the  instrument  of  expression.  The 
progress  of  mankind,  therefore,  is  a  progress  from  di- 
versity of  credence  towards  unity  of  credence.  There  is 
but  one  truth,  one  scheme  of  knowledge;  and  conse- 
quently, wherever  knowledge  is  really  attained,  diver- 
sity of  credence  is  impossible.  Where  men  differ  in 
credence,  they  differ  because  one  or  all  have  not  knowl- 
edge. 

We  have  then  to  ask,  Into  what  branches  is  knowl- 
edge divided.?  Into  the  facts  of  sensational  and 
psychological  observation,  rational  science,  and  his- 
tory. 

Next,  "  In  what  chronological  order  have  the  vari- 
ous branches  been  reduced  to  scientific  ordination.''" 
The  chronological  order  in  which  the  sciences  have 
been  discovered,  or  reduced  to  ordination,  is  correla- 
tive with  the  logical  scheme  of  classification.       One 

74 


science  must  precede  another  m  chronological  dis- 
covery, because  it  is  requisite  to  render  that  other 
science  discoverable.  The  one  is  the  means  whereby 
we  attain  to  the  other,  just  as  In  a  single  science  one 
problem  must  be  solved  before  we  can,  by  any  possi- 
bility, attain  to  the  solution  of  another  problem.  And 
the  law  of  this  dependence  of  one  science  on  another 
is,  that  the  truths  of  the  antecedent  science  which  are 
the  objects  of  research  when  we  study  that  science, 
become  subjective — that  is,  means  of  operation — 
v/hen  we  study  the  consequent  science. 

It  Is  Impossible,  therefore,  that  the  sciences  should 
be  discovered  In  any  other  than  a  certain  order;  that 
Is,  man  must  acquire  knowledge  en  a  scheme  which 
has  laws  as  fixed  and  definite  as  the  very  laws  of  the 
sciences  themselves. 

We  may  remark,  however,  that,  although  the  sci- 
ences are  necessarily  antecedent  and  consequent  to 
each  other,  they  Interweave  or  overlap  each  other  In 
their  chronological  evolution ;  just  as  father  and  son 
may  be  alive  at  the  same  time,  yet  the  father  Is  neces- 
sarily older  than  the  son.  And  in  the  evolution  of  the 
sciences,  we  may  have  several  generations  on  foot  at 
a  given  period;  we  may  have  three,  four,  five,  or  six 
sciences  all  undergoing  the  process  of  evolution,  but 
all  at  different  stages  of  progress. 

Let  us  take  chemistry  as  the  most  advanced  inor- 
ganic physical  science,  and  classify  the  sciences  that 
follow  chemistry  In  the  natural  scheme  of  classifica- 
tion.   We  have  then — 

Chemistry. 

Vegetable   physiology 
Animal  physiology. 
Man-science. 
75 


The  new  tenn  acquired  in  the  passage  from  the 
inorganic  to  the  organic  sciences,  is  vitality — life. 

The  maintenance  of  animal  life  is  the  physical  ulti- 
matum of  the  earth,  the  last  final  function  of  matter. 
When  we  proceed  beyond  this,  we  arrive  at  a  region 
where  the  functions  are  no  longer  purely  physical; 
for  although  man  in  his  political  economy  may  partly 
be  viewed  as  a  higher  kind  of  animal,  yet  his  functions, 
even  in  that  region,  are  essentially  distinguished  from 
those  of  animals  by  the  introduction  of  intellectual 
computation. 

When,  therefore,  we  turn  to  the  sustentation  of  men 
associated  together  in  society,  we  have  passed  from  the 
region  of  mere  organization,  and  have  entered  the 
sphere  of  rational  intelligence. 

The  science  that  treats  of  the  production  and  dis- 
tribution of  food,  and  the  other  physical  requirements 
of  man,  is  termed  political  economy;  and  the  ultima- 
tum of  that  science  is,  "  How  may  the  greatest  physi- 
cal good  be  procured  for  the  greatest  number?  " 

This  ultimatum  is  not  arbitrary,  as  some  would 
almost  have  us  suppose;  it  is  the  necessary  end  of  the 
science  if  that  science  have  any  existence.  Just  as 
we  are  necessarily  led  to  view  the  surface  of  the  earth 
in  its  function  of  sustaining  vegetable  life,  and  the 
vegetable  kingdom  in  its  function  of  sustaining  animal 
life ;  so  are  we  led  by  the  very  laws  of  our  intelligence  to 
posit  the  physical  benefit  of  mankind  as  the  ultimatum 
to  which  all  economical  arrangements  should  tend, 
if  they  do  not  depart  from  the  very  intention  which 
is  the  ground  and  origin  of  their  existence. 

But  political  economy  is  a  mere  computation  of 
antecedences  and  sequences:  it  tells  what  results  follow 
certain  conditions ;  and,  generalizing  its  facts,  it  at 
last  arrives   at  the  laws  which  regulate  the  physical 

76 


condition  of  man,  so  far  as  that  condition  Is  the  con- 
sequence of  human  action.  The  utmost  that  it  can  tell 
is,  "  what  means  lead  to  a  certain  end ;  '*  but  being 
based  purely  on  observation,  it  can  never  lay  on  us  a 
duty,  nor  deter  us  from  a  crime.  Even  In  its  ultima- 
tum, it  can  only  say,  that  if  men  do  not  pursue  their 
advantage,  they  act  irrationally,  but  never  can  It  say 
that  they  act  criminally.  It  computes  the  mechanism 
of  human  action,  but  never  can  determine  the  end  of 
human  action.  Duty  and  crime  are  terms  with  which 
it  has  no  concern,  and  to  which  it  can  attach  no  mean- 
ing. It  Is  merely  observational,  and  must  confine 
Itself  as  a  science  to  the  generalization  of  facts,  while, 
when  taken  as  a  practical  rule  of  action.  Its  sphere 
extends  no  further  than  the  physical  wellbeing  of  man- 
kind ;  and  the  "  benefit  of  the  greatest  number "  is 
fixed  on,  not  from  any  idea  of  moral  duty,  but  merely 
because  that  ultimatum  exhibits  the  greatest  quantity. 
In  no  sense  is  this  science  one  iota  more  moral  than 
astronomy,  which  furnishes  the  practical  rule  of  navi- 
gation, or  geometry,  which  furnishes  the  practical 
rule  of  mensuration.  To  confound  it  with  duty,  is 
essentially  to  destroy  its  character  as  an  inductive 
science. 

Human  physiology  is  the  last,  the  highest,  and  the 
most  complex  of  all  the  physical  sciences.  It  is  the 
termination  of  man's  intellectual  labors,  so  far  as  re- 
gards the  universe  of  matter.  It  Is  the  ultimatum  of 
material  manifestation,  the  final  type  of  complex  ar- 
rangement, the  summit  beyond  which  we  leave  the 
material  world,  and  enter  Into  a  new  region  of  thought. 
Nor  Is  it  merely  a  metaphor  to  say,  that  "  man  is  the 
epitome  of  the  world."  Every  science  that  precedes 
human  physiology  is  necessary  to  the  complete  under- 
standing of  the  human   frame.        But  granting  that 

77 


human  physiology  is  the  last  and  most  complex  of  all 
the  physical  sciences,  has  man  no  further  region  into 
which  he  may  push  his  inquiries,  and  extend  the  field 
of  intellectual  research? 

Man  has  his  functions — ^What  are  their  laws? 

The  most  simple  functions  of  man,  and  those  which 
naturally  fall  to  be  considered  first,  are  those  in  which 
he  acts  on  the  external  world. 

First,  Man  may  act  on  the  physical  world  that  sur- 
rounds him. 

Second,  Man  may  act  on  man. 

The  principles  involved  in  man's  action  on  man  are 
included  under  the  term  social  science  and  politics, 
when  those  terms  are  taken  in  a  general  significa- 
tion. 

Social  science  is  divided  into  two  embranchments; 
namely,  political  economy,  the  object-noun  of  which 
is  social  utility;  and  politics  proper,  the  object-noun 
of  which  is  equity. 

The  problem  of  politics  is  to  discover  the  laws  (prin- 
ciples of  the  reason)  which  ought  to  preside  over 
human  actions  in  the  matter  of  interference. 

In  both  sciences  human  actions  are  the  substantives 
with  which  we  reason.  In  endeavoring  to  determine 
the  present  position  of  man  in  his  knowledge  of  politi- 
cal economy  and  politics,  we  must  premise  that  we 
here  approach  the  region  where  superstition  and  not 
science  prevails. 

Knowledge  is  credence  based  on  sufficient  evidence, 
and  superstition  is  credence  without  sufficient  evi- 
dence. 

In  the  very  same  order,  and  to  the  very  same  extent, 
and  at  the  same  chronological  period  that  the  sciences 
have  appeared,  has  superstition  gradually  retired,  and 
taken  her  new  stand  in  those  fields  of  thought  where 

78 


the  reason  of  mankind  had  not  yet  beheld  the  divine 
light  of  truth. 

The  whole  realm  of  political  science  is  as  yet  little 
better  than  a  superstition. 

To  observe  the  manner  in  which  men  legislate  (and 
legislators,  be  they  who  they  may,  are  only  men),  we 
should  naturally  be  led  to  the  conclusion,  that  there 
was  no  truth  and  no  falsehood  in  political  science. 

Truth,  in  fact,  has  almost  as  little  to  do  with  legis- 
lation as  it  had  with  alchemy  or  astrology;  and  this 
is  the  case  whatever  may  be  the  real  matter  of  truth. 
Whenever  there  is  no  truth  to  rest  upon,  there  can 
only  be  error  or  superstition. 

Every  proper  science  has  an  object-noun,  and  the 
exclusive  end  and  intention  of  the  science  is  to  dis- 
cover and  reduce  to  logical  order  the  relations  that 
exist  between  the  substantives  of  the  science  in  that 
object-noun.  Thus,  arithmetic  treats  of  relations  in 
number;  geometry,  of  relations  in  space  (position, 
direction,  and  extent) ;  dynamics,  of  relations  in 
force,  etc. 

Political  economy  then  treats  of  relations  in  social 
utility,  and  we  ask,  "  What  are  the  relations  of  this, 
that,  and  the  other  action,  or  system  of  action,  in 
social  utility?"  The  answer  to  this  question  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  science  of  political  economy.  The 
same  action  may  be  judged  in  social  utility,  or  in 
equity ;  in  the  former  case  we  are  engaged  with  a  ques- 
tion of  political  economy ;  in  the  latter,  with  a  question 
of  politics.  Endless  ambiguities  and  discussions  arise 
from  confounding  the  one  science  with  the  other. 

2d.  We  now  ask,  "  With  what  do  we  reason?  what 
are  the  substantives  of  the  science?" 

We  reason  with  human  actions  in  social  utility. 
Social  utility  is  the  object-noun  of  the  science,  and  the 

79 


forms  of  human  action  are  the  subject-nouns,  which 
are  to  be  named,  classed,  and  reasoned  with. 

Wherever  human  action  is  not  involved,  there  is  no 
political  economy.  Whatever  results  from  the  general 
action  of  the  laws  of  the  non-human  universe,  does 
not  belong  to  political  economy  except  just  in  so  far 
as  they  are  effected  by  human  action.  The  fertility 
of  the  soil  produced  by  human  industry,  the  production 
of  iron,  the  cultivation,  manufacture,  and  commerce  of 
cotton,  wheat,  tea,  sugar,  sheep,  cattle,  wool,  etc.,  etc. 
— all  these  enter  into  political  economy,  because  they 
represent  certain  forms  of  human  action,  which  have 
an  appreciable  value  in  social  utility. 

Political  economy,  then,  is  the  science  that  treats 
of  human  function.  Where  human  function  is  not  in- 
volved, we  are  not  engaged  with  political  economy. 
But  then  there  is  a  limitation  on  the  other  hand.  Polit- 
ical economy  is  a  non-moral  science,  and  in  no  case 
can  be  allowed  to  pronounce  a  moral  judgment.  All 
that  it  can  ever  tell  us  is,  whether  certain  actions  or 
systems  of  actions  are  beneficial,  indifferent,  or  preju- 
dicial; and  when  the  terms  right  and  wrong,  ought, 
etc.,  are  employed  they  are  used  to  indicate  correctness 
or  incorrectness  in  social  utility. 

Acts  of  interference,  whether  by  law,  or  merely  by 
the  individual,  belong  properly  to  the  science  of  poli- 
tics, but  they  may  also  be  legitimately  judged  of 
through  the  medium  of  political  economy.  By  treat- 
ing a  question  of  interference  by  the  rules  of  equity, 
we  arrive  at  once  at  a  conclusion ;  whereas,  when  it 
is  treated  by  the  rules  of  utility,  it  may  require  many 
years,  many  observations,  and  many  disputations  as  to 
facts,  before  a  conclusion  can  be  drawn.  The  equity 
of  the  slave  trade  is  a  question  so  simple,  that  few 
intelligent  men  could  fail  to  settle  it  satisfactorily  in 

80 


a  few  minutes ;  but  the  economy  of  the  trade  would 
require,  and  did  require,  many  years  to  settle  it,  and 
even  now  there  are  not  wanting  hundreds  who,  on 
economical  principles,  would  defend  both  the  trade 
and  the  condition  of  slavery.  Although  perfect  knowl- 
edge in  both  sciences  would  no  doubt  lead  to  exactly 
the  same  practical  conclusion,  the  argument  of  econ- 
omy is  sometimes  set  up  against  the  argument  of 
equity.  The  concise  reply  to  such  a  mode  of  proceed- 
ing is  this,  "  If  equity  have  any  existence  at  all,  its 
rules  are  necessarily  imperative."  Deny  the  impera- 
tive nature  of  equity  and  you  obliterate  all  morals,* 

Now,  where  there  is  no  interference  between  man  and 
man,  no  judgment  in  equity  can  possibly  be  pro- 
nounced. Where  there  is  no  interference  (and  noth- 
ing that  enters  religion)  economy  gives  the  canon,  she 
holds  the  balance,  and  pronounces  judgment  because 
the  question  belongs  to  the  jurisdiction  of  her  court. 
But  where  there  is  interference  we  can  have  a  judg- 
ment in  equity;  and  where  we  can  have  a  judgment  in 
equity,  no  economical  considerations  whatever  can  ever 
relieve  man  from  the  imperative  obligation.  The  mo- 
ment it  was  admitted  that  economical  considerations 
should  outweigh  the  judgment  in  equity,  that  moment 
is  man's  moral  nature  obliterated,  and  he  becomes  an 
animal  a  little  superior  to  the  ourang-outang. 

We  now  return  to  the  mode  in  which  political  econ- 
omy is  usually  presented. 

According  to  some  writers,  we  should  imagine  that 
utility  was  measured  according  to  the  wealth  pro- 
duced. Value,  labor,  capital,  wages,  profit,  rent,  etc., 
are  the  substantives  of  their  science;  and  the  produc- 

*  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  argumment  of  economy  has  a 
far  more  powerful  influence  on  the  world  than  the  argument  of 
equity. 

81 


tion  of  wealth  appears  to  be  the  end,  the  sum  and 
substance,  the  object  of  their  desires. 

We  deny,  from  beginning  to  end,  this  view  of  polit- 
ical economy.  It  has  some  truth  in  it — the  beginnings 
of  truth;  but  such,  in  the  general,  is  no  more  the  end 
of  political  economy  than  the  determination  of  the 
chances  in  gambling  was  the  end  of  the  calculation  of 
probabilities. 

We  assert — and  we  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  this 
view  will  ultimately  obtain  the  suffrages  of  all — that 
the  welfare  of  man  is  the  end  of  political  economy. 

To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  the  production  of 
wealth  is  the  means ;  and  that  all  economics  intend  to 
include  the  welfare  of  man  as  a  matter  of  course. 

We  deny  the  whole  theory  from  beginning  to  end. 

We  assert  that  the  production  of  man,  and  man  in 
a  continually  higher  condition,  is  the  object,  the  end, 
the  ultimatum  of  the  science. 

Let  us  suppose  that  one  thousand  families  were  em- 
ployed in  the  cultivation  of  one  hundred  thousand 
acres  of  land ;  that  they  lived,  maintained  themselves 
in  decent  plenty,  reared  their  families  in  health,  in- 
dustry, honesty,  and  those  manly  qualities  which, 
among  the  agricultural  population  of  Great  Britain, 
have  assumed  a  higher  character  than  in  any  other 
portion  of  the  earth's  inhabitants.  Suppose  that  this 
population  produce  only  as  much  as  suffices  for  the 
plentiful  support  of  all  the  individuals.  Good.  There 
is  not,  on  the  average  of  twenty  years,  any  superabun- 
dance that  can  be  called  accumulated  profit. 

This  population,  according  to  some  political  econ- 
omists, would  be  a  most  unproductive,  most  useless 
portion  of  society. 

We  deny  the  fact.  This  population  has  reared  and 
produced  men. 

82 


Suppose,  again,  the  great  body  of  this  population 
should  be  set  to  spin  cotton,  smelt  iron,  grind  cutlery, 
and  weave  stockings.  That  at  these  occupations,  by 
incessant  toil,  they  should  produce  not  only  as  much 
as  support  them,  but  one-half  more.  According  to 
political  economists,  these  occupations  would  be  in- 
comparably more  profitable  than  the  agricultural  oc- 
cupations, and  consequently  much  better   for  society. 

We  deny  the  fact,  and  scout  the  inference.  The 
production  of  man,  and  of  man  in  his  best  condition, 
is  the  physical  ultimatum  of  the  earth;  and  any  sys- 
tem whatever  that  sacrifices  the  workman  to  the  work 
— the  man  who  produces  the  wealth  to  the  wealth 
produced — is  a  monstrous  system  of  misdirected  in- 
tention, based  on  a  blasphemy  against  man's  spiritual 
nature. 

The  whole  system  of  modern  manufacture,  with  its 
factory  slavery;  Its  gaunt  and  sallow  faces;  its  half- 
clad  hunger;  its  female  degradation;  its  abortions  and 
rickety  children ;  its  dens  of  pestilence  and  abomination ; 
its  ignorance,  brutality,  and  drunkenness;  its  vice, 
in  all  the  hideous  forms  of  infidelity,  hopeless  poverty, 
and  mad  despair, — these,  and,  if  it  were  possible, 
worse  than  these,  are  the  sure  fruits  of  making  man 
the  workman  of  mammon,  instead  of  making  wealth 
the  servant  of  humanity  for  the  relief  of  man's  estate. 

The  day  is  not  far  distant  when  the  Labor  of  Eng- 
land will  hold  her  court  of  justice;  let  those  who 
may  await  the  sentence  of  the  tribunal. 

That  system  of  political  economy  which  makes 
wealth  and  not  man,  the  ultimatum,  is  based  on  a 
monstrous  fallacy — on  a  fallacy  so  slavish  and  so  de- 
testable, that  the  wonder  is  how  accomplished  and  per- 
sonally amiable  men  can  be  found  as  its  abettors. 

The  fallacy  is,  in  taking  the  rents  of  the  landlords, 

83 


and  the  profits  of  the  capitalists,  as  the  measures  of 
good  and  evil,  instead  of  taking  the  condition  of  the 
cultivators,  and  the  condition  of  the  laborers  (the 
many),  as  the  sure  index  of  the  character  of  a  system. 

Whatever  tends  to  debase  man,  to  make  him  phys- 
ically, intellectually,  or  morally  a  lower  being,  is  bad, 
however  much  or  however  little  the  wealth  produced 
may  be.*  The  wealth  is  not  the  stable  element;  it  is 
an  accidental,  and  by  no  means  the  most  important 
adjunct.  Man  is  the  stable  element.  His  condition  is 
the  standard ;  his  improvement  is  a  good ;  his  de- 
terioration is  an  evil.  And  this,  independently  of  all 
other  considerations.  All  other  considerations  are 
secondary,  dependent,  subsidiary  to  the  great  inten- 
tion. Man  is  not  useful  as  he  produces  wealth,  but 
wealth  is  useful  as  it  sustains  man,  ameliorates  his 
condition,  improves  his  capacities,  gives  opportunities 
for  his  further  cultivation,  and  aids  his  progress  in 
the  great  scheme  of  human  regeneration. 

Such  views,  then,  of  political  economy  as  make 
wealth  the  ultimatum  (and  this  wealth,  be  it  always 
remembered,  is  the  wealth  of  the  land-owner,  the 
mill-owner,  the  iron-master,  etc.,  and  not  the  wealth 
of  the  multitude  of  human  laborers),  are  merely  the 
beginnings  of  the  science  of  political  economy.     This 

*The  distribution  of  wealth  is  a  question  of  incomparably- 
more  importance  than  even  its  production.  This  appears  a 
paradox.  It  is  not  so,  however.  Tlie  strong  individual  appro- 
priates more  than  his  equitable  share  at  the  expense  of  the 
weak  individual;  and  all  privileged  classes  are  merely  classes  of 
individuals  who  have  obtained  more  land,  or  more  power,  or 
more  license  than  equitably  could  have  been  assigned  to  them. 
The  laws  of  distribution  are  of  incomparably  more  practical 
importance  than  the  laws  of  production,  and  the  public  mind 
will  not  allow  many  years  to  elapse  without  bringing  them  to 
vehement  discussion. 

84 


science,  like  every  other,  must  pass  through  its  stages ; 
it  must  have  its  errors,  its  superstitions,  its  partial 
truths,  its  truths  misunderstood,  before  it  comes  forth 
as  a  system  over  which  man  has  no  power  of  control, 
but  which  he  must  contemplate  as  a  system  of  truth 
designed  by  the  Creator  of  the  world  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  his  intellect,  and  the  improvement  of  his  con- 
dition. 

Political  economy  is  now  struggling  to  assume  a 
position  among  the  sciences.  It  is  daily  growing, 
daily  assuming  a  more  definite  form,  and  daily  shaking 
off  those  questions  that  do  not  belong  to  it. 

We  must  also  remark,  that  the  natural  science  of 
political  economy  has  labored  under  the  immense  dis- 
advantage of  collecting  facts  which  were  not  the  re- 
sult of  nature's  operations,  but  which  were,  in  a  great 
measure,  the  result  of  human  legislation,  which  varied 
from  time  to  time,  and  from  country  to  country. 

There  is  the  greatest  possible  difference  between 
taking  advantage  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  originat- 
ing laws.  It  is  not  man's  office  to  originate  laws.  God 
has  made  the  laws,  and  given  man  an  intellect  to  dis- 
cover and  apply  them.  As  well  may  man  make  laws 
in  the  physical  sciences,  or  in  theology,  as  in  political 
economy.  It  is  true  he  may  make  laws,  and  enforce 
them ;  but  what  he  never  can  do  is,  to  make  the  opera- 
tion of  those  laws  beneficial  to  the  world.  This  is 
beyond  his  power ;  and,  though  the  laws  may  be  for 
the  pecuniary  advantage  of  the  privileged  classes  of  a 
country,  they  are  necessarily  followed  by  a  concomit- 
ant series  of  evils,  which  bear  on  the  masses  of  the 
population. 

The  great  truth  which  political  economy  will  ulti- 
mately teach  Is  this,  "  That  God  has  constituted  na- 
ture aright ;  that  it  is  man's  interest  to  take  advantage 

85 


of  the  arrangements  of  nature  according  to  the  laws 
which  God  has  established  in  the  world;  that  all  hu- 
man laws  originating  in  man  are  prejudicial  arrange- 
ments, which  interfere  with  the  course  of  nature;  that 
all  such  laws  ought  universally  to  be  abolished,  so  that 
man  may  have  free  scope  to  extract  the  maximum  of 
benefit  from  the  earth."  Social  arrangements  for  the 
benefit  of  all  are  not  laws — they  are  adaptations  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  These  are  requisite  for  society; 
and  to  these  arrangements,  legislation,  in  its  econom- 
ical aspect,  ought  to  be  exclusively  confined. 

When  men  make  lighthouses  for  the  protection  of 
maritime  commerce — public  harbors  for  the  safety  of 
ships,  seamen,  and  cargoes — when  they  make  a  police 
to  watch — when  they  pave,  light,  and  clean  towns — 
when  they  make  roads  and  arrangements  for  communi- 
cations— when  they  support  such  national  defences  as 
are  judged  requisite  at  any  given  time — when  they 
support  judges  and  other  officers  to  administer  the 
laws  of  justice — when  they  do  these,  and  many  other 
similar  acts,  at  the  common  expense,  and  enforce  the 
payment,  they  do  not  make  laws.  They  make  only 
such  arrangements,  based  on  the  laws  of  nature  or 
equity,  as  are  deemed  fitting  at  a  given  period;  they 
take  advantage  of  the  world,  such  as  they  find  it,  and 
endeavor  to  evolve  from  it  a  greater  amount  of  good 
than  they  could  do  individually  were  there  no  such 
social  arrangements.  Men  may  make  laws  if  they 
will ;  but  what  they  cannot  do  is,  to  make  good  to  fol- 
low them. 

From  political  economy  we  turn  to  politics.  Be- 
fore doing  so,  however,  we  must  remark  that  no 
science  of  politics,  whatever  be  its  form,  or  whatever 
be  its  matter,  can  hope  to  meet  with  impartial  investi- 
gation.    Whatever  may  be  the  real  system  of  truth 

86 


(and  a  truth  there  must  be  somewhere),  that  system 
cannot  fail  to  controvert  the  opinion  of  multitudes  and 
to  be  favorable  or  unfavorable  to  the  pecuniary  inter- 
ests of  multitudes. 

Admit  the  fact  of  human  progression,  however  (nor 
can  it  reasonably  be  denied),  and  all  the  objections, 
and  all  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  habitual  cre- 
dence of  a  present  generation,  vanish  into  air.  Let  po- 
litical truth  be  what  it  may,  it  cannot  receive  general 
adoption  at  any  period.  It  must  grow ;  it  must  be  sug- 
gested, misunderstood,  denied,  discussed,  adopted  in 
part,  rejected  in  part,  re-discussed,  further  adopted, 
and  so  on. 

Doubts,  disputes,  denials,  andi  diversity  of  opinion, 
therefore,  are  of  little  Importance.  They  are  natural; 
they  must  come.  They  are  the  modes  in  which  man 
expresses  his  ignorance,  and  frequently  the  means  he 
uses  to  acquire  knowledge  and  determine  truth.  Where 
there  is  diversity  of  opinion,  there  must  be  ignorance 
on  one  side  or  on  both ;  and  bold  would  be  the  man  who, 
in  politics,  should  assert  that  he  had  so  completely 
mastered  all  truth,  that  all  other  men  ought  to  come 
over  to  his  side.  And  yet  there  must  be  a  truth  some- 
where; and,  as  knowledge  does  not  admit  'of  diversity 
of  opinion,  if  ever  man  can  have  a  system  of  politics 
other  than  empirical,  other  than  superstitious,  diver- 
sity of  opinion  must  disappear  from  politics,  just  as  it 
has  disappeared  from  the  sciences  which  man  has  al- 
ready mastered. 

Politics  has  to  do  exclusively  with  the  relations  be- 
tween men,  and  to  determine  the  principles  that  should 
regulate  their  actions  towards  each  other.  Where  in- 
terference is  not  concerned,  there  is  no  question  in 
politics.  This,  then,  is  the  anterior  limitation  of  the 
science. 

87 


We  have,  now,  to  determine  the  posterior  boundary 
— that  which  separates  it  from  any  science  that  might 
lie  beyond  it. 

This  posterior  limit  is  likely — from  the  prevalence 
of  socialist  and  communist  doctrines — to  become  the 
great  desideratum  of  political  theory.  Those  doc- 
trines, whatever  may  be  the  contempt  heaped  on  them 
in  England,  are  far  more  generally  diffused  than  most 
Englishmen  are  aware  of.  They  are  now  revolution- 
izing Europe ;  and  no  one  can  predict  the  extent  of  the 
changes  that  must  follow  them,  if  once  they  gain  the 
complete  mastery  of  the  public  mind.  Instead  of  rail- 
ing at  them,  however,  it  is  much  more  profitable  to  en- 
deavor to  understand  them,  and  to  seize  the  fallacy 
on  which  they  are  based. 

It  is  true  that  men  are  brethren,  the  children  of  one 
Father ;  it  is  true  that  universal  benevolence  is  a  virtue ; 
it  is  true  that  man  ought  not  to  seek  his  own  advan- 
tage at  the  expense  of  his  fellow;  it  is  true  that  in  the 
present  system  of  society  there  are  stupendous  abuses 
which  cannot  be  justified.  And  it  is  also  true  that 
socialism  and  communism  are  based  on  fallacies,  al- 
though the  above  truths  are  ostensibly  at  the  bottom 
of  those  systems ;  no  dogmas  that  have  ever  been  ut- 
tered are  more  communist  than  some  precepts  of  the 
New  Testament. 

All  that  we  have  here  to  do  with  communism,  is  to 
point  out  the  fallacy  on  which  it  rests,  when  advanced, 
as  it  is,  into  the  region  of  politics.  This  fallacy  will 
be  found  the  moment  we  can  determine  the  posterior 
limitation  of  the  science  of  politics.  We  cannot  turn 
the  torrent  of  credence  that  has  set  in;  but  it  may  be 
possible  to  give  it  a  right  direction. 

Political  relations  are  not  relations  of  fraternity. 
Love,  charity,  benevolence,  and  generosity   have  noth- 

88 


mg  whatever  to  do  with  politics.  These  substantives, 
and  the  principles  of  action  to  which  they  give  rise,  lie 
beyond  the  region  of  politics.  This  they  do  necessa- 
rily, just  as  necessarily  as  light  and  sound,  optics  and 
acoustics,  lie  necessarily  beyond  the  region  of  geome- 
try. Unless  this  truth  is  fairly  apprehended,  and  un- 
less the  line  of  demarcation  between  politics  and  the 
regions  that  lie  beyond  it  is  logically  determined  and 
clearly  perceived,  there  is  a  continual  danger  of  sliding 
imperceptibly  into  socialism.  Whatever  may  be  true, 
or  whatever  may  be  false,  in  socialism  (using  that 
term  in  the  most  unobjectionable  sense — Christian 
socialism,  for  instance),  the  principles  of  equity  must 
first  be  taken  into  consideration  before  we  can,  by  any 
possibility,  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  those  higher 
principles  of  action  which  may  come  into  play,  when 
once  the  principles  of  justice  are  acknowledged  and 
carried  into  general  operation. 

This  question  is  perhaps,  practically,  the  most  im- 
portant in  modern  politics.  Insurged  millions  let  loose 
on  the  world,  with  vague  ideas  of  fraternity  in  their 
heads,  with  the  courage  of  enthusiasm  in  their  hearts, 
and  with  bayonets  in  their  hands,  are,  at  all  events, 
formidable  expositors  of  doctrine.  Their  energy  is  ex- 
actly what  the  continent  of  Europe  has  so  long  re- 
quired ;  but  their  ignorance  may  transform  what  would 
otherwise  have  been  a  most  useful  reformation,  into  a 
terrible  hurricane  of  vengeance,  and  a  blind  exercise 
of  destructive  power.  Now  that  the  theorist  and  the 
orator  can  raise  armed  millions,  the  game  of  politics 
has  assumed  a  new  character.  Theories  are  no  longer 
barren  speculations,  nor  is  oratory  mere  declamation. 
It  is,  therefore,  of  the  first  importance  that  the  most 
cheerful,  impartial,  and  honest  endeavor  should  be 
made  to  perfect  the  theory  of  politics — to  base  first 

89 


on  the  immutable  foundations  of  justice — to  satisfy 
the  reason  before  setting  the  passions  in  a  flame — to 
evolve  principles  which  can  be  calmly  and  soberly  main- 
tained by  the  intellect,  before  they  are  given  as  rules 
of  action  to  enthusiastic  populations,  ready  to  march 
in  any  direction  that  is  plausibly  pointed  out  as  the 
right  one. 

We  have  no  intention,  however,  to  attempt  the  cor- 
rection of  wrong  theories.  Wrong  theories  may  be 
supplanted,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  they  are 
ever  corrected.  The  development  of  the  right  theory 
is  the  great  object.  It  will  do  the  work  if  once  it  can 
be  finally  cleared  of  all  logical  objection.  Men  want 
political  truth,  and  they  are  making  desperate  efforts 
to  obtain  it;  and  obtain  it  they  will  ultimately,  there 
can  be  no  possible  doubt. 

Political  relations,  so  far  from  being  relations  of 
fraternity,  or  of  love,  or  of  any  of  those  sentiments 
that  teach  us  to  bear  or  to  forbear,  to  give  or  to  for- 
give, are  relations  of  equity.  They  are  relations  of 
justice,  which  gives  nothing,  and  forgives  nothing. 
They  are  jural  relations,  and  political  society  is  a 
jural  society. 

The  moment  this  ti*uth  is  forgotten,  the  door  is 
opened  for  the  wildest  and  most  impracticable  schemes. 
We  have,  in  fact,  broken  down  the  barriers  of  reason, 
and  admitted  a  flood  of  wild  imagination.  We  must 
carefully  deny  admission  to  any  propositions  whatever 
which  cannot  show  a  rational  foundation,  because  they 
pretend  to  derive  from  the  higher  and  more  expansive 
sentiments  of  the  heart.  Nothing  can  be  more  delusive, 
nothing  more  certainly  dangerous.  Justice  is  stable, 
permanent,  and  strictly  regulative.  Its  rules  must 
determine  the  form  of  society,  a  form  which  may  at  all 
times  be  enforced.     And  if,  as  is  the  case  in  all  known 

90 


countries,   that  form   shall  have  been   departed   from, 
then  force  may  be  legitimately  used  for  its  restoration. 

The  moment,  however,  that  we  attempt  to  substitute 
the  relations  of  benevolence  for  those  of  justice,  both 
the  scales  and  the  sword  fall  from  the  hands  of  the 
image.  Benevolence  can  regulate  nothing,  and  enforce 
nothing.  First  let  me  know  what  is  mine,  and  then 
inculcate  the  duties  and  the  pleasures  of  benevolence. 
But  if  nothing  is  mine,  then  is  there  not  only  no  jus- 
tice, but  no  possibility  of  benevolence.  The  moment 
property  is  abolished  that  moment  is  the  practice  of 
benevolence  (such,  at  all  events,  as  involves  the  objects 
of  property)  abolished  also.  The  foundation,  there- 
fore, of  political  society  on  benevolence  is  suicidal;  the 
only  possibility  of  benevolence  being  the  admission  that 
something  Is  mine  (service  or  property)  which  I  may 
lawfully  give,  lawfully  withhold,  but  which  I  may 
choose  to  give  if  I  please,  when  actuated  by  benevo- 
lence. 

Love,  benevolence,  charity,  fraternity,  therefore, 
cannot  enter  a  system  of  politics.  No  human  society 
could  be  founded  on  them  that  attempts  to  regulate 
the  distribution  of  natural  property,  and  the  allocation 
of  that  increased  value  which  is  created  by  the  labor  of 
individuals.  Love  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  reign  in  a 
family ;  but  in  a  state  composed  of  a  multitude  of  inde- 
pendent (although  social)  individuals,  each  producing 
according  to  his  skill,  energy,  perseverance,  and  acci- 
dental opportunities,  justice  must  be  the  regulative 
principle,  without  which  the  society  falls  either  under 
the  hand  of  tyranny,  or  falls  into  the  equally  destruc- 
tive condition  of  anarchy  and  confusion. 

We  posit,  therefore,  that  political  society  is  a  so^ 
clety  whose  essence,  end,  and  Intention  is  to  exhibit, 
in  realization,  the  principles  of  equity  or  justice. 

91 


Although,  however,  benevolence  has  nothing  to  do 
with  politics,  it  has  much  to  do  with  man.  And  as  it 
does  lie  beyond  politics,  its  laws,  whatever  they  are, 
or  wherever  they  may  be  derived  from,  will  fall  to  be 
considered  at  some  period  or  other.  Towards  them  the 
world  is  progressing,  and  after  a  reign  of  justice  there 
will  fall,  in  necessary  order,  a  reign  of  benevolence. 

But  if  politics  be  the  science  of  justice,  and  justice 
does  not  admit  the  idea  of  benevolence,  that  idea  be- 
ing necessarily  posterior  to  justice,  what  is  the  radical 
distinction  between  justice  and  benevolence,  and  where 
is  the  line  of  demarcation  that  separates  them? 

That  line  of  demarcation  is  found  in  the  distinction 
between  the  negative  and  the  positive. 

A  very  simple  consideration  will  place  in  a  clear 
enough  light  the  difference  between  the  negative  char- 
acter of  justice,  and  the  positive  character  of  benevo- 
lence. 

If  all  men  were  socially  passive,  and  did  not  in  any- 
wise interfere  with  each  other,  there  would  be  the 
perfection  of  justice,  while  there  might  be  the  total 
absence  of  benevolence. 

No  rule  of  justice  can  ever  originate  an  interference. 
All  interference  based  on  justice  is  consequential; 
that  is,  the  consequence  of  a  prior  act  of  interference, 
which  requires  to  be  corrected.  All  primary  in- 
terference, contrary  to  the  will  of  the  person  interfered 
with  (he  being  of  sound  mind,  sober,  etc.),  is  an  in- 
justice. The  essential  character  of  injustice  consists 
in  the  forcible  interference  of  one  man  with  another; 
nor  is  any  man  justified  in  constraining  another  to 
receive  even  a  benefit  (or  what  nine  hundred  and  ninety 
men  out  of  a  thousand  would  pronounce  a  benefit) 
against  his  will.  The  essential  character  of  injustice 
is,  the  overbearing  of  one  man's  will  by  another  man's 

92 


force   or  fraud.     And  no  rule  or  principle  of  equity 
can  ever  originate  such  an  interference. 

The  whole  scheme  of  justice,  therefore,  is  essentially 
and  radically  restrictive,  and  all  its  positive  rules,  or 
rules  which  justify  or  command  interference,  will  be 
found  to  consist  of  those  which  justify  the  restoration 
of  things  to  that  condition  in  which  they  would  have 
been  had  there  been  no  interference.  That  is,  whenever 
the  negative  state  of  non-interference  has  been  de- 
parted from,  and  the  equilibrium  of  equity  destroyed, 
justice  furnishes  rules  for  positive  interference, 
whereby  the  negative  state  may  be  restored,  and  the 
equilibrium  of  equity  re-established.  But  this  in  no- 
wise affects  the  assertion,  that  the  principles  of  jus- 
tice, and  the  scheme  of  the  science,  are  entirely  restric- 
tive; because,  let  all  society  be  in  the  negative  state 
of  non-interference,  and  it  would  remain  so  forever 
were  the  rules  of  justice  attended  to. 

Benevolence,  on  the  contrary,  supposes  that  men 
shall  be  socially  active;  not  that  they  shall  interfere 
with  each  other  without  consent,  but  that  they  shall' 
take  a  constant  interest  in  each  other's  welfare,  and  be 
ready  to  offer  the  helping  hand  of  sympathy  when 
sorrows  fall  upon  their  brethren.  Benevolence  cannot 
infringe  justice,  it  only  superadds  more  than  justice 
could  require. 

Such  a  condition  of  society,  then,  as  would  be  com- 
patible with  the  perfection  of  justice,  might  exclude 
benevolence  altogether.  Consequently,  justice  and  be- 
nevolence are  radically  distinguished  from  each  other; 
and  politics,  which  is  the  science  of  justice,  is  inde- 
pendent of  benevolence. 

Here,  then,  we  learn  the  posterior  limit  of  the  science 
of  politics. 

Where  there  is  no  question  of  interference  between 

93 


man  and  man,  there  is  no  question  of  politics.  This  is 
the  anterior  limit,  that  which  separates  it  from  all  that 
comes  before  it;  from  political  economy,  the  physical 
sciences,  and  the  mathematical  sciences. 

And  the  posterior  limit  is  found  in  the  fact,  that 
the  science  is  confined  exclusively  to  the  exhibition  of 
the  laws  relating  to  such  interference  as  is  consequent 
on  a  departure  from  the  state  of  non-interference,  and 
to  the  exhibition  of  the  laws  (intuitions  of  the  reason) 
which  prohibit  all  primary  interference.  [The  latter, 
of  course,  come  logically  first  in  the  exposition  of  the 
science.] 

Having,  then,  determined  the  limits  of  the  science 
of  politics,  we  affirm  (from  the  preceding  data)  that 
its  position  is  immediately  after  the  science  of  political 
economy,  and  that  it  is  followed  by  the  laws  of  benevo- 
lence, wherever  these  may  be  derived  from. 


94 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    THEORY    OF    MEN's    PRACTICAL   PROGRESSION 

WE  have  now  to  make  good  our  argument 
that  there  is  a  natural  probability  in  favor 
of  a  millennium,  or  reign  of  justice.  We 
maintain  that  man  has,  within  the  range  of  his  natural 
knowledge,  sufficient  means  for  determining,  that  if  the 
course  of  human  history  continue  ordinated  on  the 
same  principles  that  may  be  inferred  from  a  considera- 
tion of  the  past  and  present,  then  in  the  future  there 
must  come  a  time  when  justice  shall  be  the  regulative 
principle  of  the  earth,  and  man  shall  carry  it  into  sys- 
tematic and  universal  operation. 

After  all  that  has  been  said  of  the  millennium,  we 
cannot  help  thinking  that  there  is  a  peculiar  satisfac- 
tion in  finding  that  nature,  history,  and  reason  con- 
tribute to  authenticate  the  promise. 

To  condense  the  argument  we  posit,  that  human 
progression  is  from  logic  and  the  mathematical  sci- 
ences, through  the  physical  sciences,  and  up  to  man- 
science. 

Man-science  has  four  functions: 

Action  on  the  external  world. 
Action  on  man,  without  interference. 
Action  on  man  by  interference. 
Actions  towards  the  Divine  Being. 

The  second  class  of  functions  gives  rise  to  political 
economy,  which  furnishes  the  rule  of  correct  action. 

95 


The  third  class  to  politics. 

The  fourth  class  to  religion,  the  scientific  ground- 
work of  which  is  theology. 

Correct  knowledge  is  the  only  means  whereby  cor- 
rect action  can  be  performed.  In  advancing,  there- 
fore, the  probability  of  a  millennium  in  politics,  we 
must,  of  course,  imply  that  a  millennium  in  other  de- 
partments has  actually  taken  place,  or  is  now  taking 
place.  And  this  we  do.  The  definition  of  a  millen- 
nium is,  for  us,  not  any  period  of  time,  but  a  period 
of  truth  discovered  and  reduced  to  practice.  And  con- 
sequently, when  we  speak  of  a  political  millennium,  we 
speak  of  a  period  when  political  truth  shall  be  discov- 
ered and  be  reduced  to  practice;  and  such  a  period 
we  maintain  to  be  within  the  bounds  of  rational  antici- 
pation. 

What,  in  fact,  is  the  problem  of  politics?  To  dis- 
cover the  laws  which  should  regulate  men  In  the  matter 
of  interference.  When  those  laws  are  discovered,  po- 
litical truth  is  discovered.  What  reason  can  possibly  be 
alleged  for  asserting  that  the  laws  which  should  regu- 
late men  in  the  matter  of  interference  are  not  as  much 
within  the  reach  of  the  human  intellect  as  the  laws 
which  should  regulate  the  merchant  in  carrying  on  his 
commercial  transactions?  It  is  plainly  evident  that 
man,  being  the  most  complex  of  all  the  objects  that 
inhabit  the  earth,  must  be  the  last  whose  phenomena 
are  subjected  to  analysis.  Let  the  sciences  be  classed 
as  they  may,  man,  and  man's  functions,  must  always 
be  placed  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  scale  of  natural 
knowledge,  i.  e.,  of  a  description  of  the  various  steps 
of  the  course  which  the  human  race  must  take  In  its 
passage  to  an  equitable  condition  of  society ;  and  these 
must  be  looked  for  in  the  evolution  of  the  sciences  one 
after  another.     Each  new  science  is  not  only  a  revela- 

96 


tion  to  the  intellect,  but  a  new  power  for  performing 
things  which  could  not  othenvise  have  been  done;  in 
fact,  a  new  sceptre  for  man  to  rule  the  world,  and  to 
bend  its  elements  in  obedience  to  his  will. 

Let  us  again  repeat,  that  knowledge  is  the  only 
means  given  to  man  to  evolve  correct  action ;  and  that 
correct  action  is  the  only  means  whereby  man  can 
evolve  a  correct,  and  consequently  beneficial  condition. 
Let  us  also  note  well,  that  knowledge  does  not  admit 
of  diversity  of  opinion ;  that  where  knowledge  is  really 
attained  and  properly  substantiated,  uniformity  of 
credence  is  its  constant  and  necessary  result;  and  con- 
sequently, wherever  we  find  diversity  of  opinion,  we 
have  a  region  where  knowledge  is  not  yet  attained,  or 
where  it  is  not  yet  met  with  general  acceptance. 

Let  us  now  ask,  what  is  the  essence  of  that  ultimate 
condition  of  man,  expressed  for  brevity's  sake  by  the 
word  millennium? — A  period  when  truth  is  discovered, 
acknowledged,  and  carried  into  practical  operation. 

A  millennium  is  a  condition  of  society  in  which  man 
shall  evolve  the  maximum  of  good  by  acting  correctly. 
And  man  can  act  correctly  only  where  he  has  ac- 
quired knowledge.  The  moment,  then,  we  ascertain  the 
order  in  which  knowledge  must  be  acquired,  we  learn 
the  scheme  of  human  improvement,  and  ascertain  the 
general  outline  of  his  course,  in  his  passage  from  igno- 
rance, poverty,  and  depravity,  towards  knowledge, 
prosperity,  and  virtuous  action. 

Therefore,  the  past  history  of  human  progress 
must  supply  us  with  the  beginning  of  the  natural  mil- 
lennium ;  and  these  beginnings  we  must  look  for  in  the 
sciences  that  have  been  already  discovered  and  reduced 
to  practice. 

A  political  millennium  will  come,  but  it  will  come 
only  because  it   forms   a  portion  of  the  still  greater 

97 


scheme  of  human  improvement, — of  the  more  general 
millennium,  that  involves  all  human  knowledge  and  all 
human  operations. 

Consequently,  wherever  we  have  truth  discovered 
and  carried  into  practical  operation,  we  have  a  mil- 
lennium in  that  department  of  knowledge. 

All  scientific  truth  is  the  intellect  of  the  creature  ap- 
prehending correctly  the  divine  arrangements  of  the 
created. 

All  science  therefore  is  divine,  and  divine,  not  in  the 
sense  of  pantheism,  but  in  the  sense  of  its  being  the 
correlative  object  created  in  harmony  with  the  human 
reason.  Science  is  the  object  of  reason,  and  reality  is 
the  object  of  science;  and  both  reason  and  reality  are 
the  productions  of  the  divine  Creator.  Reason  on  the 
one  hand,  and  reality  on  the  other,  are  the  correlatives 
of  creation,  and  science  is  the  middle  term  that  unites 
them;  reality  giving  the  matter  of  science,  and  reason 
giving  the  form.  Knowledge,  therefore,  is  the  divine 
intention ;  and  all  the  sciences  may  be  viewed,  not  as 
human  acquisitions,  but  as  fulfilments  of  the  divine 
purpose  in  creating  an  intellect  to  comprehend,  and  an 
object  to  be  comprehended. 

Immediately,  then,  that  we  admit  science  to  be  not 
merely  human,  science  acquires  a  new  character.  It 
becomes  the  exponent  of  humanity,  and  points  out  the 
order  of  human  progression.  We  have  here  a  sure 
basis  of  operation,  a  foundation  on  which  the  reason 
may  at  last  rest  in  constructing  its  philosophy  of  man. 
Science  is  stable.  It  shifts  not  with  opinion,  and 
changes  not  with  lapse  of  ages.  Were  all  knowledge 
obliterated,  and  man  to  begin  to-morrow  a  new  course 
of  research,  he  could  come  only  to  the  same  truths  and 
to  the  same  sciences ;  and  those  sciences  would  evolve  in 

98 


a  similar  order,  were  the  experiment  to  take  place  a 
hundred  or  a  thousand  times. 

We  must  now  inquire  how  the  dogma  of  knowledge 
is  efficient  to  produce  an  amended  condition  of  man 
upon  the  globe. 

Every  science  has  a  millennium;  that  is,  a  period 
when  its  truths  are  discovered,  acknowledged,  and  car- 
ried into  practical  operation. 

First  come  the  mathematical  sciences.  A  mathemat- 
ical millennium  takes  place  when  mathematical  truth 
is  discovered,  and  reduced  to  practical  operation. 
Mathematical  science  is  the  foundation  of  man's  in- 
tellectual and  practical  progress,  and  the  region  of 
mathematics  is  the  first  region  in  which  a  natural  mil- 
lennium takes  place.  Without  mathematics  we  have 
no  astronomy,  no  geography,  no  measurement  of  time, 
and  no  systematic  navigation,  worthy  of  the  name. 
That  is,  we  have  in  those  departments  ignorance  or 
superstition,  instead  of  knowledge. 

Next  to  a  mathematical  millennium  is  a  mechanical 
millennium.  The  mathematical  sciences  are  absolutely 
essential  to  the  evolution  of  mechanics,  and  mechanical 
knowledge  is  absolutely  necessary  to  enable  man  to 
turn  the  earth  to  the  best  account.  One  of  the  first 
great  spheres  of  mechanical  operation  'is  "locomo- 
tion." 

Let  us  consider  that  the  earth,  as  constituted,  per- 
mits only  of  locomotion  under  certain  conditions.  It 
is  possible  for  man  to  have  a  maximum  of  locomotive 
facility.  A  certain  speed  will  be  found  beyond  which 
we  lose  in  safety,  and  below  which  we  lose  in  celerity 
without  gaining  in  safety.  And  this  applies  to  all 
systems  of  locomotion.  The  problem,  then,  is  to  dis- 
cover the  best  system ;  that  which  combines  the  maxi- 

99 


mum  of  celerity  with  the  minimum  of  danger.  And 
when  we  have  made  as  near  an  approach  to  this  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  earth  permit  of,  we  have  a  loco- 
motive millennium. 

We  have  said  enough  to  show  the  direct  bearing 
of  science  on  the  improvement  of  man's  condition  on 
the  globe.  Knowledge  is  obtained,  an  improved  sys- 
tem of  action  is  consequently  generated,  and  from  that 
improved  system  of  action  an  improved  condition  arises 
as  the  necessary  result. 

But  then,  how  comes  it  that,  notwithstanding  man's 
vast  achievements,  his  wonderful  efforts  of  mechanical 
ingenuity,  and  the  amazing  productions  of  his  skill, 
his  own  condition  in  a  social  capacity  should  not  have 
improved  in  the  same  ratio  as  the  improvement  'of  his 
condition  in  regard  to  the  material  world.  In  Britain, 
man  has  to  a  great  extent  beaten  the  material  world, 
and,  notwithstanding  this,  a  large  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation is  reduced  to  pauperism,  to  that  fearful  state 
of  dependence  in  which  man  finds  himself  a  blot  on  the 
universe  of  God — a  wretch  thrown  up  by  the  waves  of 
time,  without  a  use,  and  without  an  end,  homeless  in 
the  presence  of  the  firmament,  and  helpless  in  the  face 
of  creation. 

We  do  not  believe  that  pauperism  comes  from  God. 
It  is  man's  doing,  and  man's  doing  alone.  God  has 
abundantly  supplied  men  with  all  the  requisite  means 
of  support ;  and  when  he  cannot  find  support  we  must 
look  not  to  the  arrangements  of  the  almighty  God, 
but  to  the  arrangements  of  men  and  to  the  order  in 
which  they  have  portioned  out  the  earth.  Charge  the 
poverty  of  men  on  God  is  to  blaspheme  the  Creator. 
He  has  given  enough,  abundance,  more  than  sufficient; 
and  if  man  has  not  enough,  we  must  look  to  the  mode 
in  which  God's  gifts  have  been  distributed.       There 

100 


IS  enough,  enough  for  all,  abundantly  enough;  and  all 
that  is  requisite  is  freedom  to  labor  on  the  soil,  and 
to  extract  from  it  the  produce  that  God  intended  for 
man's  support. 

And  what  is  the  cause  of  human  pauperism  and 
human  degradation?  for  the  two  go  hand  in  hand.  It 
is  because  the  social  arrangements  of  men  have  been 
made  by  superstition,  and  not  by  knowledge.  The 
sciences,  we  have  shown,  lead  to  an  amended  order  of 
action,  and  an  amended  order  of  action  leads  to  an 
amended  and  improved  condition*  But  we  must  have 
knowledge  in  the  department  in  which  we  require  the 
condition  to  be  amended.  That  is,  mechanical  knowl- 
edge improves  man's  mechanical  condition,  as  regards 
his  power  over  external  nature;  agricultural  knowl- 
edge his  agricultural  condition ;  chemical  knowledge 
his  chemical  condition ;  and  so  forth.  But  social  knowl- 
edge— that  is,  social  science — is  absolutely  requisite 
before  we  can  labor  intelligently  to  improve  man's 
social  condition.  These  are  the  conditions  under  which 
man  tenants  the  globe.  Every  department  of  nature, 
and  of  man's  phenomenology,  has  its  laws ;  and  if 
those  laws  are  infringed,  evil  is  the  immediate,  invari- 
able, and  necessary  result.  And  if  man's  social  con- 
dition is  evil;  if  we  find  at  one  end  of  society  a  few 
thousands  of  individuals  with  enormous  wealth,  for 
which  they  work  not,  and  never  have  worked,  and  at 
the  other  end  of  society  millions  belonging  to  the  same 
country,  and  born  on  the  same  soil,  with  barely  the 
necessaries  of  life,  and  too  often  in  abject  destitution 
— there  is  no  other  conclusion  possible  than  that  this 
poverty  arises  from  man's  social  arrangements,  and 
that  poor  the  mass  of  the  population  must  remain  until 
those  arrangements  are  rectified  by  knowledge. 

If  Englishmen  discover  that  pauperism  and  wretch- 
101 


edness  are  unnecessary;  that  the  Divine  Being  never 
intended  such  things;  that  the  degradation  of  the 
laboring  population,  their  moral  degradation  conse- 
quent on  poverty,  is  the  curse  of  the  laws  and  not  of 
nature, — does  any  man  suppose  that  Englishmen 
would  not  be  justified  in  abolishing  such  laws,  or  that 
they  will  not  abolish  them?  Can  we  believe  for  a  mo- 
ment, that  if  any  arrangement  would  enable  the  popu- 
lation to  find  plenty,  that  such  an  arrangement  will 
not  be  made?  If  any  man  believe  this,  he  is  at  all 
events  willing  to  be  credulous.  For  ourselves,  we  be- 
lieve it  not. 

There  are  hundreds  of  thousands  of  persons  in  this 
country  who  are  not  earning  above  7s.  to  10s.  per 
week,  even  when  they  have  constant  employment. 

With  this  a  man  brings  up  a  family  and  educates 
his  children.  His  life  is  a  life  of  stern  economy,  and 
he  faces  it  like  a  man.  He  respects  himself,  and 
feels  that  he  has  a  right  to  be  respected.  He  does 
manage  to  live  like  a  moral  being,  and  sometimes  es- 
capes the  degradation  of  the  poor-roll  in  his  old  age. 
This  is  the  best  position  of  the  laborer,  the  maximum 
that  the  present  condition  of  Scotland  can  afford  to 
the  highest  class  of  her  laboring  children — milk,  por- 
ridge, and  potatoes,  and  with  these  he  goes  through 
his  life  of  honest  independence. 

But  what  is  the  minimum,  what  is  the  condition  of 
the  shoals  of  Irish  peasantry  who  invade  the  west 
coast,  and  the  tribes  of  Highlanders  who  have  little 
or  nothing  to  do?  What  can  they  earn?  What  food 
do  they  habitually  use,  and  what  is  their  moral  exist- 
ence? Let  any  one  visit  the  Western  Islands,  and 
inquire  into  the  social  condition  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  the  arrangements  men  have  made  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  population.     See  scores  of  men,  women,  and 

102 


children  gathering  shell-fish  on  the  shore  as  almost 
their  only  food,  while  the  rent  of  the  island  is  all  ab- 
stracted, and  spent  in  London  or  elsewhere;  and  then 
say  if  it  be  possible  that,  with  such  arrangements,  any 
soil,  or  any  climate,  or  any  profusion  of  natural  ad- 
vantages, would  have  compensated  for  the  evil  arrange- 
ments that  men  have  made.  Does  any  one  suppose 
that  those  same  Highlanders,  who  find  a  wretched  sus- 
tenance on  the  shore,  could  not,  and  would  not,  ex- 
tract an  abundant  existence  out  of  the  soil  of  their 
native  island?  The  law  forbids  them;  that  is,  men 
have  made  such  arrangements  with  regard  to  God's 
earth,  that  the  stable  population  must  be  reduced  to 
destitution,  for  the  purpose  of  having  one  man  en- 
dowed with  a  wealth  which  he,  perhaps,  knows  not 
how  to  use,  nor  even  to  retain. 

And  we  affirm,  without  the  slightest  hesitation,  that 
the  very  same  kind  of  improvements  that  have  followed 
the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences,  will  follow 
social  science,  and  achieve  in  the  world  of  man  far 
greater  wonders  than  have  yet  been  achieved  in  the 
world  of  matter.  It  is  not  trade  Britain  wants,  nor 
more  railroads,  nor  larger  orders  for  cotton,  nor  new 
schemes  for  alimenting  the  poor,  nor  loans  to  land- 
lords, nor  any  other  mercantile  or  economical  change. 
It  is  social  change, — new  social  arrangements,  made 
on  the  principles  of  natural  equity.  No  economical 
measure  whatever  is  capable  of  reaching  the  depths 
of  the  social  evils.  Ameliorations  may,  no  doubt,  be 
made  for  a  time ;  but  the  radical  evil  remains,  still 
generating  the  poison  that  corrupts  society. 

The  evil  is  expressed  in  a  few  words;  and,  sooner 
or  later,  the  nation  will  appreciate  it  and  rectify  it. 
It  is  "  the  alienation  of  the  soil  from  the  state,  and  the 
consequent  taxation  of  the  industry  of  the  country." 

103 


Britain  may  go  on  producing  with  wonderful  energy, 
and  may  accomplish  far  more  than  she  has  yet  accom- 
plished. She  may  struggle  as  Britain  only  can  strug- 
gle. She  may  present  to  the  world  peace  at  home, 
when  the  nations  of  Europe  are  filled  with  Insurrection. 
She  may  lead  foremost  In  the  march  of  civilization, 
and  be  first  among  the  kingdoms  of  the  earth.  All 
this  she  may  do,  and  more.  But  as  certainly  as  Brit- 
ain continues  her  present  social  arrangements,  so  cer- 
tainly will  there  come  a  time  when — 'the  other  questions 
being  cleared  on  this  side  and  on  that  side,  and  the 
main  question  brought  into  the  arena — ^the  labor  of 
Britain  will  emancipate  itself  from  thraldom.  Gradu- 
ally and  surely  has  the  separation  been  taking  place 
between  the  privileged  landowner  and  the  unprivileged 
laborer.  And  the  time  will  come  at  last  that  there 
shall  be  but  two  parties  looking  each  other  In  the 
face,  and  knowing  that  the  destruction  of  one  Is  an 
event  of  necessary  occurrence.  That  event  must  come. 
Nor  is  It  in  man  to  stay  it  or  to  produce  it.  It  will 
come  as  the  result  of  the  laws  that  govern  nature  and 
that  govern  man. 

We  may  as  well  attempt  mechanical  Impossibilities 
as  political  Impossibilities:  and,  notwithstanding  the 
almost  universal  prevalence  of  the  current  superstition 
about  the  rights  of  landed  property,  we  have  no  hesi- 
tation in  affirming  that  a  very  few  years  will  show 
that  superstition  destroyed,  and  the  main  question  of 
England's  welfare  brought  to  a  serious  and  definite 
discussion. 

In  politics  there  are  only  two  main  questions — first, 
personal  liberty;  second,  natural  property.  England 
has  been  at  work  for  centuries  in  the  endeavor  to  settle 
the  first;  and,  when  that  is  definitely  settled,  she  will 
give  her  undivided  attention  to  the  second. 

104 


The  first  and  most  obvious  requirement  in  a  country, 
is  some  degree  of  security  for  life,  liberty,  and  prop- 
erty. This  gives  birth  to  criminal  law,  the  great  end 
of  which  is  ostensibly  to  prevent  crimes.  The  minor 
proposition,  "What  is  a  crime?"  requires  to  be  deter- 
mined on  exactly  the  same  principles  as  we  determine 
"What  is  a  square.?"  or,  "What  is  the  orbit  of  the 
earth.?"  Without  this  determination,  made  on  prin- 
ciples which  are  not  arbitrary  but  scientific,  law  is 
despotism;  and  no  man  in  the  world  is  morally  bound 
to  obey  it,  except  as  Scripture  may  enjoin  him  to  obey 
even  unjust  laws.  If  legislatures  will  make  arbitrary 
crimes — that  is,  make  actions  legally  criminal  which 
are  not  naturally  criminal — no  population  is  bound 
to  obey  them.  On  the  contrary,  it  becomes  one  of  the 
highest  duties  of  man  to  resist  such  laws ;  to  use  every 
effort  to  procure  their  abolition;  and,  if  he  cannot  do 
so  by  reason,  then  do  so  by  force.  The  welfare  of 
humanity  demands  this  at  the  hand  of  every  man ;  and 
the  base  and  slavish  doctrine  of  non-resistance  is  fit — 
not  for  men  who  study  truth  in  God's  universe — but 
for  hireling  sycophants,  who  care  not  what  man  may 
suffer  so  that  their  vile  carcases  are  clothed  and  fed. 
The  liberties  we  have  in  England  are  mainly  owing  to 
the  fact,  tliat  England  would  not  tolerate  the  deter- 
mination of  crime  by  the  executive  rulers,  but  reserved 
this  for  the  deliberate  assembly. 

Ultimately  connected  with  the  theory  of  crime  (much 
more  so  than  is  usually  imagined),  is  the  theory  of 
natural  property.  The  law  assumed  crime  arbitrarily, 
and  proceeded  to  punish  it;  it  assumed  property  arbi- 
trarily, and  proceeded  to  protect  it.  The  king,  who  had 
the  power  to  make  or  unmake  crimes,  had  the  power  to 
dispose  of  the  land  that  belonged  to  the  state.  He 
sold  or  gifted  it,  and  thus  in  the  long  run  the  whole 

105 


of  the  lands  of  England,  with  some  trifling  exceptions, 
have  been  alienated  from  the  nation,  and  the  burden 
of  taxation  has  been  placed  upon  the  people.  Super- 
stition (that  is,  unfounded  credence)  was  at  the  bot- 
tom of  the  king's  right  in  both  cases;  and  the  present 
inhabitants  of  the  British  islands  are  bound  to  observe 
the  laws,  made  in  former  times,  concerning  crimes  and 
property,  just  in  so  far  as  those  laws  are  now  equit- 
able, or  would  now  be  re-enacted  were  there  no  laws 
on  those  subjects.  The  present  possessor  of  a  portion 
of  land  derives  not  one  iota  of  present  right  from  the 
former  gift  of  a  defunct  monarch ;  and  his  right,  to 
be  now  valid,  must  be  such,  that  were  all  his  titles 
destroyed  the  nation  would  proceed  to  place  him  in 
possession  of  the  lands,  because  he,  as  an  individual 
man,  had  an  equitable  claim  to  them.  Just  as,  if  all 
the  laws  and  statutes  of  England  were  destroyed,  the 
nation  would  proceed  as  usual  to  the  arrest  and  pun- 
ishment of  the  murderer  and  robber — those  persons 
being  punished,  not  because  there  are  laws  for  their 
punishment,  but  because  it  is  just  that  they  should 
be  punished,  and  just  that  there  should  be  laws  to 
punish.  The  justice  of  the  punishment  does  in  no  case 
derive  from  the  law,  but  the  whole  force  and  validity 
of  the  law  derives  from  the  justice  of  the  punishment; 
and  where  the  punishment  is  not  just,  that  punishment 
is  a  crime,  whatever  the  law  may  be,  or  whatever  it 
may  declare. 

One  striking  fact  is  apparent  in  considering  the 
past  history  of  laws  with  regard  to  crimes  and  prop- 
erty. The  laws  with  regard  to  crimes  have  been  con- 
sidered alterable,  the  laws  with  regard  to  property 
have  been  considered  unalterable.  One  generation  of 
legislators  and  rulers  made  an  action  a  legal  crime; 
but  the  next  generation  did  not  on  that  account  con- 

106 


sider  itself  bound  forever  so  to  esteem  it.  On  the  con- 
trary, every  generation  of  legislators  fias  considered 
itself  at  full  liberty  to  alter,  revise,  amend,  and  abolish 
such  laws,  according  to  its  own  judgment.  But  with 
regard  to  the  king's  gift  of  lands  it  has  been  quite 
otherwise.  The  deeds  of  past  rulers  have  been  sup- 
posed to  extend  to  all  future  generations;  and  the 
doctrine  now  prevalent  is,  that  the  lands  once  alienated 
by  the  king's  gift,  could  not  be  reassumed  by  the 
nation  without  a  breach  of  equity — without,  in  fact, 
committing  that  crime  abhorrent  in  the  eyes  of  aristoc- 
racy, "  attacking  the  rights  of  property."  This  dis- 
crepancy is  at  once  explained,  when  we  reflect  that 
the  legislators  of  Britain  have  been  for  the  most  part 
the  landlords  themselves,  or  those  so  immediately  con- 
nected with  their  interests,  that  the  government  was 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  landlordocracy.  But  the 
question  still  occurs,  and  must  occur  again  and  again, 
"  If  the  acts  of  past  rulers  were  not  morally  perma- 
nent with  regard  to  crime,  how  can  they  possibly  be 
so  with  regard  to  property.?  and  if  they  are  morally 
permanent  with  regard  to  property,  how  can  they  be 
otherwise  with  regard  to  crime.'"' 

We  have  now  to  show  that  crime  and  property  are 
not  distinct,  in  fact  that,  so  far  as  regards  legislation, 
they  are  identical ;  and  that  the  laws  (or  king's  grants, 
which  are  in  fact  nothing  else  than  laws,  although  this 
fact  is  overlooked)  regarding  landed  property,  are 
neither  more  nor  less  than  laws  regarding  crime. 
Property  is  usually  regarded  as  an  object,  as  some- 
thing essentially  distinguished  from  action.  Yet  we 
shall  undertake  to  show  that  action  alone  is  concerned, 
and  that  all  laws  regarding  property  are  merely  laws 
regarding  action.  And  if  we  succeed  in  doing  this,  we 
have  unhinged  the  superstition   that  prevails   on   the 

107 


subject  of  landed  property, — we  have  loosened  the 
fabric  of  aristocracy,  and  laid  open  a  question  that 
for  many  years  to  come  will  occupy  the  attention  of 
Great  Britain.  There  is  already  in  the  public  mind 
a  very  extensive  suspicion  that  the  present  distribu- 
tion of  the  land  is  the  true  and  main  cause  of  Eng- 
land's distress  and  Ireland's  wretchedness ;  but  the 
supposed  difficulty  of  presenting  a  scheme  which 
should  be  perfectly  just  in  theory,  and  practicable 
and  beneficial  if  carried  into  effect,  appears  to  have  de- 
terred many  from  openly  attacking  the  question,  and 
from  subjecting  it  to  the  same  kind  of  calm  and  ra- 
tional investigation  so  lavishly  accorded  to  other 
questions  of  incomparably  less  importance.  The 
apparent  hopelessness,  also,  of  effecting  any  radical 
change  in  the  present  system,  and  the  fear  of  advo- 
cating "  v/ild  "  doctrines,  have  both  exerted  an  influ- 
ence in  repressing  investigation.  This  apathy,  how- 
ever, cannot  continue  long.  Whatever  may  be  the 
result,  the  investigation  cannot  fail  to  be  made. 

We  now  undertake  to  show  that  the  gift  of  the  land 
by  the  king,  is  nothing  more  than  a  law  affecting 
action ;  and,  consequently,  is  of  the  same  character 
as  a  law  relating  to  crime.  And  if  so,  it  must  follow 
the  general  course  of  the  laws  relating  to  crime;  and 
if  those  laws  are  not  morally  permanent,  neither  is  the 
king's  gift  of  land  morally  permanent,  but  may  be 
revised,  amended,  or  abolished,  exactly  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  law  affecting  crime.  And  over  and  above, 
we  maintain,  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  one 
atom  more  valid,  or  more  binding,  on  account  of  legis- 
lation, but  that  they  are  right  now,  or  wrong  now, 
wholly  and  solely  according  to  their  own  merits ;  that 
the  law  cannot  make  a  crime,  although  the  law  may 
call  an  action  by  this  name,  and  treat  it  as  such;  and 

108 


that  the  law  cannot  make  a  portion  of  land  property 
although  it  may  call  it  property.  Both  crime  and 
property  are  anterior  to  law,  and  superior  to  it:  and 
it  was  not  to  make  either  the  one  or  the  other,  but  to 
prevent  the  one  and  protect  the  other,  that  legislative 
law  was  called  into  existence.  Law  is  not  the  mtoral 
measure  of  right  and  wrong;  but  the  rule  of  practice 
for  the  policeman,  constable,  jailer,  judge,  sheriff,  and 
hangman;  and  until  law  is  absolutely  perfect,  there 
is  a  canon  higher  than  the  canon  of  law,  one  more 
valid  and  more  stable — the  canon  of  reason — to  which 
law  itself  must  be  subject. 

A  law  against  crime  is  a  public  declaration  that 
certain  acts  ought  not  to  be  performed;  and  that  he 
who  performs  them  shall  be  visited  with  certain  speci- 
fied penalties.  This,  we  maintain,  is  exactly  the  essence 
of  the  king's  grant  of  landed  property,  because  the 
law  declares  that  if  any  persons  use  the  land  without 
permission  of  the  grantee,  they  shall  be  punished. 

Now  the  essential  part  of  this  political  arrangement 
is  this : — "  All  persons  in  the  nation  are  forbidden, 
under  pains  and  penalties,  to  use  a  certain  portion 
of  land,  with  the  exception  of  the  grantee,  or  by  his 
permission."  This,  then,  is  essentially  a  law  against 
action — a  law  declaring  that  to  use  a  certain  portion 
of  land  is  a  crime  for  the  vast  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion. 

Now,  if  we  turn  to  the  effects  of  this  arrangement, 
we  find  that  this  grantee  is  in  no  respect  bound  to 
make  the  land  produce.  He  may  utterly  neglect  it; 
nay,  he  may,  as  has  actually  been  done  recently  in  the 
Highlands  of  Scotland  (and  as  the  king  did  himself 
ages  ago  at  the  New  Forest) — may  drive  off  the 
population,  drive  off  the  sheep  (the  food  of  the  man), 
and  convert  the  district  into  a  game  desert  for  his  own 

109 


amusement — ^he  having  plenty  of  wealth,  derived  per- 
haps from  other  lands,  wherewith  to  support  these 
costly  pleasures — at  the  expense  of  the  nation. 

Such,  on  the  side  of  the  grantee,  is  the  limit  of 
liberty.  Let  us  now  ask.  What  the  limit  is  on  the 
part  of  the  nation?  No  matter  what  may  be  the  state 
of  the  land — even  if  it  is  lying  waste,  and  producing 
nothing  for  man's  support,  as  is  actually  the  case  in 
many  parts  of  the  kingdom — no  man  in  Britain  may 
put  into  it  a  spade  or  a  potato,  to  save  his  family 
from  starvation,  without  incurring  the  penalties  of 
the  law.  He  would  be  a  criminal  (the  law  would  call 
him  so),  and  he  would  be  treated  as  such. 

This  state  of  affairs  represents  the  extremes ;  and 
all  that  is  better  than  the  extremes  is  due,  not  to  the 
law,  but  to  the  laws  of  nature.  Now,  the  law  has  done 
this  grievous  injury;  it  has  deprived  the  poor  of  the 
natural  remedy  whereby  they  would  have  corrected  so 
enormous  an  abuse.  Let  us  suppose  that  there  was 
no  law,  and  that  one  man  claimed  thirty  thousand 
acres  for  his  amusement.  Other  persons  require  the 
land  for  their  support.  They  begin  to  occupy  it,  and 
he  endeavors  to  repel  them.  Now,  what  would  be  the 
natural  consequence.?  What  ought  the  cultivators  to 
do?  Should  they  retire  and  starve?  or  expatriate 
themselves?  They  would  resist  the  aggression  by 
force,  and  in  so  doing  they  would  only  do  their  duty. 
But  the  law  will  not  allow  them  to  resist.  The  law 
has  first  deprived  them  of  the  land,  and  then  enlisted 
a  standing  army  to  prevent  them  from  using  the  natu- 
ral means  of  recovering  it. 

No  truth  can  be  more  certain  than  that  God  gave 
the  land  for  the  benefit  of  all ;  and  if  any  arrangement 
interfere  with,  or  diminish  that  benefit,  then  has  man 
as  man,  as  the  recipient    of    God's    bounty,    an    un- 

110 


doubted  right  to  alter  or  abolish  that  arrangement, 
exactly  as  he  alters  his  arrangements  in  agriculture, 
in  medicine,  in  mechanics,  or  in  navigation.  No 
more  crime,  and  no  more  wrong  attaches  to  his  altera- 
tions in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

Political  improvement  takes  place  exactly  as  men 
discover  and  definitely  determine  the  true  nature  of 
crime;  and  exactly  as  they  confine  their  laws  to  the 
prohibition  of  those  actions  which  are  crimes,  and  to 
the  non-prohibition  of  those  actions  which  are  not 
crimes.  The  laws  of  man  cannot  make  a  crime,  neither 
can  they  unmake  a  crime.  Crime  is  logically  anterior 
to  human  legislation,  and  the  very  end  and  intent  of 
legislation  in  its  first  and  most  essential  capacity  is, — 
to  prevent  crime. 

All  nations  with  which  we  are  acquainted  have 
punished  as  crimes  actions  which  were  not  crimes ;  and 
the  gradual  improvement  of  the  laws  of  man  in  this 
respect,  is  one  of  the  great  phenomena  that  we  learn 
from  history. 

But  while  we  have  a  positive  major  proposition,  we 
have  also  a  negative  major  proposition,  which  is — 

"  No  action  that  is  not  a  crime  ought  to  be  pre- 
vented by  the  law." 

Now,  as  legislators  and  rulers  are  only  men  (there 
is  no  divine  wisdom,  nor  divine  sacredness  about  them), 
they  may  be  the  criminals  as  well  as  any  of  the  popu- 
lation. It  is  quite  easy  for  the  generality  of  writers 
on  these  subjects  to  treat  of  crime  as  committed  by 
the  population.  They  see  so  far,  and  sometimes  their 
views  are  valuable  and  correct.  But  they  have  first 
perched  the  government  on  a  great  height,  which  they 
do  not  intend  to  survey;  and  then  they  confine  their 
observation  to  the  subject  population.  To  include 
both  at  one  view  appears  a  stretch  beyond  their  power, 

111 


and  hence  their  admirable  dissertations  are  unsatis- 
factory; and  by  unsatisfactory,  we  do  not  mean  that 
they  are  not  distinguished  by  talent  of  the  highest 
order,  and  by  upright  sincerity;  but  that  they  treat 
only  one  portion  of  the  phenomenon,  and  omit  its 
correlative.  Exactly  as  if  one  were  to  write  an  able 
dissertation  on  the  earth's  motion,  furnishing  us  with 
a  perfect  diagram  and  specification  of  the  orbit,  and 
an  exact  determination  of  the  velocity,  and  yet  should 
altogether  omit  to  mention  the  sun.  Such  a  disserta- 
tion, let  its  details  be  as  perfect  as  they  may,  would  be 
altogether  unsatisfactory;  because  the  correlative,  the 
sun,  has  not  been  exhibited  in  its  relations  to  the 
earth. 

And  so  it  is  with  crime.  He  who  studies  crime  as  a 
portion  of  man-science,  must  include  in  his  view  the 
whole  phenomenon,  and  must  inquire  what  does  man 
do,  as  man.  And  when  we  turn  to  Britain  with  this 
principle,  we  must  regard  the  whole  population,  king, 
lords,  commons,  soldiers,  judges,  laborers,  paupers,  in 
fact,  the  whole  mass  of  society,  as  merely  men.  And 
when  we  define  crime,  and  find  that  actions  coinciding 
with  that  definition  are  performed  by  any  of  these 
parties,  by  whatever  name  they  may  be  called,  or  under 
whatever  pretences  they  may  appear,  we  must  not 
hesitate  to  call  the  action  by  the  name  of  crime,  and 
to  say,  "  this  is  a  crime  committed  by  men."  Rever- 
ence for  law  as  law,  as  a  human  rule  of  action  de  facto 
enacted  by  legislators,  is  mere  debasing  superstition ; 
nor,  however  venerable  law  may  be  in  some  men's  esti- 
mation, do  we  consider  either  their  law  or  their  worship 
of  it  at  all  entitled  to  respect.  Men  venerate  law  and 
care  nothing  for  justice,  just  as  they  venerate  the 
priest  and  forget  the  Deity. 

The  Almighty  Maker  and  Ruler  of  mankind  will 
112 


have  men  subject  to  justice  and  not  to  men;  and  the 
very  moment  the  rules  of  justice,  which  vary  not,  nor 
can  vary,  are  departed  from,  that  moment  is  man  re- 
lieved from  his  allegiance  to  the  ruler;  and  if  the 
population  have  the  power,  they  may  arrest  the  rulers, 
and  bring  them  to  the  same  judicial  trial  that  would 
be  reserved  for  the  individual. 

Hence  the  necessity  for  a  "  science  of  justice,"  that 
men — definitely  ascertaining,  on  principles  which  are 
not  arbitrary,  the  real  actions  which  are  criminal — ■ 
may  appoint  a  first  magistrate  to  carry  into  execu- 
tion the  laws  of  justice.  And  this  first  magistrate — 
king,  president,  or  anything  else — is  not  to  govern 
men,  but  to  regulate  them  according  to  the  laws  of 
equity;  and  in  performing  this  function,  he  occupies 
the  highest  position  to  which  man  may  attain,  and, 
performing  his  duties  with  impartial  sincerity,  he 
merits  the  constant  respect,  aid,  and  support  of  every 
person  in  the  land.  This  portion  of  the  British  con- 
stitution, the  first  magistrate  king,  the  independent 
judges,  and  the  jury  from  the  locality,  is  unsurpassed, 
if  not  unequalled,  by  anything  in  the  whole  history  of 
man.  In  England,  we  have  in  this  portion  of  our 
political  mechanism,  the  most  profound  reason  for 
thankfulness  to  God.  Had  the  slave-owner  been  tried, 
he  could  not  have  been  convicted  because  of  the  law; 
but  had  the  legislature  been  tried  for  making  laws  to 
allow  slavery,  and  for  using  the  British  arms  to  sup- 
port it,  there  can  be  no  question  that,  if  the  ordinary 
decisions  were  adhered  to,  the  jury  would  have  found 
the  legislature  guilty,  and  England  may  proudly  say 
that  her  judges  would  not  have  hesitated  to  pronounce 
the  condemnation.  Definitely  to  determine  what  is  a 
crime  and  what  is  not  a  crime  is  one  of  the  first  great 
problems  of  political  science.     We  define  crime  to  be, 

113 


"  a  breach  of  equity  " ;  and  consequently  we  maintain 
that  whatever  is  not  a  breach  of  equity  is  not  a  crime, 
and  under  no  circumstances  whatever  ought  to  be  pro- 
hibited or  restricted  by  the  laws.  Absolute  freedom, 
then,  to  perform  every  action  that  is  not  a  breach  of 
equity,  constitutes  the  great  final  termination  of  man's 
political  progress,  so  far  as  liberty  is  concerned. 

But  what  is  man's  final  termination  with  regard  to 
the  other  great  substantive  of  politics,  property? 

Here  we  approach  a  subject  that,  in  the  course  of  a 
few  years  (in  all  probability),  will  be  the  great  ele- 
ment of  strife  and  contention.  Here  is  the  rock  on 
which  England's  famous  constitution  of  King,  Lords, 
and  Commons,  will  suffer  its  final  shipwreck.  Such 
an  assertion  is,  of  course,  at  present  a  mere  opinion ; 
but  if  the  scheme  we  have  advanced  be  in  the  main 
correct,  then  we  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  that  if  we 
continue  that  scheme  into  the  future,  we  may  see  that 
the  question  of  landed  property  will  be  the  cause  of  a 
stupendous  struggle  between  the  aristocracy  and  the 
laborocracy  of  Britain,  and  that  its  final  settlement 
will  entail  the  destruction  of  the  constitution.  And 
the  question  lies  in  narrow  bounds,  all  that  is  required 
being  an  answer  to  a  question  virtually  the  following: 
"Is  the  population  to  be  starved,  pauperized,  and 
expatriated,  or  is  the  aristocracy  to  be  destroyed.'' "* 
Let  the  political  arrangements  be  what  they  may,  let 
there  be  universal  or  any  other  suffrage,  so  long  as 
the  aristocracy  have  all  the  land,  and  derive  the  rent 

*  By  the  destruction  of  the  aristocracy,  we  do  not  mean  the 
destruction  of  the  aristocrats,  any  more  than,  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  pauperism,  we  should  mean  the  destruction  of  the  per- 
sons of  the  paupers.  It  is  to  the  system  that  we  refer  exchi- 
sively,  and  only  as  either  system  has  been  created  by  the  ar- 
rangements of  men. 

114 


of  it,  the  laborer  is  only  a  serf,  and  a  serf  lie  will 
remain  until  he  has  uprooted  the  rights  of  private 
landed  property.  The  land  is  for  the  nation,  and  not 
for  the  aristocracy. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  understand  what  we  mean  by 
a  lord  and  a  serf. 

A  serf  is  a  man  who,  by  the  arrangements  of  man- 
kind, is  deprived  of  the  object  on  which  he  might  ex- 
pend his  labor,  or  of  the  natural  profit  that  results 
from  his  labor ;  and  consequently  is  under  the  necessity 
of  supporting  himself  and  his  family  by  his  labor 
alone.  And  a  lord  or  an  aristocrat  is  a  man  who,  by 
the  arrangements  of  mankind,  is  made  to  possess  the 
object;  and  who  consequently  can  support  himself  and 
his  family  without  labor,  on  the  profits  created  by  the 
labor  of  others.  This  is  the  essential  distinction  be- 
tween the  lord  and  the  serf;  and  we  maintain  that  the 
constitution  of  the  world  forbids  that  any  arrangement 
of  this  kind  should  result  in  any  other  than  an  evil 
condition  of  society,  which  must  necessarily  condemn 
a  large  part  of  the  population  to  physical  degrada- 
tion, and  if  to  physical  degradation  to  moral  degra- 
dation. No  instance  can  be  adduced  of  a  population 
reduced  to  extreme  poverty  (as  must  ever  be  the  case 
where  the  land,  the  great  source  of  wealth,  is  allotted 
to  a  few  who  labor  not),  where  that  population  has 
not  been  also  and  in  consequence  reduced  to  moral  and 
intellectual  degradation,  and  where  the  spirit  of  man 
has  not  been  depraved  and  borne  down  by  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  man,  and  not  Grod,  has  placed 
him. 

The  history  of  the  acquisition  of  liberty  (in  Britain, 
for  instance)  is  only  the  history  of  the  gradual  de- 
struction of  the  privileges  of  the  lord,  and  of  the  legal 
title  which  the  serf  has  from  time  to  time  succeeded 

115 


in  establishing  to  those  natural  rights  of  which  he  has 
been   deprived. 

We  are  fully  aware  that  there  exists  in  the  minds 
of  many  persons  a  vague  apprehension,  that  if  the 
present  laws  relating  to  landed  property  were  to  be 
disturbed,  evils  of  the  most  malignant  character  would 
invade  the  society  of  Britain.  Nothing  can  be 
more  absurd,  more  puerile,  more  dastardly.  The  very 
same  fears  have  prevailed  with  regard  to  every 
other  change  that  has  taken  place ;  and,  down  to  the 
last  change  that  man  shall  make  in  his  political  arrange- 
ments, we  may  rest  satisfied  that  the  craven,  the  place- 
man, and  the  aristocrat  will  not  fail  to  vent  loud 
lamentations  on  the  evils  which,  in  their  estimation, 
are  sure  to  follow.  The  arrangements  of  mankind 
have  established  diversities  of  rights  affecting  the 
possession  of  the  earth,  which  the  Creator  intended 
for  the  race ;  and  thus  one  man  was  endowed  with  vast 
extents  of  territory,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  multi- 
tudes were  thereby  necessarily  deprived  of  everything 
except  their  labor.  So  singular  a  system  could  only 
originate  in  the  reign  of  power,  and  could  only  be 
perpetuated  through  the  ignorance  of  the  masses  of 
the  population.  But  the  arrangements  of  mankind 
with  regard  to  the  earth  did  not  stop  here.  One  gen- 
eration was  not  content  with  making  arrangements 
which  were  to  be  in  force  for  that  generation  alone; 
but  laws  were  enacted,  and  customs  were  acknowledged 
whereby  the  arrangements  of  one  generation  were  to 
descend  to  future  generations,  and  to  be  imposed  on 
men  not  yet  bom,  who  were  to  be  born  into  a  world 
already  portioned  out,  and  consequently  to  which  they 
had  no  title.  Those,  therefore,  who  were  bom  into 
the  world  in  a  country  where  the  land  had  been  accorded 
to  individual  proprietors,  could  obtain  their  livelihood 

116 


only  by  labor  for  other  men ;  and  as  those  to  whom 
the  land  had  been  accorded  could  not  cultivate  it  them- 
selves, and  as  the  land  was  required  for  the  support  of 
the  population,  the  laborers  were  under  the  necessity  of 
paying  a  rent  to  those  who  thus  procured  a  vast  rev- 
enue without  labor.  This  system  of  diversity  of  rights 
to  the  natural  earth,  which  God  intended  for  the  race, 
being  perpetuated  from  generation  to  generation,  en- 
tails with  it,  as  its  necessary  attendant,  that  baneful 
condition  of  society,  in  which  we  have  a  few  aristocrats 
endowed  with  vast  wealth  without  labor,  and  a  multi- 
tude of  laborers  reduced  to  poverty,  destitution,  and 
sometimes  to  actual  starvation. 

No  political  truth  requires  to  be  more  strenuously 
impressed  upon  the  world,  than  that  the  men  of  every 
succeeding  generation  have  the  same  right  to  make 
their  own  arrangements,  unburdened  with  any  respon- 
sibilities, restrictions,  diversities  of  rights  and  privi- 
leges, other  than  those  restrictions  imposed  by  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  equity,  or  those  diversities  of  office  which 
they  may  agree  to  make  for  their  general  advantage. 

If,  then,  we  admit  that  every  generation  of  inen  has 
the  same  free  right  to  make  its  own  arrangements,  and 
to  carry  into  effect  the  principles  it  knows  or  believes 
to  be  true,  quite  independently  of  the  arrangements 
that  have  been  made  by  any  anterior  generations,  we 
must  also  of  necessity  admit,  that  the  earth  and  all 
it  contains,  belongs,  for  the  time  being,  to  every  exist- 
ing generation,  and  that  the  disposition  of  the  earth 
(as  the  great  storehouse  from  which  man  must  derive 
his  support  and  sustenance)  is  not  to  be  determined  by 
the  laws,  customs,  arrangements,  king's  gifts,  or  pre- 
scriptive rights  of  any  past  generation  of  men,  but 
by  the  judgment  and  reason  of  the  existing  generation, 
ordering  all   arrangements   according  to   the  rules   of 

117 


equity,  which  are  always  valid  and  always  binding, 
and  which  at  every  given  moment  of  time  are  the  rules 
which  ought  to  determine  human  action.  Consequently 
the  question  at  every  period  is,  "  What  is  the  equitable 
disposition  of  the  earth?  "  The  great  problem  is  to 
discover  "  such  a  system  as  shall  secure  to  every  man 
his  exact  share  of  the  natural  advantages  which  the 
Creator  has  provided  for  the  race;  while,  at  the  same 
time,  he  has  full  opportunity,  without  let  or  hindrance, 
to  exercise  his  labor,  industry,  and  skill,  for  his  own 
advantage."  Until  this  problem  is  solved,  both  in 
theory  and  in  practice,  political  change  must  continu- 
ally go  on. 

Absolute  equalization  in  the  eye  of  the  law  with  re- 
gard to  natural  rights,  is  the  final  termination  of  man's 
political  progress,  the  last  term  in  that  grand  series 
of  changes  that  commenced  with  the  two  opposite  ele- 
ments— the  lord  and  the  serf;  and  which  will  terminate 
with  the  one  element — the  freeman  without  privileges 
and  without  oppressions. 

There  cannot  be  the  slightest  question  that  the  pro- 
gression of  modern  states  is  towards  universal  suf- 
frage; that  is,  towards  absolute  equalization  of  the 
political  function  of  the  individuals  of  whom  the  state 
is  composed.  The  necessary  attendant  of  universal 
suffrage  must  be,  "  the  equal  eligibility  of  every  mem- 
ber of  the  state  to  fill  any  office  in  the  state." 

When  a  state  arrives  at  this  ultimatum  with  regard 
to  the  political  function  of  each  individual,  the  ques- 
tion of  natural  property  must  fall  to  be  discussed; 
and  as  no  possible  reason  can  be  alleged  why  one  in- 
dividual should  a  priori  be  endowed  with  more  of  the 
earth  (which  God,  the  Creator  and  Father  of  mankind, 
has  given  to  the  human  race)  than  any  other  individ- 
ual;  and  as   every  generation   of  existing  men  must 

118 


have  exactly  the  same  title  to  a  free  earth,  unencum- 
bered with  any  arrangements  of  past  generations,  we 
may  rest  satisfied,  that  through  whatever  transforma- 
tions men  may  pass,  the  ultimate  point  at  which  they 
must  necessarily  arrive,  is  absolute  equality  with  re- 
gard to  natural  property.  And  if  so,  the  intention  of 
Providence  will  then  be  realized,  that  the  industrious 
man  shall  be  rich,  and  the  man  who  labors  not  shall  be 
poor.  Such  is  the  intention  of  ng^ture,  and  such  is  the 
intention  of  the  Almighty  Maker  of  mankind. 

The  great  social  problem,  then,  that  cannot  fail  ere 
long  to  appear  in  the  arena  of  European  discussion  is, 
"  to  discover  such  a  system  as  shall  secure  to  every 
man  his  exact  share  of  the  natural  advantages  which 
the  Creator  has  provided  for  the  race;  while,  at  the 
same  time,  he  has  full  opportunity,  without  let  or  hin- 
drance, to  exercise  his  skill,  industry,  and  perseverance 
for  his  own  advantage." 

Of  this  problem,  we  maintain  that  there  can  be  but 
one  general  solution  possible;  and  the  whole  analogy 
of  scientific  discovery  assures  us  that,  sooner  or  later, 
the  problem  will  be  solved,  that  the  solution  will  be 
acknowledged,  and  that  it  will  be  transformed  from  an 
intellectual  dogma  into  a  practical  rule  of  action, 
thereby  presenting  a  realization,  in  outward  condition, 
of  those  propositions  which  the  reason  has  seen  to  be 
correct. 

The  solution  we  propound  is  the  following,  although, 
of  course,  there  is  no  supposition  that  any  general 
solution  can  be  immediately  applicable  to  the  circum- 
stances of  this  or  any  other  country. 

We  shall  speak  of  England  alone,  and  consider  the 
state  of  England  as  composed  of  an  indefinite  number 
of  members,  all  equal  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  all  on  a 
parity  with  regard  to  primary  political  function,  and 

119 


all  equally  eligible  to  fill  any  office  to  which  they  may 
be  elected  by  the  suffrages  of  the  majority.  All  au- 
thority of  man  is  of  course  excluded,  and  the  canon 
of  right  is  the  science  of  equity — that  is,  the  rules  of 
divine  and  immutable  justice,  as  capable  of  being  ap- 
prehended by  the  human  reason. 

[Even  if  it  were  true  that  there  ought  to  be  an  in- 
equality of  rights  among  the  individuals  of  the  human 
race,  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to  determine 
which  individuals  of  the  race  should  be  bom  to  more 
rights,  and  which  individuals  to  fewer  rights,  than 
their  fellows.*  An  inequality  of  rights  can  only  be 
based  on  superstition,  and  the  very  moment  reason  is 
substituted  for  superstition  in  political  science  (as  it 
has  been  in  physical  science),  that  moment  must  men 
admit  that  no  possible  means  are  known  by  which  an 
inequality  of  rights  could  possible  be  substantiated.] 

The  state  of  England,  then,  would  present  a  soil 
(including  the  soil  proper,  the  mines,  forests,  fisheries, 

*  "  Whilst  we  maintain  the  unity  of  the  human  species,  we  at 
the  same  time  repel  the  depressing  assumption  of  superior  and 
inferior  races  of  men."  "There  are  nations  more  susceptible  of 
cultivation,  more  highly  civilized,  more  ennobled  by  mental  cul- 
tivation, than  others,  but  none  in  themselves  nobler  than  others. 
All  are  in  like  degree  designed  for  freedom — a  freedom  which, 
in  the  ruder  conditions  of  society,  belongs  only  to  the  individ- 
ual, but  which,  in  social  states  enjoying  political  institutions, 
appertains  as  a  right  to  the  whole  body  of  the  community."  "If 
we  would  indicate  an  idea  which,  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  history,  has  ever  more  and  more  widely  extended  its  empire, 
or  which,  more  than  any  other,  testifies  to  the  much  contested, 
and  still  more  decidedly  misunderstood  perfectibility  of  the 
whole  human  race,  it  is  that  of  establishing  our  common  hu- 
manity— without  reference  to  religion,  nation,  or  color,  as  one 
fraternity,  one  great  community,  fitted  for  the  attainment  of 
one  object,  the  unrestrained  development  of  the  psychical  pow- 
ers.    This  is  the  ultimate  and  highest  aim  of  society,  identical 

120 


etc.;  in  fact,  that  portion  of  the  natural  earth  called 
England)  which  was  permanent,  and  a  population  that 
was  not  permanent,  but  renewed  by  successive  genera- 
tions. 

The  question  then  is,  "  What  system  will  secure  to 
every  individual  of  these  successive  generations  his 
portion  of  the  natural  advantages  of  England.'^"  Of 
this  problem,  we  maintain  that  there  is  but  one  solution 
possible. 

No  truth  can  be  more  absolutely  certain  as  an  in- 
tuitive proposition  of  the  reason,  than  that  "  an  ob- 
ject is  the  property  of  its  creator";  and  we  maintain 
that  creation  *  is  the  only  means  by  which  an  individ- 
ual right  to  property  can  be  generated.  Consequently, 
as  no  individual  and  no  generation  is  the  creator  of  the 

with  the  direction  implanted  by  nature  in  the  mind  of  man 
towards  the  indefinite  extension  of  his  existence.  He  regards 
the  earth  in  all  its  limits,  and  the  heavens  as  far  as  his  eye  can 
scan  their  bright  and  starry  depths,  as  inwardly  his  own,  given 
to  him  as  the  objects  of  his  contemplation,  and  as  a  field  for 
the  development  of  his  energies.  Even  the  child  longs  to  pass 
the  hills,  or  the  seas  which  enclose  his  manor-house;  yet,  when 
his  eager  steps  have  borne  him  beyond  those  limits,  he  pines 
like  the  plant  for  his  native  soil;  and  it  is  by  this  touching  and 
beautiful  attribute  of  man,  this  longing  for  that  which  is  un- 
known, audi  this  fond  remembrance  of  that  which  is  lost,  that  he 
is  spared  from  an  exclusive  attachment  to  the  present.  Thus 
deeply  rooted  in  the  innermost  nature  of  man,  and  even  en- 
joined upon  him  by  his  highest  tendencies,  the  recognition  of 
the  bond  of  humanity  becomes  one  of  the  noblest  leading  prin- 
ciples in  the  history  of  mankind." — Humboldt's  Cosmos,  vol.  i. 
p.  368;  Bohn's  Edition. 

*  In  the  arts,  man  creates  form;  in  political  economy,  he  cre- 
ates value;  and  in  politics,  he  creates  property.  And  as  the 
evolution  is  in  this  order — 1st,  the  Arts;  2d,  Political  Econ- 
omy; 3d,  Politics;  the  laws  of  political  economy  must  be  dis- 
covered before  there  can  be  a  system  of  property  rational  in 
its  theory  and  scientific  in  its  form. 

121 


substantive,  earth,  it  belongs  equally  to  all  tKe  exist- 
ing inhabitants.  That  is,  no  individual  has  a  special 
claim  to  more  than  another. 

But  while  on  the  one  hand  we  take  into  consideration 
the  object — ^that  is,  the  earth;  we  must  also  take  into 
consideration  the  subject — that  is,  man,  and  man's 
labor. 

The  object  is  the  common  property  of  all;  no  in- 
dividual being  able  to  exhibit  a  title  to  any  particular 
portion  of  it.  And  individual  or  private  property  is, 
the  increased  value  produced  by  individual  labor. 
Again,  in  the  earth  must  be  distinguished  the  per- 
manent earth  and  its  temporary  or  perishable  produc- 
tions. The  former — that  is,  the  permanent  earth — we 
maintain,  never  can  be  private  property;  and  every 
system  that  treats  it  as  such  must  necessarily  be  un- 
just. No  rational  basis  has  ever  been  exhibited  to  the 
world  on  which  private  right  to  any  particular  por- 
tion of  the  earth  could  possible  be  founded. 

But  though  the  permanent  earth  never  can  be  pri- 
vate property  (although  the  laws  may  call  it  so,  and 
may  treat  it  as  such),  it  must  be  possessed  by  indi- 
viduals for  the  purpose  of  cultivation,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  extracting  from  it  all  those  natural  objects 
which  man  requires. 

The  question  then  is,  upon  what  terms,  or  accord- 
ing to  what  system,  must  the  earth  be  possessed  by  the 
successive  generations  that  succeed  each  other  on  the 
surface  of  the  globe?  The  conditions  given  are — 
First,  That  the  earth  is  the  common  property  of  the 
race;  Second,  That  whatever  an  individual  produces 
by  his  own  labor  (whether  it  be  a  new  object,  made 
out  of  many  materials,  or  a  new  value  given  by  labor 
to  an  object  whose  form,  locality,  etc.,  may  be  changed) 
is  the  private  property  of  that  individual,  and  he  may 

122 


dispose  of  It  as  lie  pleases,  provided  he  does  not  inter- 
fere with  his  fellows.  Third,  The  earth  is  the  perpetual 
common  property  of  the  race,  and  each  succeeding 
generation  has  a  full  title  to  a  free  earth.  One  genera- 
tion cannot  encumber  a  succeeding  generation. 

And  the  condition  required  is,  such  a  system  as  shall 
secure  to  the  successive  individuals  of  the  race  their 
share  of  the  common  property,  and  the  opportunity 
without  interference,  of  making  as  much  private  prop- 
erty as  their  skill,  industry,  and  enterprise  would  enable 
them  to  make. 

The  scheme  that  appears  to  present  itself  most  natu- 
rally is,  the  general  division  of  the  soil,  portioning  It 
out  to  the  Inhabitants  according  to  their  number. 
Such  appears  to  be  the  only  system  that  suggests  it- 
self to  most  minds,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  objec- 
tions brought  forward  against  an  equalization  of 
property. 

But  men  must  go  forward,  never  backward.  To 
speak  of  a  division  of  lands  in  England  is  absurd. 
Such  a  division  would  be  as  useless  as  it  Is  improbable. 
But  it  is  more  than  useless — ^it  is  unjust;  and  unjust, 
not  to  the  present  so-called  proprietors,  but  to  the 
human  beings  who  are  continually  bein^  born  into  the 
world,  and  who  have  exactly  the  same  natural  right 
to  a  portion  that  their  predecessors  have. 

The  actual  division  of  the  soil  need  never  be  an- 
ticipated, nor  would  such  a  division  be  just,  if  the 
divided  portions  were  made  the  property  (legally,  for 
they  could  never  be  so  morally)   of  individuals. 

If,  then,  successive  generations  of  men  cannot  have 
their  fractional  share  of  the  actual  soil  (including 
mines,  etc.),  how  can  the  division  of  the  advantages 
of  the  natural  earth  be  effected.? 

By  the  division  of  its  annual  value  or  rent ;  that  is, 
123 


by  making  the  rent  of  the  soil  the  common  property 
of  the  nation.  That  is  (as  the  taxation  is  the  com- 
mon property  of  the  state) ,  by  taking  the  whole  of  the 
taxes  out  of  the  rents  of  the  soil,  and  thereby  abolish- 
ing all  other  kinds  of  taxation  whatever.  And  thus  all 
industry  would  be  absolutely  emancipated  from  every 
burden,  and  every  man  would  reap  such  natural  reward 
as  his  skill,  industry,  or  enterprise  rendered  legitimately 
his,  according  to  the  natural  law  of  free  competition.* 
This  we  maintain  to  be  the  only  theory  that  will  sat- 
isfy the  requirements  of  the  problem  of  natural  prop- 
erty. And  the  question  now  is :  how  can  the  division 
of  the  rent  be  effected.''  An  actual  division  of  the  rent 
— that  is,  the  payment  of  so  much  money  to  each  in- 
dividual— would  be  attended  with,  perhaps,  insuper- 
able inconveniences ;  neither  is  such  an  actual  division 
requisite,  every  requirement  being  capable  of  fulfilment 
without  it. 

We  now  apply  this  solution  to  England.  England 
forms  a  state;  that  is,  a  community  acting  through 
public  servants  for  the  administration  of  justice,  etc. 
In  the  actual  condition  of  England,  many  things  are 
at  present  unjust;  and  the  right  of  the  government 
to  tax  and  make  laws  for  those  who  are  excluded  from 
representation,  is  at  all  events  questionable.  How- 
ever, we  shall  make  a  few  remarks  on  England  as  she 
is,  and  on  England  as  she  ought  to  be;  that  is,  as  she 
would  be  were  the  rules  of  equity  reduced  to  practical 
operation. 

1st.  The  state   has   alienated   the  lands   to  private 

*  We  have  no  hesitation  whatever  in  predicting  that  all  civil- 
ized communities  must  ultimately  abolish  all  revenue  restrictions 
on  industry,  and  draw  the  whole  taxation  from  the  rents  of  the 
soil.  And  this  because  the  rents  of  the  soil  are  the  common 
produce  of  the  whole  labor  of  a  community. 

124) 


individuals  called  proprietors,  and  the  vast  majority 
of  Englishmen  are  born  to  their  labor,  minus  their 
share  of  the  taxation. 

2d.  This  taxation  of  labor  has  introduced  vast  sys- 
tems of  restriction  on  trades  and  industry.  Instead 
of  a  perfectly  free  trade  with  all  the  world,  England 
has  adopted  a  revenue  system  that  most  materially 
diminishes  both  the  amount  of  trade  and  its  profit. 
And,  instead  of  a  perfectly  free  internal  industry, 
England  has  adopted  an  excise  that  is  as  vexatious 
in  its  operation  as  can  well  be  conceived.  Both  the 
customs  and  excise  laws,  and  every  other  tax  on  indus- 
try, have  arisen  from  the  alienation  of  the  soil  from 
the  state;  and  had  the  soil  not  been  alienated,  no  tax 
whatever  would  have  been  requisite;  and  were  the  soil 
resumed  (as  it  undoubtedly  ought  to  be),  every  tax 
of  every  kind  and  character,  save  the  common  rent  of 
the  soil,  might  at  once  be  abolished,  with  the  whole 
army  of  collectors,  revenue-officers,  cruisers,  coast- 
guards, excisemen,  etc.,  etc. 

3d.  Taxation  can  only  be  on  land  or  labor.  [By 
land  we  mean  the  natural  earth,  not  merely  the  agri- 
cultural soil.]  These  are  the  two  radical  elements  that 
can  be  subjected  to  taxation,  capital  being  originally 
derived  from  one  or  the  other.  Capital  is  only 
hoarded  labor  or  hoarded  rent ;  and  as  all  capital  must 
be  derived  from  the  one  source  or  the  other,  all  taxa- 
tion of  capital  is  only  taxation  of  land  or  of  labor. 
Consequently  all  taxation  of  whatever  kind  is, — 1st, 
taxation  of  labor,  that  is,  a  deduction  from  the  natural 
remuneration  which  God  intended  the  laborer  to  derive 
from  his  exertions ;  or  2d,  taxation  of  land,  that  is, 
the  appropriation  of  the  current  value  of  the  natural 
earth  to  the  expenses  of  the  state. 

Now,  labor  is  essentially  private  property,  and 
125 


land  Is  not  essentially  private  property,  but  on  the 
contrary  is  the  common  inheritance  of  every  genera- 
tion of  mankind.  Where  the  land  is  taxed,  no  man 
is  taxed,  nor  does  the  taxation  of  land  interfere  in  any 
way  whatever  with  the  progress  of  human  industry. 
On  the  contrary,  the  taxation  of  land,  rightly  directed, 
might  be  made  to  advance  the  condition  of  the  coun- 
try to  a  high  degree  of  prosperity. 

4th.  For  the  expenses  of  a  state  there  must  be  a 
revenue,  and  this  revenue  must  be  derived  from  the 
taxation  of  labor,  or  from  the  rent  of  the  lands.  There 
is  no  other  alternative ;  either  the  rents  of  the  soil  must 
be  devoted  to  the  common  expenses  of  the  state,  or 
the  labor  of  individuals  must  be  interfered  with;  and 
restrictions,  supervisions,  prohibitions,  etc.,  must  be 
called  into  existence,  to  facilitate  the  collection  of  the 
revenue. 

The  political  history  of  landed  property  in  Eng- 
land, appears  to  have  been  as  follows: — 

1st.  The  lands  were  accorded  by  the  king  to  per- 
sons who  were  to  undertake  the  military  service  of  the 
kingdom. 

2d.  The  performance  of  this  military  service  was 
the  condition  on  which  individuals  held  the  national 
land. 

3d.  The  lands  were  at  first  held  for  life,  and  after- 
wards were  made  hereditary. 

4th.  The  military  service  was  abolished  by  the  law, 
and  a  standing  army  introduced. 

5th.  This  standing  army  was  paid  by  the  king. 

6th.  The  king,  having  abolished  the  military  serv- 
ices of  the  individuals  who  held  the  national  land,  re- 
sorted to  the  taxation  of  articles  of  consumption  for 
the  payment  of  the  army. 

The  lands  of  England,  therefore,  instead  of  being 
126 


held  on  condition  of  performing  the  military  service 
of  the  kingdom,  became  the  property  of  the  individuals 
who  held  them,  and  thus  the  State  of  England  lost  the 
lands  of  England.  And  the  military  service  of  the 
kingdom,  instead  of  being  performed  by  those  individ- 
uals who  held  the  national  land,  was  henceforth  (after 
the  reign  of  Charles  II.)  to  be  paid  for  by  the  gen- 
eral taxation  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country. 

Therefore  the  present  system  of  taxation,  and  the 
national  debt,  the  interest  of  which  is  procured  by  the 
forcible  taxation  of  the  general  inhabitants  of  Eng- 
land, are  both  due  to  the  alienation  of  the  lands  from 
the  State,  inasmuch  as  the  national  debt  (incurred  for 
war  expenses)  would  have  been  a  debt  upon  the  lands, 
and  not  a  debt  upon  the  people  of  England.  If,  there- 
fore, the  legislature  had  a  right  to  abolish  the  mili- 
tary services  of  those  who  held  the  national  land,  and 
thereby  to  impose  on  the  general  community  all  the 
liabilities  of  the  military  service  of  the  kingdom,  the 
legislature  has  the  same  right  to  abolish  the  general 
taxation  of  the  community,  and  to  allocate  to  those 
who  hold  the  land  all  the  expenses  that  have  been  in- 
curred, and  that  are  still  incurred,  for  the  war  charges 
of  the  kingdom. 

The  alienation  of  the  land  from  the  state,  and  its 
conversion  into  private  property,  was  the  first  grand 
step  that  laid  the  foundation  of  the  modem  system  of 
society  in  England, — a  system  that  presents  enormous 
wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few  aristocrats,  who  neither 
labor,  nor  even  pay  taxes  in  proportion  to  those  who 
do  labor;  and  a  vast  population  laboring  for  a  bare 
subsistence,  or  reduced  sometimes  by  millions  to  the 
condition  of  pauperism. 

So  long  as  this  system  is  allowed  to  continue,  it  ap- 
pears (from  the  constitution  of  the  earth,  and  of  man's 

127 


power  to  extract  from  it  a  maintenance)  an  absolute 
impossibility  that  pauperism  should  be  obliterated; 
inasmuch  as  the  burden  of  taxation  necessarily  falls 
on  labor,  and  more  especially  as  the  value  of  labor  is 
necessarily  diminished  wherever  there  is  a  sioil  al- 
located to  an  aristocracy.* 

The  three  events  which  have  at  last  left  the  lands 
of  England  in  the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  aristo- 
crats, are  these:  the  suppression  of  the  monasteries; 
the  abolition  of  military  tenures ;  and  the  enclosure 
of  the  common  lands. 

Yet  every  one  of  these  events  has  a  right  side  as 
well  as  a  wrong  side.  It  was  right  to  abolish  the  mon- 
asteries and  the  military  tenures,  but  it  was  iniquitous 
to  transform  the  lands  thus  obtained  into  the  property 
of  the  aristocracy. 

The  enclosure  of  the  common  lands,  again,  was  a 
proper  measure,  inasmuch  as  the  lands  were  produc- 
ing a  little;  and  every  measure  that  caused  the  lands 
to  produce  more  for  the  consumption  of  the  country 
was  so  far  beneficial.  It  would  have  been  quite  absurd 
to  leave  the  common  lands  in  pasture,  while  their  en- 
closure would  produce  for  the  service  of  the  country 

*  In  fact,  it  is  the  disposition  of  the  land  that  determines  the 
value  of  labor.  If  men  could  get  the  land  to  labor  on,  they 
would  manufacture  only  for  a  remuneration  that  afforded  more 
profit  than  God  has  attached  to  the  cultivation  of  the  earth. 
Where  they  cannot  get  the  land  to  labor  on  they  are  starved 
into  working  for  a  bare  subsistence.  There  is  only  one  reason 
why  the  labor  of  England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland,  is  of  so  little 
marketable  value,  and  that  reason  is,  the  present  disposition  of 
the  soil.  The  lands  of  England  have  been  disposed  of  accord- 
ing to  two  laws — the  law  of  the  strongest  and  the  law  of  the 
most  cunning;  hence  England's  pauperism  and  England's  moral 
degradation.  There  yet  remains  another  law,  and  its  reduction 
to  practice  will,  one  day  or  other,  regenerate  the  social  condi- 
tion of  the  population — the  law  of  equity. 

128 


a  much  larger  quantity  of  food.  But  these  allotments 
were  assigned,  under  enclosure  acts,  not  to  the  occu- 
piers, but  the  owners  of  the  cottages.  Thus  almost  a 
complete  severance  has  been  affected  between  the  Eng- 
lish peasantry  and  the  English  soil.  The  little  farmers 
and  cottiers  of  the  country  have  been  converted  into  day- 
laborers,  depending  entirely  upon  daily  earnings, 
which  may,  and  frequently  in  point  of  fact  do,  fail 
them.  They  have  now  no  land,  upon  the  produce  of 
which  they  can  fall  as  a  reserve  whenever  the  demand 
for  labor  happens  to  be  slack. 

And  now  it  is  necessary  to  inquire,  "Why  does  it 
happen,  that  in  the  richest  country  in  the  world  a  large 
portion  of  the  population  should  be  reduced  to  pauper- 
ism? "  Until  the  causes  of  pauperism  are  satisfactor- 
ily ascertained,  and  until  the  remedy  is  applied  to  the 
cause,  no  remedial  measure  can  do  more  than  alleviate 
the  evil.  Apply  the  remedy  to  the  cause,  and  the  evil 
is  eradicated.  The  cause,  or  at  least  one  of  the  great 
causes,  is  that  expressed  in  the  words  quoted  above, 
"  the  severance  between  the  English  peasantry  and  the 
English  soil ; "  and  until  the  peasantry  recover  that 
soil,  the  inhabitants  of  England  may  rest  satisfied  that 
the  curse  of  pauperism  will  pursue  them.  The  British 
public  can  never  be  sufficiently  reminded  that  there 
need  have  been  no  taxes  had  it  not  been  for  the  alien- 
ation of  the  land  from  the  state. 

No  truth  appears  to  be  more  satisfactorily  and 
more  generally  borne  out  by  the  history  of  modem 
Europe,  than  that  the  progression  of  men  in  the  mat- 
ter of  liberty  "  is  from  a  diversity  of  privileges  to- 
wards an  equality  of  rights;"  that  Is,  that  the  past 
progress  has  been  all  In  this  direction  since  the  maxi- 
mum of  diversity  prevailed  in  the  aspect  of  individual 
lord  and  individual  serf.     And  if  this  be  the  case,  it 

129 


cannot  be  an  unreasonable  conclusion,  that  if  suf- 
ficient time  be  allowed  for  the  evolution,  the  progress 
of  change  will  continue  to  go  on  till  some  ultimate  con- 
dition is  evolved.  And  that  ultimate  condition  can 
only  be  at  the  point  where  diversity  of  privilege  dis- 
appears, and  every  individual  in  the  state  is  legally 
entitled  to  identically  the  same  political  functions. 
Diversities  of  office  there  may  be,  and  there  must  be, 
but  diversity  of  rights  there  cannot  be  without  in- 
justice. 

Such,  then,  is  the  theoretic  ultimatum  that  satisfies 
the  reason  with  regard  to  its  equity,  and  such  is  the 
historic  ultimatum  that  the  reason  infers  from  the  past 
history  of  mankind.  Such,  then,  is  the  point  towards 
which  societies  are  progressing;  and  when  that  point 
is  reached,  the  ultimatum  of  equity  is  achieved,  and 
the  present  course  of  historical  evolution  is  complete. 

The  next  steps  required  to  lead  society  towards  its 
final  destination  are  questions  for  the  practical  states- 
man. 

Diversity  of  opinion  may  arise  between  two  men  who 
are  both  apparently  in  the  right,  if  the  attention  of 
the  one  be  directed  to  what  is  theoretically  right,  and 
the  attention  of  the  other  to  what  is  practically  ex- 
pedient as  the  next  step  which  the  present  balance  of 
powers  in  the  state  renders  possible.  The  one  takes 
the  unchangeable  and  imperishable  element  of  man, 
the  objective  reason,  crowns  it  with  imperial  author- 
ity, and  demands  that  all  should  at  once  acknowledge 
its  supremacy.  The  other  takes  the  variable  element 
of  man — his  subjective  condition — and,  rejecting 
every  dogma  that  claims  to  be  absolute,  discourses 
only  on  the  proximate  possibility  of  improving  that 
condition. 

Between  these  two  parties,  therefore,  there  is  not 
130 


so  much  a  perpetual  warfare,  as  a  perpetual  misun- 
derstanding. Their  point  of  view  is  different.  They 
stand  on  different  elevations,  and  have  quite  a  differ- 
ent range  of  horizon. 

To  a  certain  extent,  both  are  necessary — both  are 
workers  in  the  great  field  of  human  improvement  and 
of  man's  amelioration.  Incomprehensible  as  they  must 
ever  be  to  each  other  (till  the  last  final  item  of  change 
shall  bring  both  to  an  identity  of  purpose),  they  are 
fellow-laborers  in  the  scheme  of  human  evolution.  The 
one  devises  afar  off  the  general  scheme  of  progress ; 
the  other  carries  the  proximate  measures  of  that 
scheme  into  practical  operation.  The  one  is  the  hydro- 
grapher  who  constructs  the  chart;  the  other,  the 
mariner  who  navigates  the  ship,  ignorant  perhaps 
what  may  be  its  final  destination. 

The  theorist,  too  often  trusting  to  his  individual 
perceptions,  forgets  that  propositions  which  appear 
to  him  of  absolute  certitude,  can  never  be  accepted  by 
the  world  until  they  have  received  a  far  wider  authen- 
tication than  any  one  man  could  possibly  bestow  upon 
them.  And  though  perchance  he  might  evolve  some 
propositions  which  should  ultimately  be  able  to  stand 
their  ground,  experience  will  prove  that  the  diffusion 
of  truth  is  no  less  necessary  than  its  discovery.  Truth, 
like  leaven,  must  pervade  the  mass  before  the  requisite 
transformation  is  effected.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
man  of  practice  moves,  for  the  most  part,  as  he  is  im- 
pelled by  the  convictions  of  the  multitude,  and  his  ob- 
ject is  not  to  theorize  but  to  design  the  requisite 
changes,  and  to  carry  them  into  execution.  The 
theories  of  to-day  he  regards  with  indifference  or 
aversion ;  tliey  are  of  no  practical  avail ;  he  is  pressed 
with  the  necessity  of  action,  and  forgets  that  he  moves 
in  action  because  the  multitude  have  moved  in  mind; 

131 


and  that  the  multitude  moved  in  mind  because  they 
had  imbibed  the  theories  of  former  speculators,  and 
changed  their  credence  under  the  influence  'of  convic- 
tion. He  forgets  that  change  of  action  comes  from 
change  of  credence,  and  that  change  of  credence  comes 
from  theoretic  speculation.  He  forgets  that  if  there 
were  no  theories  there  would  be  no  change,  and  if  no 
change  no  necessity  for  him  to  execute  it. 

In  assigning,  then,  a  theoretic  ultimatum  to  man's 
political  progress,  we  posit — 

That  absolute  equality  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  with- 
out the  slightest  distinction  of  individuals  or  classes, 
is  the  ultimatum  of  political  progression ;  and  this  ul- 
timatum is  the  only  condition  that  satisfies  the  re- 
quirements of  the  reason,  and  the  only  condition  that 
presents  a  rational  termination  to  those  changes 
which,  according  to  history,  have  been  gradually  tak- 
ing place  for  centuries. 


182 


CHAPTER    IV 

SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND    WHICH    HAVE   RULED 

SOCIETY 

BUT  while  an  equality  of  human  rights  may  be 
.  posited  as  a  logical  ultimatum  that  satisfies 
the  reason  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
practical  ultimatum  is  the  organization  of  society  on 
true  principles,  instead  of  on  false  principles. 

In  Britain,  the  constitution  of  civil  society,  like  that 
of  ecclesiastical  society,  has  only  once  been  subjected 
to   systematic   arrangement. 

The  Church,  as  one  association,  presented  itself  un- 
der the  form  of  the  Papacy;  the  state,  as  one  associa- 
tion, presented  Itself  under  the  form  of  the  feudal 
system.  The  Papacy  was  the  complete  organization 
of  the  Church  on  false  principles ;  the  feudal  system 
was  the  complete  organization  of  the  state  on  false 
principles ;  and  the  history  of  modern  society  is  the 
history  of  the  gradual  destruction  of  those  two  great 
systems. 

The  feudal  system  was  organization  on  false  prin- 
ciples, but  It  was  organization ;  and  so  long  as  the 
organization  was  genuine  and  spontaneous,  the  feudal 
system  was  the  true  and  living  expression  of  man's 
necessities.  The  leader  was  a  leader,  a  lion-heart  who 
could  dare  and  do.  He  led  because  he  could  lead,  and 
was  followed  from  instinct,  which  knows  its  leader  and 
follows  him.     But  when  the  feudal  system  was  trans- 

133 


planted  from  the  field  to  the  court  the  life  of  feudalism 
was  gone. 

It  became  hereditary,  and  as  neither  courage  nor 
skill  are  hereditary,  hereditary  warriors  are  mummies. 
When  the  force  organization  of  society  gave  way 
to  the  law  organization  of  society,  the  hereditary  prin- 
ciple was  transplanted  into  the  legislature,  and  men 
became  hereditary  legislators.  But  wisdom  is  no  more 
hereditary  than  courage  and  skill;  and  the  hereditary 
system  of  legislation — the  parchment  feudalism — be- 
came as  inefficient  as  the  hereditary  system  of  defence 
— the  pennon  feudalism.  A  new  element  was  required, 
and  a  new  element  appeared — wealth  produced  by 
trade, — not  merely  trade,  but  trade  beginning  to  be 
organized  and  systematized. 

It  must  be  observed  that  the  feudal  system  had  no 
place  for  the  trader.  The  trader  is  a  non-feudal  ele- 
ment in  society,  and  belongs  to  a  different  system  of 
organization.  His  day  is  fast  approaching,  and  he 
will  ultimately  push  out  hereditary  feudalism  from  the 
direction  of  the  state.  He  began  without  a  place, 
without  a  rank,  and  almost  without  ordinary  protec- 
tion. He  asserted  his  claims,  however,  and  at  length 
society  began  to  admit  a  portion  of  the  trade  principle. 
This,  like  everything  else,  began  on  false  grounds; 
with  privileges,  charters  and  a  hundred  other  inter- 
ruptions to  the  laws  of  nature.  Finally  the  burgesses 
were  tolerated  because  they  had  mioney  and  could  pay 
taxes,  and  gradually  the  traders  have  pushed  their 
way  against  the  parchment  lords.  The  Commons  have 
taken  up  the  power.  The  Commons  are  partly  knights 
who  represent  proprietors  of  land,  and  partly  citizens 
and  burgesses,  chosen  by  the  mercantile  interest  of 
the  nation.    The  lord^  have  retired  in  solemn  decency, 

134 


and  the  knights  and  burgesses  direct  the  affairs  of 
Britain. 

To  suppose,  however,  that  this  change  is  ultimate, 
would  be  contrary  to  all  the  teaching  of  history. 
Parchment  lordship  is  contrary  to  the  credence  of 
modern  times.  Men  are  beginning  to  believe  that  he 
who  does  not  work  ought  not  to  be  supported,  as  those 
who  do  work  support  the  whole.  The  war  lord  worked, 
and  worked  hard.  He  fought,  or  was  ready  to  fight, 
and  his  life  was  at  stake  for  his  wages.  He  deserved 
his  reward.  He  was  a  man  who  led  men;  and  so  long 
as  he  was  a  real  war  lord,  and  war  was  the  real  pur- 
suit, he  was  a  genuine  man,  and  filled  an  office  for 
which  men  were  willing  to  accord  him  wages.  When 
he  became  a  parchment  lord,  he  still  worked.  He 
made  laws  and  ruled  the  country.  He  was  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  necessary,  like  the  bishop,  who  once  worked 
also,  and  ruled  the  church.  And  in  former  days, 
the  rule  of  the  Church  was  no  miore  a  jest  than  the 
rule  of  the  state.  It  was  a  real  office — a  thing  not  of 
silks  and  drawing-rooms ;  but  of  the  translation  of  the 
Word  of  God,  and  appearance  at  the  martyr's  stake 
when  requisite.  The  bishop  was  a  pastor,  a  real, 
genuine  pastor,  who  had  a  flock  and  cared  for  it; 
and  even  now,  if  it  were  possible  to  reanimate  the 
bishop,  and  make  him  again  a  leader,  a  genuine  leader 
of  men,  there  is  no  man  in  the  country  who  could 
count  followers  with  him.  But  the  office  is  no  longer 
requisite. 

Every  human  system  dies,  but  beneath  the  surface 
of  the  human  systems  there  is  a  reality  which  does  not 
die — a  reality  which  evolves.  All  systems  preserved 
by  law  beyond  their  natural  existence  are  mummy 
systems.      So  long  as  the  credences  last,  the  systems 

135 


are  natural,  and  do  not  decay,  but  when  the  credence 
advances,  the  system  is  no  longer  the  expression  of 
man's  requirements ;  and  the  system  if  preserved  can 
do  evil,  and  only  evil.  With  the  advance  of  credence 
the  system  ought  to  advance  also ;  for  man  in  perpetu- 
ating systems  perpetuates  only  the  expression  of  his 
former  ignorance.  The  trading  community  are  fast, 
very  fast,  pushing  out  the  parchment  holders:  mer- 
chants are  now  the  notables,  the  men  of  note  who  ex- 
press the  requirements  of  the  country. 

But  the  pursuit  of  money  is  no  more  the  ultimate 
pursuit  of  man  than  the  pursuit  of  war  or  pleasure. 
The  trader,  in  his  turn,  must  cede  the  first  place  to 
those  who  express  man's  higher  requirements.  Money 
is  a  means,  not  an  end;  and  when  those  who  represent 
the  means  have  played  their  part,  those  who  represent 
something  beyond  the  means  will  assert  their  claims, 
and  push  the  trader  from  the  direction  of  the  State. 
Man  is  a  rational  and  a  moral  being,  and  his  rational 
and  moral  nature  must  ultimately  prevail  to  determine 
the  arrangements  of  society. 

Out  of  the  courtly  pleasures  grew  courtly  policies, 
and  it  became  the  ambition  to  be  a  statesman.  An 
age  of  policy  ensued,  but  the  policy  statesman  is  mak- 
ing way  for  the  trader.  The  trader's  day  is  now,  and 
every  day  will  see  the  policy  and  pleasure  laws  clear- 
ing away  because  they  interfere  with  trade.  The 
policy  system  is  not  yet  dead,  only  dying. 

Trade  imperceptibly,  and  almost  unconsciously, 
begins  to  influence  policy,  not  by  denying  that  policy 
ought  to  rule,  but  by  discovering  and  making  mani- 
fest that  certain  acts  which  were  assumed  to  be  politic 
are  actually  disadvantageous;  that  they  involve  loss 
and  not  profit,  and  consequently  that  they  ought  not 
to  be  done;  and  the  moment  acts  of  policy  come  to  be 

136 


accurately  measured  instead  of  having  their  value 
assumed,  the  policy  system  is  defunct,  and  political 
economy,  which  has  grown  out  of  it,  supersedes  it. 
That  political  economists  will  ere  long  take  the  direc- 
tion of  the  state,  appears  beyond  a  doubt. 

But  neither  is  political  economy  the  ultimate.  It  is  a 
step  beyond  policy,  as  the  reign  of  court  policy  was  a 
step  beyond  the  reign  of  court  pleasure.  But  it  is 
logically  insufficient.  There  are  questions  which  it 
cannot  answer,  or  dare  not  answer.  It  must  take  the 
money  management  -of  the  state,  and  determine  the 
mode  in  which  taxes  should  be  levied,  as  well  as  the 
amount  of  taxes;  and,  in  determining  the  mode  in 
which  taxes  ought  to  be  levied,  it  must  come  between 
two  parties, — the  laborers  who  create  the  wealth  of 
the  country,  and  the  landlords  who  consume  the  rents. 
This  position  will  bring  political  economy  to  a  stand. 
The  difficulty  is  insoluble  to  political  economy,  and 
a  new  system  must  grow,  develop,  and  assume  the 
direction  of  the  country.  This  new  system  is  neces- 
sarily politics,  or  the  science  of  equity. 

Political  economy  professes  to  teach  how  value 
grows,  increases,  accumulates,  and  who  makes  it.  The 
latter  question,  solved  by  a  fair  exposition  of  ascer- 
tained facts,  first  systematized,  and  then  reduced  to  a 
law,  lands  society  on  the  grand  question,  "  To  whom 
does  it  belong?"  With  this  question  political  economy, 
as  such,  has  no  concern.  It  is  beyond  political  econ- 
omy, higher  than  political  economy,  and  is  what  polit- 
ical economy  is  not, — it  is  final  in  theory.  Let  polit- 
ical economy  be  as  perfect  as  any  science  can  possibly 
be,  beyond  it  there  lies  the  question.  To  whom — to 
what  persons — does  the  created  value  belong?  And 
first  and  foremost  must  come  the  question  of  the  land. 
"  Who  is  the  proprietor  of  the  created  value?  "     This 

1S7 


question  arises  necessarily  so  soon  as  political  economy 
has  discovered  who  creates  the  value.  And  thus,  poli- 
tics, or  the  science  of  equity,  springs  necessarily  in 
chronological  order  out  of  political  economy;  and 
when  economists  have  directed  the  state  affairs  up  to 
those  questions  which  they  cannot  answer,  they  must 
cede  the  first  place  to  the  true  politicians,  or  them- 
selves become  true  politicians.  And  when  that  period 
arrives,  the  political  evolution  is  complete,  and  there 
is  the  reign  of  equity  or  justice. 

On  these  grounds,  imperfectly  as  we  have  advanced 
them,  may  be  projected  the  natural  probability  of  a 
period  yet  to  come,  when  justice  shall  be  realized 
on  earth,  to  be  followed  by  a  period  when  Christianity 
shall  reign  supreme,  and  call  into  real  and  systematic 
action  the  higher  and  nobler  sentiments  of  man. 

CONCLUSION 

Beneath  the  outward  formula  of  science  there  lies 
the  everlasting  truth,  as  beneath  the  outward  forms 
of  nature  there  lies  the  everlasting  power. 

Posterior  to  the  science  of  equity  comes  theology — 
natural  theology.  By  natural  theology  we  do  not 
mean  that  which  is  accepted  by  the  Church,  but  we 
mean  such  a  natural  theology  as  shall  convince  intel- 
lect as  intellect,  and  thereby  produce  a  unity  of  cre- 
dence for  the  whole  race  of  men. 

We  have,  therefore,  to  inquire  what  kind  of  the- 
ology can  be  taught  by  reason,  assuming  in  the  first 
place  that  natural  theology  is  impossible  in  its  com- 
plete form  until  men  have  arrived  at  a  knowledge  of 
the  natural  universe. 

Against  the  traditions  of  false  gods  and  erroneous 
worship,   science   enters   the  lists.     It   assumes   as  its 

138 


first  proposition,  to  base  credence  on  evidence,  and 
thereby  to  evolve  truth  instead  of  error  or  supersti- 
tion. Consequently  it  will  invariably  manifest  itself 
in  scepticism.  Scepticism  in  its  legitimate  form  is 
d'oubt,  and  doubt  is  one  of  the  great  elements  of 
humanity  absolutely  requisite  to  place  knowledge  on 
a  secure  basis.  Truth  can  have  nothing  to  fear,  but 
everything  to  hope,  from  the  most  accurate  survey 
that  men  can  possibly  take  of  the  region  open  to  cog- 
nition. 

Scepticism  has  to  achieve  the  destruction  of  super- 
stition, but  in  the  place  of  superstition  it  has  nothing 
to  substitute.  That  man  should  permanently  refrain 
from  a  theological  credence  is  out  of  the  question. 
There  is  either  nothing  whatever,  or  there  is  some  per- 
manently enduring  something  that  was  anterior  to 
man,  that  underlies  all  the  operations  of  nature,  and 
that  constructed,  and  continues  to  construct,  all  the 
varied  mechanisms,  physical  and  mental,  with  which 
man  is  acquainted;  and  this  permanent  element  which 
man  posits,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  his  reason, 
is  what  is  meant  by  God.  God  therefore  has  a  neces- 
sary existence  to  the  human  mind ;  and  the  main  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  there  is  a  God — ^but  what,  in  fact, 
are  the  attributes  of  God.? 

That  there  Is  a  proof  of  God's  existence,  and  of  his 
power  and  wisdom,  so  perfectly  conclusive  that  it 
shall  command  the  assent  of  the  reason  of  mankind, 
we  have  no  possible  doubt ;  but  that  such  an  argument 
can  be  drawn  from  physical  science  (further  than 
power  is  concerned),  we  by  no  means  admit. 

In  the  works  of  nature,  and  the  operations  of  nature 
man  intuitively  perceives  by  his  reason  a  power  of 
force;  and  the  primordial  force,  if  we  make  nothing 

139 


objective  but  matter,  necessarily  lands  us  in  panthe- 
ism, which  is  at  present  the  theolog-Ical  credence  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  scientific  men  on  the  Continent. 
And  out  of  this  pantheism  there  is  no  scientific  exit 
until  mind  is  made  objective,  and  the  facts  of  mind 
are  brought  to  bear  on  the  facts  of  physics;  so  that 
what  was  before  only  a  primordial  force  becomes  an 
intelligent  agent,  of  whom  power  is  the  attribute. 
Pantheism  is  the  theology  of  physical  science;  and 
if  there  were  no  other  science  beyond  physical  science, 
pantheism  would  be  the  last  final  form  of  scientific 
credence. 

The  physical  world  does  not  present  within  the 
field  of  contemplation  the  operation  of  mind.  For 
this  we  must  turn  to  man.  Man,  when  made  objective, 
is  found  to  be  possessed  of  intellectual  capacity,  of 
executive  power,  and  also  of  a  moral  nature,  which 
lays  on  him  the  imperative  obligation  of  designing 
certain  ends,  and  of  refraining  from  designing  certain 
other  ends.  And  as  man  is  as  much  a  portion  of 
nature  as  is  matter,  we  must  have  a  power  of  such  a 
character  as  would  account  for  this  moral  nature  of 
man,  and  to  have  this  we  must  have  the  transformation 
of  mere  natural  theology  Into  moral  theology.  Men 
may  assume  the  character  of  the  Moral  Ruler  of  the 
universe,  but  proven,  in  the  same  manner  as  any  other 
portion  of  science,  it  never  can  be,  till  moral  science 
is  actually  achieved  and  taught  as  a  branch  of  knowl- 
edge. 

Nor  are  we  to  admit  mere  assumptions,  and  pre- 
sumptions, and  speculations,  as  science  in  the  world 
of  morals  any  more  than  in  the  world  of  matter. 
Either  it  Is  true  that  a  definite  rule  of  moral  action 
can  be  discovered  by  the  reason,  or  It  follows  of  course 
that  rules  of  action  are  not  naturally  imperative;  and 

140 


if  they  be  not  naturally  imperative  it  can  only  be  a 
superstition  to  consider  them  as  obligatory. 

We  have  already  considered  human  action  as  far 
as  it  involves  the  laws  of  political  economy  which 
treats  of  the  production  of  wealth.  After  that  comes 
social  science,  treating  of  the  distribution  of  wealth, 
and  finally,  politics,  which  treats  of  the  laws  which 
should  regulate  interference. 

These  last  two  alone  are  entitled  to  the  name  of 
moral  science,  which  lays  down  the  laws  of  human 
duty.  Thus,  the  consideration  of  man's  relation  to 
man  is  the  first  period  at  which  moral  science  makes 
its  appearance. 

Every  attempt  to  make  a  more  complete  theology 
than  science  really  warrants,  only  produces  scepticism 
on  the  part  of  those  who  find  an  inconclusive  argu- 
ment advanced  as  a  demonstration.  Moral  theology, 
strictly  and  purely  scientific,  is  at  present  impossible 
(that  is,  impossible  for  the  world)  :  and  impossible, 
because  moral  science  has  not  yet  made  its  appear- 
ance, and  because  moral  theology  depends  on  moral 
science,  and  is  an  inference  from  it.  In  Britain,  of 
course.  Scripture  is  the  source  of  theology,  and  moral 
theology  is  derived  from  the  written  revelation.  But 
on  the  Continent,  philosophy  is  the  theology  of  the 
great  mass  of  thinking  men ;  and  their  theology,  de- 
rived from  the  revelation  of  nature,  does  actually  fol- 
low the  development  of  science.  And  as  scepticism 
was  first  posted  with  its  negation,  and  then  pantheism 
with  its  more  general  affirmation,  and  now,  instead 
of  a  mere  power,  an  intelligent  power  is  beginning 
to  be  seen  as  absolutely  necessary  to  explain  the  phe- 
nomena of  nature,  we  may  rest  assured  that,  with  the 
development  of  social  science  and  moral  science  (which 
cannot  fail  to  undergo  their  evolution  in  their  order), 

141 


there  will  arise  necessarily  a  moral  theology,  and  the 
world  will  be  indoctrinated  with  the  theology  of  a 
moral  Deity. 

Now,  if  it  be  true  that  all  human  science  ends  in 
morals,  and  that  natural  theology  follows  the  develop- 
ment of  science  (and  it  can  never  legitimately  be  in 
advance  of  science),  then  natural  theology  will  come 
ultimately  to  be  a  purely  scientific  moral  theology, 
and  will  thus  be  brought  to  the  point  where  man  iden- 
tifies the  God  of  Nature  with  the  God  of  Scripture. 
And  thus  the  long-lost  unity  will  be  once  more  restored. 


THE  END 


143 


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